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ABSTRACT
The first essay, Creditor Rights and Entrepreneurship: Evidence from Fraudulent Transfer
Law, examines entrepreneurship following the adoption of modern-day fraudulent transfer
laws in the United States. These laws remove the burden of proof from creditors attempting
to claw back funds that were transferred out of failing businesses. They are particularly
important for entrepreneurs whose personal assets are often commingled with those of the
firm. Using establishment-level data from the U.S. Census Bureau, I document declines in
startup entry, churning among entrants, and closures of existing ventures after the passage
of these laws. Thus, strengthening creditor rights can impede entrepreneurial activity and
the process of reallocating capital from failing to new businesses.
In the second essay, Creditor Rights, Technology Adoption, and Productivity: Plant-Level
Evidence, I analyze the impact of stronger creditor rights on productivity using plant-level
data from the U.S. Census Bureau. Following the adoption of anti-recharacterization laws
that give lenders greater access to the collateral of firms in financial distress, total factor
productivity of treated plants increases by 2.6 percent. This effect is mainly observed among
plants belonging to financially constrained firms. Furthermore, treated plants invest in
capital of younger vintage and newer technology, and become more capital-intensive. My
results suggest that stronger creditor rights relax borrowing constraints and help firms adopt
more efficient production technologies.
The third essay, Creditor Control Rights and Resource Allocation within Firms, exam-
ines the within-firm resource allocation and restructuring outcomes at firms violating debt
covenants. We use establishment-level data from the U.S. Census Bureau to demonstrate
that covenant violations are followed by reductions in employment, investment, and more
frequent establishment closures among violating firms’ noncore business lines and underper-
forming establishments. These changes are pronounced when key lenders have prior industry
experience. Thus, refocusing operations and improving productive efficiency via resource re-
allocation are important channels through which enhanced creditor rights can facilitate the
turnaround of firms in technical default.
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CHAPTER 1
CREDITOR RIGHTS AND ENTREPRENEURSHIP:
EVIDENCE FROM FRAUDULENT TRANSFER
LAW
1.1. Introduction
The unsecured creditors of a failing small business are not in a position of significant au-
thority. High fixed costs associated with Chapter 11 usually destroy any of the value of the
business that would have gone to unsecured creditors. Unsecured creditors can file for an
involuntary Chapter 7 liquidation of the business, but this often requires coordination, and
managers of the business can counter with a conversion to Chapter 11. In fact, most small
businesses deal with insolvency by relying on state rather than federal bankruptcy law. But
state laws, which generally concern secured creditors, can be even less friendly to unsecured
creditors. One of the few protections afforded to the unsecured creditors of a small business
lies in fraudulent transfer law.
Consider, as an example, a grocer whose business is failing. If he were to take the remaining
cash out of the registers and deposit it into a bank account while his unsecured creditors—his
fruit and vegetable vendors—remained unpaid, this would constitute a fraudulent transfer.
The vendors would have the right to sue him in state court according to fraudulent transfer
law and be repaid out of the funds that were originally in the cash register. Fraudulent
transfer laws come in two forms: actual fraud, in which the burden of proof lies on the
creditors to prove that the business owner intended to defraud them, and constructive fraud,
in which the burden of proof lies on the business owner to prove that the transfer was an
equivalent exchange of value. In the example of the grocer, an unsecured creditor acting as
a plaintiff under actual fraud law would have to prove that the grocer intended to defraud.
Under constructive fraud law, by contrast, it is straightforward that the business received
far less than equivalent value as a result of the transfer (i.e., nothing).1
In this paper, we document the effects of switching from actual to constructive fraud law on
entrepreneurial activity. As motivated by the example above, such a regime change represents
1In reality, a transfer such as the grocer’s would probably be overturned according to actual fraud law
as well. This simple example illustrates the difference between a system in which the burden of proof is on
creditors and one in which the burden of proof is on the business owner.
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an increase in expected payoffs to unsecured creditors in adverse scenarios. It therefore should
increase the availability of unsecured credit, boosting new business formation. At the same
time, however, risk-averse entrepreneurs may respond by declining to enter into new ventures
because of the lower payoffs they face in insolvency.2 Whether the net effect on business
formation is positive or negative is an open question.
Fraudulent transfer law in the United States. was originally borrowed from England, which
relied on the actual definition of fraud. While most states gradually adopted the constructive
definition of fraud in the early part of the 20th century, a subset of states updated their legal
definitions of fraud more recently—Iowa, Kansas, Vermont, and the District of Columbia in
the period from 1992 to 2007. This allows us to examine the effects of the staggered adoption
of these law changes for entrepreneurship in a difference-in-differences (DiD) framework.
Drawing on establishment-level data from the U.S. Census Bureau, we find that states
experience a significant decline in entrepreneurial activity in the years following the adoption
of constructive fraud laws. We observe substantial declines in both startup entry and closure
rates after the passage of constructive fraud laws. The decrease in entry rates occurs among
the smallest businesses that succeed or fail within three years of starting up, suggesting
creditors are not simply screening out riskier borrowers. We find similar negative effects
when we compare startup entry and exit with adjustments made by incumbent, multi-unit
firms that are unlikely to capture entrepreneurial activity.
While central focus of this paper is on small businesses, large businesses may rely on
fraudulent transfer law as well, usually through bankruptcy.3 We posit that the impact of
constructive fraud laws, to the extent that they hinder business growth, should be stronger
for startups because, first, entrepreneurs are more likely to have personal assets commingled
with those of the business, and second, large businesses are more likely to reorganize or
have control over matters of jurisdiction in insolvency. To support these views, we examine
the heterogeneity of the average treatment effect. Sorting based on organizational form and
size, we find that the effects are driven by single-unit firms and the smallest firms with
between one and five employees. These effects hold even within state-year-industry cells,
which alleviates the concern that coincident state-level unobservable factors such as the
non-economic legal environment or social dynamics may have led to the decline in startup
creation. Furthermore, we find that effects are present only for firms in industries with low
levels of startup capital, where owners’ financing using personal assets as collateral is more
2Landier (2005) shows theoretically that debtor protection in bankruptcy is more suitable for en-
trepreneurship and innovation by fostering experimentation. In a related analysis, Manso (2011) demon-
strates that the optimal compensation scheme to promote innovation tolerates failure.
3Even though bankruptcy is a federal procedure, provisions exist that allow courts to defer to state law
on matters of fraudulent transfer.
2
likely to be feasible.
Because state laws are often open to interpretation, it can be difficult to measure the
strictness with which various statutes apply. An additional challenge is that during our
event window, only the District of Columbia, Iowa, Kansas, and Vermont underwent drastic
fraudulent transfer law changes. To ensure a broad effect, we show that the results hold for
each of these states individually. We run additional tests including Indiana, which had some
case law on constructive fraud prior to the passage of new statutory law, and find consistent
results. The inclusion of states that had some preexisting statutory law on constructive
fraud and then passed comprehensive definitions of constructive fraud, however, weaken the
results. We also check for robustness by excluding Alaska, which never passed constructive
fraud laws, excluding states that were treated immediately prior to the sample horizon, and
excluding Louisiana, which went through a period of uncertainty regarding the statutory law
on fraudulent transfers. In all of these tests, our results hold. Finally, we show our results
do not reflect changes to related laws on insider preferences, which were sometimes enacted
alongside the redefinition of fraud.
Taken together, our findings indicate that expanding laws that allow unsecured creditors to
reclaim a higher fraction of assets upon business failure discourage startup creation and ex-
tend the survival of old ventures. This suggests that entrepreneurs may become constrained
in their ability to redeploy assets into new and potentially more productive uses.
Our paper contributes to the literature on the relationship between law, credit markets,
and growth that began with the work of La Porta et al. (1998). This literature initially con-
nected strong creditor protections with favorable credit market conditions in cross-country
analyses, evolving to show that in some circumstances, creditor rights might be too strong
and have adverse consequences.4 Our approach relates to recent studies that use within-
country regulatory changes to identify exogenous variation in creditor rights. Several papers
analyze the effects of debt recovery tribunals in India that reduce the cost of enforcing debt
contracts. Notably, Visaria (2009) finds that these tribunals improve repayment behavior and
make loan terms more favorable, and von Lilienfeld-Toal et al. (2012) find that they promote
access to credit only for large borrowers, while weakening access to credit for small borrow-
ers. Vig (2013) observes a similar negative impact of a 2002 law in India that strengthened
4Cross-country evidence suggests that countries with stronger investor and creditor protections have larger
and more robust capital markets (La Porta et al., 1997; Giannetti, 2003; Qian and Strahan, 2007), and better
banking systems with higher credit growth (Levine and Zervos, 1998; Djankov et al., 2007). Haselmann et al.
(2010) demonstrate, more specifically, that countries that improved collateral laws were met with stronger
credit markets and increases in economic activity (see also Campello and Larrain, 2016; Calomiris et al.,
2016). In contrast, Acharya and Subramanian (2009) find that changes to bankruptcy codes in favor of
creditors result in lower investment in R&D and levels of innovation. Similarly, Acharya et al. (2011) find
that countries with strong creditor rights have lower levels of risk-taking and operating performance.
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the rights of secured creditors. He finds that the reform led to reductions in asset growth
and a substitution from secured to unsecured debt, consistent with large firms with multiple
financing options contracting around a liquidation bias among creditors. Our contribution is
to examine the importance of creditor rights for entry and exit rates among entrepreneurial
firms in the U.S. economy. We focus on a legal protection that affects unsecured creditors,
in contrast to related work that considers secured creditor rights in isolation. Our results
suggest that strengthening unsecured creditor rights—by allowing for greater access to en-
trepreneurs’ assets during insolvency—can impede business formation and the process of
reallocating capital from failed to entering businesses.
Our paper is also related to the literature on personal bankruptcy exemptions. While
these exemptions are the most basic protection of an entrepreneur’s assets, they only apply
to certain property such as a home or a vehicle, they are relatively limited in some states, and
they do not apply to owners of a corporation or LLC. Thus, in some sense, transfers can be
thought of as a complementary asset protection strategy, once personal bankruptcy exemp-
tions have been exhausted.5 Gropp et al. (1997) first connected state personal bankruptcy
exemptions to credit conditions, finding that states with high exemptions eased credit con-
ditions for wealthy borrowers and tightened them for low-asset households. Cerqueiro and
Penas (2014) find such exemptions reduce credit available to the owner-managers of unlim-
ited liability companies. Most similar in spirit to our study of real effects is Cerqueiro et al.
(2015), who find that higher exemption limits reduce the number of patents generated by
small firms in the United States, suggesting that reductions in credit supply outweigh the
potential risk-sharing benefits when it comes to exploration by innovators. We complement
this work by, first, examining more broadly the effects of creditor rights on the various as-
pects of the entrepreneurial process and, second, by considering a unique and previously
unexplored aspect of creditor protection: the definition of fraudulent transfers.
1.2. Institutional Background
When a business becomes insolvent, all of the transactions made in its recent history become
a matter of scrutiny. This is because owners may have undergone such transactions in order
to place assets beyond the reach of creditors, either for their own personal gain or so that
the business may be able to survive longer. Given these incentives and the ability of most
business owners to exert significant control over business assets, fraudulent transfer laws
have been established in order to prevent debtors from absconding with the business’s assets
5Appendix B.1.2 describes the relationship between organizational form and asset protection.
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in the event of financial distress.
While fraudulent transfer law applies to all debtors, there are several reasons why it is
particularly relevant to entrepreneurs. Information asymmetries are extreme because small
businesses are subject to few, if any, financial reporting requirements and because monitoring
costs are high for external lenders. The owner has significant control over business decisions,
and does not have to report to a board or to outside shareholders. As discussed, the assets
of small businesses are often commingled with the owner’s personal assets, thus exacerbating
incentives to hide assets from creditors when the business is in distress.
This section provides an overview of the important components of fraudulent transfer law.
The first subsection compares the concepts of actual fraud and constructive fraud. The
second subsection reviews the history of fraudulent transfer law in the United States, which
is key to understanding the quasi-exogenous nature of the experimental design.
1.2.1. Actual fraud versus constructive fraud
This paper studies the response of small business owners to a strengthening of unsecured
creditor rights that resulted from a new set of laws that made it easier for unsecured creditors
to reclaim funds transferred out of failing businesses. In the older version of the law, the
burden of proof lay on unsecured creditors, whereas in the new version, the burden of proof
lies on the business owner. Specifically, according to the older version of the law in which
actual fraud had to have been established, unsecured creditors challenging business owners
had to prove that the business owners acted with fraudulent intent. Under the new version
of the law, known as constructive fraud, as long as any transfer of assets out of the business
are not an equivalent exchange of value from the perspective of the business and the business
was close to or in a state of insolvency, the transfer can be nullified.
Most fraudulent transfer statutes that relied on actual fraud contained the following text:
“every gift, grant, conveyance, assignment or transfer... made with the intent to disturb,
delay, hinder or defraud creditors... shall be void as against such creditors.”6 As noted in
Ayer et al. (2004), “it is usually difficult to find good, non-circumstantial evidence of ‘actual
intent to hinder, delay, or defraud.’ People do not tend to admit to such ‘evil’ intent.” Some
judges adopted legal standards that were halfway measures toward a constructive definition
of fraud, by acknowledging the existence of badges of fraud. These include transfers to
insiders, concealed transfers, transfers of all the debtors’ assets, and transfers in which the
business did not receive equivalent value in exchange. What is relevant for our research
design, however, is that it is up to the judge in states with actual fraud laws to determine
6This particular passage was an excerpt from I.L. R.S. 1874, §4.
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the standards of proving fraudulent intent.
States that adopted a constructive definition of fraud are those that: (i) added to their
fraudulent transfer statute; or (ii) replaced the text of their statutes with a passage allowing
for a more expansive definition of fraud. Most fraudulent transfer statutes that rely on
constructive fraud contain the following text: “without receiving a reasonably equivalent
value in exchange for the transfer” and “was engaged... in a business or a transaction for
which the remaining assets of the debtor were unreasonably small.”7 The insertion of this
phrase allowed creditors to attack transactions on the grounds that reasonably equivalent
value was not delivered to the business as a result of the transfer. The fact that creditors
remain unpaid is grounds for the scarcity of remaining assets.
Because the changes that were made to the definition of constructive fraud happened
incrementally across states, and also because of variations in case law across judges, it is dif-
ficult to measure the degree to which statutory law on fraudulent transfers has been deemed
favorable toward creditors. In order to overcome this problem, we consider only states that
had no statutory or case law acknowledging constructive fraud prior to the adoption of
the Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act (UFTA), introduced below. To identify these states,
we read the text of each state’s annotated statutes. Portions of each state’s statutes are
grouped by topic and updated every several years based on the frequency of changes. We
compared each statute regarding transfers in the version immediately before the passage of
the UFTA to the version immediately after the passage of the UFTA. We also read the case
law for each statute related to fraudulent transfer. Ultimately, we focus on three states and
the District of Columbia because they underwent drastic transitions from intent-based to
constructive-based fraudulent transfer regimes.
1.2.2. The history of fraudulent transfer law
Most states in the United States imported their fraudulent transfer laws from England.
English fraudulent transfer law was based on the Statute of 13 Elizabeth (1571), which
declared void all transfers made with the “purpose and intent to delay, hinder or defraud
creditors.” As financial relationships became more complex, however, these statutes became
quickly outdated. The archaic text setting out the rules of fraudulent transfer failed to lay
out which types of creditors were protected, which transfers were relevant, which transferees
were held liable, whether insolvency was a necessary condition, and how exactly to prove
fraud.
In 1918, the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Law (NCCUSL)
7This particular passage was an excerpt from N.J. S.A. 1999, §§25:2-20-25:2-34.
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drafted a model law that clarified and standardized fraudulent transfer laws in the United
States. They promulgated the Uniform Fraudulent Conveyance Act (UFCA), which was
eventually adopted by twenty-five states in the following half-century.8 The UFCA intro-
duced the concept of constructive fraud. Under the UFCA, it would no longer be necessary
to prove intent as a mindset in order to undo a transfer by the debtor.
A version of the UFCA was incorporated into the Bankruptcy Act of 1938 and the
Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978 (1978 Act). In its current form, §547-548 of Chapter 11
dictate procedure on fraudulent transfers. Although the Bankruptcy Code is federal, state
fraudulent transfer laws may be invoked during a bankruptcy proceeding in place of §548, if
one can prove a creditor would have benefited from the use of state law. Because the statute
of limitations is usually longer in state law, many creditors find these laws favorable.
After the passage of the 1978 Act, the NCCUSL was reminded that half of the states still
retained fraudulent transfer laws dating back to the sixteenth century. In addition, given the
rise in complexity of debtor-creditor relations throughout the twentieth century, many states
had a multitude of contradictory case rulings. Because of this, judges were left to their own
discretion to interpret the statutes as they saw fit. The NCCUSL commented that “[t]here
are few legal subjects where there is greater lack of exact definitions and clear understanding”
than fraudulent transfer law.9 In addition to pressure from those involved in the drafting of
the 1978 Act, the NCCUSL was also influenced by a number of legal organizations, including
the Committee on Corporate Laws and the American Bar Association. A drafting committee
for the Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act (UFTA) was appointed in early 1983, and the law
was approved in mid-1984.
The NCCUSL lacks the authority to enact legislation, however, and so following the ap-
proval of the UFTA, representatives of NCCUSL contacted state representatives and pres-
sured them to adopt the new uniform act. This initiative was largely successful, and the
UFTA was eventually put into law by forty-five states and the District of Columbia. This
gradual adoption took place over the twenty-one years spanning the period from 1985 until
2006. Table 1.1 presents the timing of the passage of the UFTA.10
The UFTA was not a major overhaul of the UFCA, and so states that had already enacted
the earlier version ended up with a relatively similar law following the change. The only
major difference was the addition of a new section, §5(b), which invalidated preferential
debt payments to insiders. Prior to this addition, states were relatively mixed in their
8The NCCUSL is an umbrella authority that makes recommendations to state legislatures.
9Uniform Fraudulent Conveyance Act, 7A U.L.A. 428 (1985) (Prefatory note).
10Maryland and New York passed the UFCA in the early twentieth century, but never the UFTA. Alaska,
Kentucky, South Carolina, and Virginia have yet to adopt a uniform law on fraudulent transfers. Louisiana
passed the UFTA in 2003, but almost immediately set in motion the steps to repeal it in 2004.
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approaches to insider preferences. Some treated it as a separate category of fraud and had
explicit statutes on the voidability of this type of transaction, but most did not have any
statutory law regarding this area and left it up to interpretations of fraudulent transfer.
Several states, upon adopting the UFTA, opted out of this section. Of the states that had
not already enacted the UFCA, some had adopted measures similar to the constructive
fraud provisions in the uniform laws on their own. Those that retained statutes similar to
13 Elizabeth experienced the greatest change when they switched to the UFTA.11
A key identifying assumption in this paper is that the timing of the passage of constructive
fraud laws was unrelated to broader trends in entrepreneurship. Several elements of historical
context support this assumption. First, a primary impetus of the NCCUSL’s decision to
revisit fraudulent transfer law in 1983 was the lack of legal cohesion across states, and not
any particular attitude toward the business environment. Second, because it originated in the
NCCUSL, the legislators who passed the UFTA were probably less invested in the material
of the act relative to laws that they drafted themselves. Further evidence for this lies in the
fact that the adoption of constructive fraud laws took place in bursts, after the NCCUSL
urged the states to do so (both in 1918 and 1984), and not in response to the business cycle.
Finally, the coupling of constructive fraud law with preferential transfer law in some states
but not others allows us to isolate the effects of the constructive fraud element from general
motivations to adopt the UFTA.
1.3. Data and Empirical Methodology
1.3.1. Data sources
We gather legal data from a variety of sources. First, we use state historical statutes, available
through Hein’s Superseded State Statutes and State Session Laws microfiche collections.12
Superseded State Statutes provides a snapshot of each state’s laws through time, while State
Session Laws contains all laws passed by each state’s general assembly in each year. Because
of the incremental nature of changes that were made to the definition of constructive fraud,
we construct a timeline of fraudulent transfer law for each state. To construct this timeline,
we begin with the session law that introduced the UFTA, obtained from ThomsonWest’s
Uniform Laws Annotated. We then make use of the references to the prior fraudulent
11In July 2014, the UFTA was renamed the Uniform Voidable Transactions Act (UVTA). Although the
substance of the law was effectively unchanged, the new name now reflects the fact that the law gives creditors
the power to undo a much broader set of transactions than those that fall within the scope of fraud.
12These collections were accessed through the New York University Law Library. Some state statutes were
supplemented by West’s State Statutes Annotated and Harrison Company’s State Statutes Annotated.
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conveyance laws that were either amended or repealed by the UFTA, which is provided in
the text of the UFTA for most adopting states. We retrieve the most recent version of the
fraudulent conveyance law either amended or repealed by the UFTA from the Superseded
State Statutes. We obtain the evolution of each state’s laws due to the fact that, in nearly all
states, these statutes are annotated with the history of amendments as well as the relevant
case law.13
Our establishment-level data set comes from the Longitudinal Business Database (LBD)
of the U.S. Census Bureau. The LBD is an administrative register of all private business
establishments in the United States that is updated annually. Establishments are identified
as locations with at least one paid employee, and could belong to privately held or publicly
traded firms. The data contain information on the number of employees, payroll, industry
codes, and physical location for each establishment at the annual frequency. The LBD
also provides information on corporate ownership, which helps us identify which firm an
establishment belongs to in a given year. These corporate affiliation data are crucial for the
correct measurement of entrepreneurial activity, as entering establishments might represent
an expansion of a potentially large preexisting (“multi-unit”) firm as opposed to startup
activity (i.e., entry by a standalone or “single-unit” firm). Such distinctions cannot be made
with publicly available, aggregated versions of the Census data (for example, the County
Business Patterns data). Our sample spans the period from 1992 until 2007.
Finally, a key variable for our analysis is the amount of capital required to start a firm.
Since the adoption of fraudulent transfer law is particularly important for entrepreneurs
whose personal assets are commingled with the business’s assets, its effect on business cre-
ation might vary across industries depending on the amount of startup capital required.
The Characteristics of Business Owners (CBO) Survey, which is a part of the 1992 Eco-
nomic Census, provides economic and demographic information on business owners in the
United States. We use data from the survey responses on “Total Capital Needed by Owner
to Start/Acquire the Business by Industry Division” to determine the amount of startup
capital required at the industry level (Hurst and Lusardi, 2004).
13For Oregon, we retrieve case law on fraudulent conveyances prior to the UFTA from Westlaw Next.
For either states that did not adopt UFTA (South Carolina, Alaska, Kentucky, and Virginia) or states
where references to repealed statutes were not available in the text of UFTA (Arkansas, Hawaii, Kansas,
Missouri), we constructed a legal history by canvassing all laws concerning debtor-creditor relations, statutes
of fraud, and bulk transfer laws. All these states except for Hawaii had fraudulent transfer laws resembling
13 Elizabeth.
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1.3.2. Variable construction and summary statistics
We examine four dependent variables to measure the effects of the UFTA on entrepreneurial
activity: business starts, the success and failure rates of new businesses, and the closure
rates of incumbent establishments. These variables are measured at the state-year and
state-industry-year levels. We further disaggregate these measures by establishment size
(i.e., number of employees) and firm type, where the latter indicates whether entry or exit
occurs at a standalone firm or among the facilities of a multi-unit firm.
The first dependent variable is the natural logarithm of the number of new establish-
ments. We define the year of entry to be the first year with positive employment. We define
entrepreneurship as the entry of new, standalone firms. The second and third dependent
variables are related to the subsequent survival of these entrants. The LBD provides estab-
lishment identifiers that allow us to track them over time and identify exits. We focus on a
three-year window after entry and define “churning entrants” as the (log) number of estab-
lishment entries that close within this period. We analogously define “long-term entrants”
as the (log) sum of those entering establishments that survive three years. Finally, we also
consider the (log) number of establishment closures, where the establishment-level year of
closure is defined to be the last year with positive employment. This measure captures the
closure rate among both entrant and incumbent establishments.
The main independent variable is an indicator variable that equals one if the state defines
fraud according to the constructive view. This includes states that have passed the UFCA
or UFTA, states with “good consideration” or “voluntary conveyance” statutes, or states in
which case law exists that allows creditors to reverse transfers based solely on the economic
circumstances of the debtor. The indicator variable UFTA equals zero if: (i) the state has no
case law allowing creditors to reverse transfers based solely on the economic circumstances of
the debtor; and, (ii) the statutory law either contains no mention of fraudulent transfers or
its fraudulent transfer statutes were based on 13 Elizabeth. This is our preferred definition
of the independent variable, as it ensures that we identify off of states adopting constructive
fraud law for the first time.
Table 1.1 presents the adoption year of fraudulent transfer laws on a state-by-state basis.
Alaska, Kentucky, Maryland, New York, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, and Virginia did
not adopt the UFTA. Table 1.1 also presents the effective year of insider preference laws
and, in the final column, whether there is a preexisting law on fraudulent transfers prior
to the passage of the UFTA for each state. To illustrate how our independent variable
works, consider Alabama (AL) and Iowa (IA). Alabama and Iowa adopted the UFTA in
1990 and 1995, respectively. However, Alabama had either case or statutory law defining
fraud constructively, whereas Iowa did not. Thus, the independent variable always takes the
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value of one for Alabama, whereas it takes the value of zero before 1995 and one after 1995
for Iowa. Our definition of the treatment variable coupled with our event window from 1992
to 2007 confines our analysis to three states, Kansas, Iowa, Vermont, and the District of
Columbia that switch from being untreated to treated.14
Table 1.2 presents summary statistics for entering establishments between 1992 and 2007.
Entering establishments are classified into two groups: churning entrants, which close within
three years of entry, and long-term entrants, which survive at least three years. Entry is
further broken down according to firm status. Single-unit entry indicates that the entering
establishment is a new standalone firm, which we interpret as entrepreneurship. On the other
hand, multi-unit entry corresponds to expansions of already existing firms. The statistics
reported in Table 1.2 provide information about the size, sector, and geography of entering
establishments. Several notable facts emerge. First, single-unit firms constitute 83 percent
of all the entrants. The majority of entrants survive for longer than three years, with
66 percent being long-term versus 34 percent being churning entrants. Second, the size
distribution indicates that most (70 percent) of these new businesses start with between one
and five employees. On average, churning entrants start with fewer employees than long-
term entrants. The industry sector distribution statistics show the spread of our sample
across Manufacturing, Services, Wholesale Trade, Retail Trade, Mining, Construction, and
Transportation. The majority of entrepreneurs start their businesses in the Services and
Retail Trade industries with 43 percent and 22 percent, respectively.
1.3.3. Identification and empirical model
To examine how changes in creditor rights may impact entrepreneurial activity, we begin
our analysis at the state-year level with the following specification:15
yst = αs + αt + β · UFTAst + st, (1.1)
where s indexes states and t indexes years. The variable y stands for one of four measures of
establishment entry and exit: the total number of entrants, the number of churning entrants,
the number of long-term entrants, or the number of closures. We take the natural logarithm
of each of these variables. UFTAst is an indicator variable that equals one if the state has
any case or statutory law defining fraud constructively, and zero otherwise. αs and αt are
state and year fixed effects, respectively. Since the analysis is based on a state-year panel
14We have restricted access to the confidential U.S. Census Bureau LBD for this event window only.
15Kerr and Nanda (2009) use a similar difference-in-differences (DiD) framework study the effect of state-
level bank branching deregulations on entrepreneurial activity.
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data, we cluster standard errors by state (Bertrand et al., 2004).
The coefficient of interest, β, measures the average response in percentage points of en-
trepreneurial activity among states adopting constructive fraud law for the first time. If
entrepreneurs face financial constraints and the increase in creditor rights expands the sup-
ply of credit, thus boosting business growth, β will be strictly positive for all measures of
entry. On the other hand, if risk-averse entrepreneurs with personal assets tied up in their
ventures reduce demand for credit, then we may observe a reduction in entrepreneurial activ-
ity, which corresponds to a strictly negative β. The null hypothesis is that constructive fraud
law is irrelevant for entrepreneurial activity (because financial constraints are not binding,
creditor rights are unaffected by constructive fraud law, or the supply and demand response
of credit are offsetting), which corresponds to β equal to zero.
Identification of β in Equation (1.1) exploits changes in entrepreneurial activity within-
state around the first adoption of constructive fraud law. There are several identification
concerns with this approach that we now detail. The first potential issue concerns our
definition of treated and control states. Our focus is on those states that underwent the
most dramatic change in fraudulent transfer law. In particular, we define constructive fraud
(treated) states as those with any precedent in defining fraud in the constructive sense
(according to either statutory or case law). Nearly all states meet this condition by the end
of our event window. Alaska is the only state that never adopted the constructive fraud
definition of voidable transfers.16 In order words, the control group consists of states that
are already treated, eventually treated during the sample horizon, as well as Alaska, which
is never treated. This classification of states may present a problem if, for example, early
adopters of constructive fraud statutes exhibit different growth trajectories. In this case we
may have a violation of the parallel trends assumption of our DiD model.
We examine this concern in the following ways. Most importantly, we estimate a dynamic
version of Equation (1.1) with indicator variables showing the timing relative to the passage of
the UFTA in each state. Within this framework, we can examine if there are any preexisting
differential trends in the startup entry and exit rates between the treated and control groups.
We also directly examine whether treatment puts states on permanently different growth
trajectories, which could compromise the internal validity of our approach. To complement
this analysis of dynamics, we consider several alternative control group classifications that
either remove the never-treated states (Alaska) or the states that were treated close to the
beginning of our event window. We defer the details of these tests to Section 1.4.5.
The second potential concern is that there might be unobservable economic factors corre-
16Although a couple of states adopted neither the UFCA or the UFTA, they instead adopted other legis-
lation introducing the constructive definition of fraud to their debtor-creditor relation statutes.
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lated with the law change affecting investment opportunities for all firms, including startups.
To mitigate this concern, we first show that with the exception of population, which is neg-
atively and significantly associated with the passage of the law, the timing of these laws was
uncorrelated with broader macroeconomic trends. To provide further compelling evidence,
we exploit the granularity of the LBD and compare activity between single- and multi-unit
firms in the same state of location, industry, and year. Since multi-unit entrants correspond
to expansions of already existing firms, they are unlikely to represent startup activity. Thus,
we use establishment entry and exit rates of already existing, multi-unit firms as a control
group to demonstrate that the strengthening of creditor rights only impacts entrepreneurs’
incentives. To this end, we refine Equation (1.1) to separately compare both single-unit and
multi-unit entrants:
ysitx = αsix + αtx + αsit + β · UFTAst × Single-Unitx + sitx, (1.2)
where s, t, i, and x stand for state, year, industry, and type of firm, respectively. Single-Unitx
is an indicator variable that equals one for single-unit firms. Industries are grouped at the
two-digit Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) level, and we exclude the financial and
public administration industries. We fully saturate the model with fixed effects—αsix, αtx,
and αsit at the state-industry-type, time-type, and state-industry-type levels, respectively.
The state-industry-year fixed effects are included to sweep out common factors affecting the
investment opportunities of both startups and multi-unit firms. We cluster standard errors
at the state-type level to account for the disaggregation of our panel data. The coefficient
β now measures the mean percentage point response of entrepreneurs relative to multi-unit
firms following the passage of the UFTA.
The final concern is that other regulatory changes might occur in conjunction with the first
adoption of constructive fraud law. We are particularly interested in changes in anti-insider
preference laws, which invalidated preferential payments to insiders, as described in Section
1.2.2. It is unclear whether these laws have similar effects on credit supply and demand
among startups, since they target owners’ discretion over making payments to insiders as
they approach insolvency. While anti-insider preference laws were often passed at the same
time as the first adoption of a constructive definition of fraud, this is not always the case
(see Table 1.1). This permits a separate analysis of entrepreneurial activity among states
adopting anti-insider preference laws relative to a control group of states that do not. We
implement this test by reestimating Equation (1.1) with an independent variable that equals
one if an insider preference law was passed in that state and zero otherwise.
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1.4. Empirical Results
1.4.1. Effect of the UFTA on establishment entry and exit
The strengthening of creditor rights—in our context through a constructive definition of
fraud—has a theoretically ambiguous effect on entrepreneurial activity in equilibrium. It
may increase entrepreneurship by expanding access to credit for financially constrained en-
trepreneurs or slow down entrepreneurship if risk-averse business owners fear personal as-
sets will be clawed back by creditors in the event of default. These competing hypotheses
are tested in Table 1.3, where we estimate Equation (1.1) with the (log) number of total,
churning, and long-term entrants, and the number of establishment closures as dependent
variables.
Column [1] shows the effect of the UFTA on the total number of entering establishments
at the state-year level. We see that the coefficient on UFTA is -0.066, which is significant at
the 1 percent confidence level. The passage of the UFTA yields an economically large effect
on entrepreneurship: a 6.6 percent decrease in the number of new entrants.
Columns [2] and [3] report the effect of the UFTA on the number of churning and long-
term entrants, respectively. Churning entrants are entrants that close within three years of
entry, whereas long-term entrants are those that survive for at least three years. The point
estimates are -0.073 and -0.064 for churning and long-term entrants, respectively, and both
are statistically significant at the 1 percent confidence level. In Column [4], we look at the
effect of the UFTA on establishment closures. We define the year of closure to be the last
year with a positive number of employees. The estimated coefficient on UFTA is -0.065 and
continues to be statistically significant at the 1 percent confidence level. Evidently, both
business creation and failure decrease following the passage of the UFTA. This indicates
that the strengthening of creditor rights not only decreases new business formation but also
increases the survival of old businesses. These effects are consistent with owners reducing
risk-taking when their personal assets are at stake.
The results so far suggest that the passage of constructive fraud law is associated with a
decrease in both establishment entry and exit rates. One potential concern with this finding
is that some of these entering or exiting establishments may belong to large, incumbent
firms that are not necessarily representative of entrepreneurial activity. To address this
concern, we estimate Equation (1.1) separately for establishments belonging to both single-
and multi-unit firms. The results of this estimation are shown in Table 1.4.
Columns [1] and [2] report the effect of adopting the UFTA on the number of entrants
for single- and multi-unit firms, respectively. We see that strengthening creditor rights
decreases single-unit firm entry by 9.6 percent, which is about 50 percent larger than the
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baseline effect and statistically significant at the 1 percent level, whereas it has no statistically
significant impact on the expansion of already existing, multi-unit firms. The remaining
columns of Table 1.4 indicate that similar results emerge when we focus on other aspects
of the entrepreneurial process in the wake of the law change. In each case, only the entry
and exit rates of single-unit firms are affected. These results confirm that the law change
only has an impact on churning among startups, which are the types of firms likely to have
owners’ personal and business assets commingled.
1.4.2. Dynamic analysis of entry and exit
Table 1.5 provides a nonparametric estimation of the treatment effect dynamics at the state-
year level. Rather than having a single indicator variable switching on after each adoption
of the UFTA, we modify Equation (1.1) to include four indicator variables: the first is for
the two years before the law change, the second is for the year of the law change and the
following year, the third is for the subsequent two years, and the final indicator is for the
fourth and all other years after the law change. The coefficients on each of these indicator
variables measure entry and exit rates relative to the corresponding rates in the period at
least three years prior to the law change, which is a suitable approach given the short length
of time before the first law change. For this analysis, we focus on the entry and exit rates of
single-unit firms, since they better capture entrepreneurship, and we know from Table 1.5
that this is where the treatment effect is located.
Turning to the estimates in columns [1] to [4], three notable facts emerge. First, we observe
that the effects of the UFTA do not show up immediately, but instead take between two and
three years to materialize. The estimated effects on two and three years after the passage of
the UFTA and year four and thereafter are statistically different from zero. The estimated
entry rate for startups four or more years after the law change is about 9.2 percent lower
than entry rates at least three years prior. We find similar effects for churning and long-
term entry. Second, establishment closure rates decrease only four years out, which makes
sense given that churning entry begins to wane in the second year and beyond. Third, the
coefficients on all entry and exit measures are indistinguishable from zero for the two years
prior to the law change, confirming that there are no preexisting trends between treated and
control states.
1.4.3. Effect of the UFTA by startup capital amount
Stronger creditor rights are likely to matter more for startups in which owners’ personal and
business assets are commingled. For such firms, under a constructive definition of fraud,
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creditors would be better positioned to recover their claims using the personal assets of the
entrepreneur should the venture fail. We provide a direct test of this argument by performing
sample splits according to the amount of capital required to start a new business.
Sectors requiring large, upfront investments (e.g., heavy manufacturing) have startup cap-
ital requirements that are likely too large to be met with the use of personal assets. In
contrast, for owners operating in industries requiring less startup capital, pledging personal
assets as collateral is likely to be feasible. We therefore sort industries on the basis of startup
capital required using survey data from the CBO Survey of the 1992 Economic Census (see
also Hurst and Lusardi, 2004; Adelino et al., 2015).17 We then reestimate Equation (1.1)
separately for industries with high and low needs for startup capital.
The results in Table 1.6 follow the predicted pattern. As indicated in columns [1] and [2],
following the UFTA the number of startups decreases in industries that require low startup
capital, whereas we see no effect in high startup capital industries. The estimated coefficient
is -0.072 and is significant at the 1 percent confidence level. Columns [3] to [6] show that
this effect is seen in both churning and long-term entrants. The estimated coefficients are
-0.064 and -0.077 for churning and long-term entrants, respectively, and significant at the 5
percent level, at least. The remaining columns indicate that closures decrease for only low
startup capital industries. Thus, the link between creditor protection and entrepreneurial
activity is present only among industries with lower startup capital requirements.
1.4.4. Effect of the UFTA by initial employment
We next characterize patterns of entry and exit across the establishment size distribution.
This analysis provides a more accurate description of how the passage of the UFTA slowed
down entrepreneurial activity. By estimating a stricter version of Equation (1.1), it also
allows us to mitigate concerns regarding unobservable state-level factors that might jointly
impact both the law change and investment opportunities.
Table 1.7 reports our estimates of entry and exit rates with establishments classified ac-
cording to their level of employment in the year of entry (or exit). We focus on the following
size groupings: 1–5 employees, 6–20 employees, 21–100 employees, and greater than 100 em-
ployees.18 We thus compare the establishment opening and closure rates of the two types of
17Based on the fraction of owners responding to the question “Total Capital Needed by Owner to
Start/Acquire the Business by Industry Division” above or below $1,000,000, we classify two-digit SIC
industries as having high or low startup capital need. Precisely, Manufacturing (20–39), Transportation,
Communications, and Utilities (40–49), and Wholesale Trade (50–51) are classified as having high startup
capital need. The remaining industries are classified as having low startup capital need: Agricultural Services,
Forestry, Fishing, and Mining (01–14), Construction (15–17), Retail Trade (52–59), and Services (70–89).
18For establishment closures, we construct the size groups based on final number of employees, i.e., the
last positive number of employees reported in LBD before the closure.
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firms, single and multi-unit, at the same state of location, industry, and year. We form our
estimates based on Equation (1.2), which exploits the granularity of the LBD using a state-
year-industry-type unit of observation and fully saturates the model with firm type–year,
state–industry–year, and state–industry–firm type fixed effects. Coefficients on the UFTA ×
Single-Unit indicator variable in these regressions capture the relative elasticity of startup
entry to facility expansions of multi-unit firms by employment size. Naturally, if the effect
of the UFTA operates through the incentives of entrepreneurs, then the slowdown in entry
and exit rates should be among the smallest establishments of single-unit entrants.
Columns [1] to [4] of the table show the effect of the UFTA on the total number of entrants
for different size groups. In line with our expectation, we see that the effect of the UFTA
on business formation is largest among single-unit firms with an initial number of employees
between one and five. The estimated coefficient is -0.036, which implies that the number of
startups with between one and five employees decreases by 3.6 percent relative to the number
of facility expansions of the same size by multi-unit firms in the same state, industry, and
year. The point estimate is significant at the 1 percent confidence level.
Similar patterns emerge when we look at the remaining columns. Columns [5] to [8] and
[9] to [12] show analogous point estimates for churning and long-term entrants of -0.050 and
-0.025, respectively. Columns [13] to [16] indicate that single-unit firms with between one
and five employees reduce exit rates by 4.7 percent relative to unit closures by multi-unit
firms. Similar patterns do not consistently emerge among single-unit entrants with greater
than five employees.
Overall, we see that only entry and exit rates among the smallest single-unit startup
firms appear to be significantly affected by the adoption of the UFTA. These size-based
results are consistent with the hypothesis that the strengthening of creditor rights inhibits
entrepreneurial activity. Importantly, they contrast with the alternative that startup entry
simply reflects changing investment opportunities at the state level that may correlate with
the adoption of the UFTA.
1.4.5. Additional results and robustness checks
The results of a series of robustness tests are presented in Table 1.8. We first examine
whether our results are an artifact of our modeling choices and, particularly, the definition
of treated and control states. To this end, we repeat the estimation of Equation (1.1) for all
firms and also single-unit (startup) firms under a number of alternative assumptions to test
the sensitivity of our results.
As described in Section 3.1.2, we choose to define our treatment variable to capture vari-
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ation within states undergoing the most drastic change in creditor rights. Consequently,
the District of Columbia, Iowa, Kansas, and Vermont are classified as treated states during
our sample period. In panel A, we first show that the basic patterns we have documented
hold for each of these states individually. Thus, we are not concerned that the peculiar
circumstances of one of these four states are responsible for our findings.
In panel B, we enlarge the treatment group. First, we include Indiana, which had only
a limited history of case law on constructive fraud prior to the passage of new statutory
constructive fraud law in 1994. The results do not change. Second, in addition to Indi-
ana, we include Mississippi and North Carolina, which had vague preexisting statutory law
on constructive fraud but nevertheless adopted the UFTA in 2006 and 1997, respectively.
Our results weaken considerably in both economic and statistical significance following the
inclusion of these states to the treatment group. This last finding demonstrates that our
benchmark effect occurs primarily among states undergoing the most meaningful change in
creditor rights.
Thus far the control group has consisted of several subgroups: never-treated states,
eventually-treated states, and already-treated states. Our identifying assumption is simply
that the law changes occur at random, which is equivalent to a parallel trends assumption.
While we have already demonstrated that there are no preexisting differential trends among
the control group, on average, there could be among one of the subgroups of control states,
and this could compromise the internal validity of our estimates. In panel C, we make sev-
eral modifications to the control group to examine this possibility. First, we exclude Alaska,
which never passed any statutory or case law regarding constructive fraud. We see that re-
sults are not affected. Second, we exclude Colorado, Maine, and Oregon, which were treated
in 1991, 1986, and 1986, respectively. These three states were treated close to the beginning
of our event window. We see that the exclusion of these three states from the already-treated
group does not change the significance of our results. Finally, our results are robust to the
exclusion of Louisiana, which went through a period of uncertainty regarding the statutory
law on constructive fraud—Louisiana passed the UFTA in 2003, but almost immediately set
in motion the steps to repeal it in 2004.
Finally, we examine the importance of anti-insider preference laws to check if the slowdown
in entrepreneurial activity is coincident with this regulatory change. Since they were not
always passed concurrently with the first adoption of a constructive definition of fraud (see
Table 1.1), we can compare establishment entry and exit rates among states adopting anti-
insider preference laws relative to a control group of states that do not.
Table 1.9 presents the results of this analysis using Insider Preferences—an indicator
variable equal to one for any state adopting anti-insider preference laws—as the independent
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variable. We repeat each of the analyses presented in Tables 1.3 through 1.7 for the anti-
insider states. Results in each panel confirm that anti-insider preference laws are not the
driving force behind our main results. Indeed, for the various tests, we do not find a clear
effect of anti-insider preferences on entrepreneurial activity. The point estimates are mostly
insignificant and generally mixed in sign. This is in stark contrast to the estimates of the
effect of the UFTA on establishment entry and exit rates, which a show consistently negative
pattern and are statistically significant across numerous specifications.
The insignificance of the timing of insider preference laws addresses the concern that our
main results may be driven by a reduction in mostly fraudulent businesses. Stricter laws
that make it more difficult to pay insiders, who are typically friends or family members,
should also have resulted in a reduction in business entrants. Under the assumption that
fraudulent businesses are more likely to take advantage of preferential payments to insiders,
the lack of evidence in this regard suggests that fraudulent business activity accounts for a
minor fraction of businesses overall.
1.5. Conclusion
The passage of the UFTA brought about an important change in business law: it eliminated
the burden of proof of fraudulent intent previously needed for creditors to undo transfers
from failing businesses. Our evidence demonstrates that the adoption of the constructive
interpretation of fraud had negative effects on entrepreneurial activity.
Using longitudinal establishment-level data from the U.S. Census Bureau, we find signif-
icant reductions in establishment entry and exit rates following the passage of the UFTA.
These effects are present only among new, single-unit firms (i.e., entrepreneurs), as opposed
to the expansions and contractions among larger, multi-unit firms, even within the same
industry and the smallest employment size grouping, in a given state. Moreover, we find
an effect of the UFTA only on startups requiring low initial levels of capital. These results
point to the law change affecting the incentives of entrepreneurs beginning new ventures (or
winding down existing ones) where personal assets have a higher weight both in operations
and in the financing of the business.
We attribute the decrease in entrepreneurship to a reduction in demand for credit by
risk-averse individuals. Affording stronger rights to creditors, while expanding the contract
space, can have adverse consequences for risk-sharing. Traditional corporate finance theory,
however, may attribute the decrease in entry to frictions related to nonverifiable cash flows
or early liquidation. Since we cannot observe individuals’ preferences for risk, we are limited
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in our ability to discern between models and pin down welfare implications.
Nevertheless, the response of entrepreneurs to improvements in creditor rights is important
to policymakers, especially in light of the ongoing discussion on how to reform bankruptcy
law in a way that will make the system more accessible to small businesses. The results in
this paper indicate that expanding laws in favor of unsecured creditors—here, allowing them
to reclaim a higher fraction of assets upon business failure—can discourage startup creation
and prolong the survival of old ventures. This suggests that entrepreneurs may become
constrained in their ability to redeploy assets into new and potentially more productive uses,
thus inhibiting the process of capital reallocation and economic efficiency.
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1.6. Tables
Table 1.1 Fraudulent transfer laws by state
This table lists the effective year of fraudulent transfers and insider preference laws as well as
indicates whether there is a preexisting law on fraudulent transfers before UFTA for each state.
“statutory” refers to the text that is contained within the legal code of a state, whereas “case” refers
to what courts within a particular state have decided as precedent. The last column equals one if
the state has some case or statutory law before the adoption of UFTA defining fraud constructively.
“N/A” indicates states not adopting the UFTA.
Insider Statutory or case
State UFTA preferences law before UFTA
AL 1990 1990 1
AK - - N/A
AZ 1990 - 1
AR 1987 1987 1
CA 1986 - 1
CO 1991 1991 0
CT 1991 1991 1
DE 1996 1996 1
DC 1996 1996 0
FL 1988 1988 1
GA 2002 2002 1
HI 1985 1985 0
ID 1987 1987 1
IL 1990 1990 1
IN 1994 - 1
IA 1995 1995 0
KS 1999 1999 0
KY - 1970 N/A
LA 1985 1985 0
ME 1986 1986 0
MD - - N/A
MA 1996 1996 1
MI 1998 1998 1
MN 1987 1987 1
MS 2006 - 1
MO 1992 1992 1
MT 1991 1991 1
NE 1989 1989 1
NV 1987 1987 1
NH 1988 1988 1
NJ 1989 1989 1
NM 1989 1959 1
NY - - N/A
NC 1997 1997 1
ND 1985 1943 1
OH 1990 1961 1
OK 1986 1986 0
OR 1986 1986 0
PA - - N/A
RI 1986 1986 1
SD 1987 1919 1
TN 2003 2003 1
TX 1987 1987 1
UT 1988 1988 1
VT 1996 1996 0
VA - - N/A
WA 1988 1988 1
WV 1986 1986 1
WI 1988 1988 1














































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 1.3 Establishment entry and exit
This table presents estimates of the impact of uniform fraudulent transfer (UFTA) laws on the
entry and exit of establishments. Establishment entry and exit rates are at the state-year level.
Analysis is based on data from Longitudinal Business Database (LBD) for 1992 to 2007. Total
entrants include establishments at their first year of positive employment. Churning entrants are
defined to be entrants closing within three years of entry. Long-term entrants include entrants
that did not close within three years of entry. UFTA is an indicator variable that equals one if the
state has any case or statutory law defining fraud constructively, and zero otherwise. Estimations
include state and year fixed effects. Standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered at the state
level. ***, **, and * denote 1 percent, 5 percent, and 10 percent statistical significance, respectively.
Dependent variable: Log(Total Log(Churning Log(Long-Term Log(Establishment
Entrants) Entrants) Entrants) Closures)
[1] [2] [3] [4]
UFTA -0.066*** -0.073*** -0.064*** -0.065***
(0.023) (0.023) (0.025) (0.016)
State fixed effects Y Y Y Y
Year fixed effects Y Y Y Y































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 1.5 Dynamics of estimated effects
This table presents dynamic estimates of the impact of uniform fraudulent transfer (UFTA)
laws on the entry and exit of single-unit firms. Single-unit firms consist of new firm creations.
Establishment entry and exit rates are at the state-year level. Analysis is based on data
from Longitudinal Business Database (LBD) for 1992 to 2007. The independent variables
indicate the timing relative to the passage of UFTA laws in each state. Total entrants include
establishments at their first year of positive employment. Churning entrants are defined to be
entrants closing within three years of entry. Long-term entrants include entrants that did not
close within three years of entry. UFTA is an indicator variable that equals one if the state
has any case or statutory law defining fraud constructively, and zero otherwise. Estimations
include state and year fixed effects. Standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered at the state
level. ***, **, and * denote 1 percent, 5 percent, and 10 percent statistical significance, respectively.
Dependent variable: Log(Total Log(Churning Log(Long-Term Log(Establishment
Entrants) Entrants) Entrants) Closures)
[1] [2] [3] [4]
UFTA × Year(-2, -1) -0.016 -0.023 -0.012 0.026
(0.016) (0.016) (0.019) (0.021)
UFTA × Year(0, 1) 0.009 -0.013 0.014 0.012
(0.033) (0.028) (0.059) (0.018)
UFTA × Year(2, 3) -0.080*** -0.089*** -0.076*** -0.086
(0.020) (0.028) (0.017) (0.053)
UFTA × Year(4+) -0.092*** -0.113*** -0.083*** -0.058**
(0.033) (0.030) (0.036) (0.028)
State fixed effects Y Y Y Y
Year fixed effects Y Y Y Y
























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 1.7 Effects by firms’ initial employment
This table presents estimates of the impact of uniform fraudulent transfer (UFTA) laws on the
entry and exit of firms based on their initial number of employees for total, churning, and long-term
entrants and final number of employees for closures. Establishment entry and exit rates are at the
state-year level. Analysis is based on data from Longitudinal Business Database (LBD) for 1992 to
2007. Total entrants include establishments at their first year of positive employment. Churning
entrants are defined to be entrants closing within three years of entry. Long-term entrants include
entrants that did not close within three years of entry. UFTA is an indicator variable that equals
one if the state has any case or statutory law defining fraud constructively, and zero otherwise. In
addition to state and year fixed effects, estimations include type fixed effects indicating whether
the firm is single-unit or multi-unit. Standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered at the state
level. ***, **, and * denote 1 percent, 5 percent, and 10 percent statistical significance, respectively.
Dependent variable: Log(Total Entrants) Log(Churning Entrants)
Initial employment: 1-5 6-20 21-100 101+ 1-5 6-20 21-100 101+
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8]
UFTA × SU -0.036*** 0.000 0.001 -0.015* -0.050*** 0.002 -0.006 -0.015***
(0.012) (0.017) (0.020) (0.008) (0.016) (0.011) (0.013) (0.005)
State-ind.-type Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
State-ind.-year Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Type-year Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Observations 109,344 109,344 109,344 109,344 109,344 109,344 109,344 109,344
Dependent variable: Log(Long-Term Entrants) Log(Establishment Closures)
Initial employment: 1-5 6-20 21-100 101+ 1-5 6-20 21-100 101+
[9] [10] [11] [12] [13] [14] [15] [16]
UFTA × SU -0.025** -0.007 0.001 -0.005 -0.047*** -0.004 0.000 -0.002
(0.011) (0.023) (0.014) (0.012) (0.015) (0.020) (0.009) (0.014)
State-ind.-type Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
State-ind.-year Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Type-year Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y





































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 1.9 Passage of insider preference laws
This table presents estimates of the impact of insider preference laws on entrepreneurship. Panel
A presents estimates of the impact of insider laws on the entry and exit of establishments. Panel
B shows establishment entry and exit rates based on their single- or multi-unit firm status. Panel
C presents the dynamic estimates. Panel D analyzes the impact of insider preference laws on firms
based on their initial number of employees. Establishment entry and exit rates are at the state-year
level. Analysis is based on data from Longitudinal Business Database (LBD) for 1992 to 2007.
Total entrants include establishments at their first year of positive employment. Churning entrants
are defined to be entrants closing within three years of entry. Long-term entrants include entrants
that did not close within three years of entry. Insider Preferences is an indicator variable that
equals one if the state has adopted any anti-insider preferences laws, and zero otherwise. Estima-
tions include state and year fixed effects. Standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered at the state
level. ***, **, and * denote 1 percent, 5 percent, and 10 percent statistical significance, respectively.
Panel A. Baseline estimates
Dependent variable: Log(Total Log(Churning Log(Long-Term Log(Establishment
Entrants) Entrants) Entrants) Closures)
[1] [2] [3] [4]
Insider Preferences -0.028 0.067* 0.008 0.033
(0.032) (0.038) (0.033) (0.022)
State fixed effects Y Y Y Y
Year fixed effects Y Y Y Y

























































































































































































































































































































































Panel C. Dynamic effects
Dependent variable: Log(Total Log(Churning Log(Long-Term Log(Establishment
Entrants) Entrants) Entrants) Closures)
[1] [2] [3] [4]
Insider Preferences × Year(-2, -1) -0.012 -0.034 0.006 -0.008
(0.028) (0.042) (0.019) (0.025)
Insider Preferences × Year(0, 1) 0.034*** 0.009 0.054*** 0.011
(0.011) (0.012) (0.013) (0.013)
Insider Preferences × Year(2, 3) -0.013 0.024 -0.034 0.000
(0.029) (0.024) (0.040) (0.031)
Insider Preferences × Year(4+) -0.016 0.031 -0.045* 0.020
(0.023) (0.031) (0.027) (0.021)
State fixed effects Y Y Y Y
Year fixed effects Y Y Y Y
Observations 752 752 752 752
Panel D.I. Effect by initial employment
Dependent variable: Log(Total Entrants) Log(Churning Entrants)
Initial employment: 1-5 6-20 21-100 101+ 1-5 6-20 21-100 101+
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8]
Insider × SU -0.006 0.006 0.042*** 0.019 0.010 0.020 0.034* 0.015
(0.012) (0.025) (0.019) (0.020) (0.016) (0.022) (0.019) (0.013)
State-industry-type Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
State-industry-year Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Type-year Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Observations 100,768 100,768 100,768 100,768 100,768 100,768 100,768 100,768
Panel D.II. Effect by initial employment
Dependent variable: Log(Long-Term Entrants) Log(Establishment Closures)
Initial employment: 1-5 6-20 21-100 101+ 1-5 6-20 21-100 101+
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8]
Insider Pref. × SU -0.012 0.003 0.036* 0.004 -0.022 -0.015 0.004 -0.013
(0.011) (0.023) (0.02) (0.015) (0.015) (0.017) (0.024) (0.018)
State-industry-type Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
State-industry-year Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Type-year Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Observations 100,768 100,768 100,768 100,768 100,768 100,768 100,768 100,768
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CHAPTER 2
CREDITOR RIGHTS, TECHNOLOGY ADOPTION,
AND PRODUCTIVITY: PLANT-LEVEL EVIDENCE
2.1. Introduction
There is an influential body of research arguing that financial and legal institutions affect
economic growth (La Porta et al., 1997; King and Levine, 1993; Rajan and Zingales, 1998);
however, much less is known about the specific channel. The effect of these institutions
on financing constraints, technology adoption, and productivity is a possible explanation
(Hicks, 1969).1 The purpose of this study is to investigate the importance of the rights of
secured creditors in bankruptcy for the productivity of businesses.
On the theoretical front, the effect of creditor rights on productivity is far from obvious.
On the one hand, stronger creditor rights, such as an increased ability to recover collateral
in the event of financial distress, might encourage lending. The relaxation in borrowing
constraints might lead to higher technology adoption by firms, which will help them operate
more efficiently (Midrigan and Xu, 2014). On the other hand, stronger creditor rights may
increase the costs of financial distress for firms and managers, leading them to avoid risky
but innovative projects, which can be detrimental to the productive efficiency (Acharya and
Subramanian, 2009; Acharya et al., 2011).
Endogeneity greatly hinders any attempt to study the effect of creditor rights on produc-
tivity. For example, there might be a variety of unobservable factors affecting both creditor
rights in a country or a state and the performance of firms. To overcome this obstacle, I use
enactment of anti-recharacterization statutes as a source of exogenous variation in creditor
rights (e.g., Li et al., 2016). These laws mainly affect the securitization industry and firms
using a special-purpose vehicle (SPV) to conduct secured borrowing. Collateral is transferred
to an SPV for the purpose of protecting it from automatic stay in case of the bankruptcy of
the debtor. However, before these laws, bankruptcy judges had the discretion to make the
1Productivity shocks have been modeled as an important driver of economic fluctuations in a variety of
macroeconomic models, beginning with Kydland and Prescott (1982). Moreover, Klenow and Rodriguez-
Clare (1997) and Hall and Jones (1999) argue that differences in productivity are critical to understanding
output differences between countries.
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collateral in the SPV subject to automatic stay. These laws significantly increased the rights
of secured creditors in bankruptcy by denying judges this discretion and allowing secured
creditors to seize the collateral in the SPV.2
I adapt the empirical methodology of Bertrand and Mullainathan (2003) to study the effect
of anti-recharacterization laws based on plant-level data from the U.S. Census Bureau. The
granularity of the Census data coupled with the fact that anti-recharacterization laws were
adapted at the state of incorporation level helps me conduct two types of analysis. First,
the Census data provide the exact geographic location and industry of each plant, which
allows me to compare the change in productivity of two plants in the same year, industry,
and location. To illustrate, I am able to compare the productivity change of two plants in
Iowa, one of which belongs to a firm incorporated in Texas (a treated state), and the other
which belongs to a firm incorporated in California (a control state). This plant-level analysis
allows me to observe the productive efficiency of a plant far from the state of headquarters
or state of incorporation, and separately identify the effect of stronger creditor rights from
local economic shocks contemporaneous with the laws. Second, the longitudinal nature of
the plant-level data helps me observe the productivity of a plant for several consecutive
years, which is crucial in the context of my study given that effects on productivity may take
time to materialize.
Following the adoption of anti-recharacterization laws, total factor productivity of plants
belonging to treated firms increases significantly, by 2.6 percent. In addition to total factor
productivity, capital and labor productivities increase. The fact that these laws are passed
by states and are not driven by firm-specific conditions alleviates the concern of endogeneity.
However, the possibility that these laws are passed in response to changing economic condi-
tions needs to be addressed. I conduct two tests to address this concern. First, I conduct a
dynamic analysis and show insignificant effects before the passage of these laws. Second, I
conduct a placebo test, falsely assuming that neighboring states are treated. If my estimates
are simply picking up economic shocks near the geography of Texas, Louisiana, and Alabama,
then I should be able to see significant effects for neighboring states as well. Estimates from
this falsification test are statistically indistinguishable from zero, which shows that the effect
on productivity is coming only from states that enacted these laws.
In the second part of my empirical analysis, I try to uncover the channel through which
stronger creditor rights translate into increasing productive efficiency. First, I demonstrate
2There are a substantial number of firms using SPVs. Using 6,473 public firms between 1997 and 2004,
Feng et al. (2009) find that on average 42 percent of firms use at least one SPV. In 2004, 59 percent of firms
report at least one SPV, which shows that their use is quite prevalent. Furthermore, Korgaonkar and Nini
(2010) state that firms in manufacturing and production of consumer durables use special-purpose vehicles
intensively.
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that the increase in productivity is related to financial constraints: plants belonging to fi-
nancially constrained firms show substantial increase in productivity, whereas I do not see
any significant change in the productivity of plants belonging to unconstrained firms. Sec-
ond, the disaggregated nature of the Census data allows me to document two important
changes in the composition of investments that are motivated by the literature on financial
constraints and investment. I show that treated plants adopt more advanced technology by
investing in capital of younger vintage and newer technology: new machinery and computer
investments increase significantly at treated plants. Consistent with Eisfeldt and Rampini
(2007), who show that investing in used capital rather than new capital is more common
among credit-constrained firms, I document that the fraction of capital expenditures on new
machinery increases significantly at treated plants.3 Furthermore, as argued by Garmaise
(2008), constrained firms are much more labor-intensive in their production process. There-
fore, a relaxation of borrowing constraints should be accompanied with a shift to a more
capital-intensive production. To test this theory, I examine how new machinery scaled by
labor changes at treated plants and find that new machinery expenditures per unit of la-
bor increase significantly at treated plants. This compositional change indicates that the
production at treated plants is becoming more capital-intensive.
My findings are related to at least two strands of literature. First, I contribute to the
literature on creditor rights and their effects on firms. Strengthening of creditor rights can
result in inefficient liquidation of firms by increasing the cost of continuing during financial
distress (Aghion and Bolton, 1992; Hart et al., 1997). This liquidation bias can lead firms
to pursue more conservative financing and investment policies ex ante. Vig (2013) analyzes
the effects of a securitization reform in India on the debt structure of firms. He shows
that following a 2002 law that strengthened the rights of secured creditors, firms use less
secured debt and hoard more cash, which are indicative of a more conservative financing
policy. Acharya and Subramanian (2009), Acharya et al. (2011), Berger et al. (2011), and
Seifert and Gonenc (2012) present evidence consistent with this view, showing that stronger
creditor rights are associated with less innovation, as well as more conservative investment
and financing policies. A more recent set of studies shows effects contrary to the liquidation
bias. Li et al. (2016) show that firms increase leverage significantly following the adoption of
anti-recharacterization laws. Favara et al. (2017) argue that strengthening of creditor rights
following these laws affects firms’ investment and financing policies by making them more
3Using data from the Annual Capital Expenditure Survey (ACES) conducted by the U.S. Census Bureau,
Eisfeldt and Rampini (2007) show that the fraction of capital expenditures on used capital is 27.79 percent
for firms in the lowest size decile, with assets below $0.10 million, and 10.10 percent for firms in the highest
asset decile, with assets above $186.55 million. Using other measures of credit constraints, they report that
this fraction increases significantly as firms become more constrained.
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resilient to uncertainty shocks. Using the same laws as well as additional court decisions,
Mann (2015) documents that firms increase their debt, as well as their innovation output.
Cerqueiro et al. (2016) look at increases in U.S. state-level bankruptcy exemption limits as
a source of variation in creditor rights and report that the number and quality of patents
produced by small firms decrease significantly. Finally, using a bankruptcy reform increasing
the rights of secured creditors in Brazil, Ponticelli and Alencar (2016) argue that efficient
judicial courts increase firm investment and growth.
Second, my study contributes to the literature analyzing the effects of finance on produc-
tivity and performance. Butler and Cornaggia (2011) analyze the effects of ethanol-induced
change in demand on the productivity of farmers. They find that farmer productivity in-
creases significantly more in areas with high levels of bank deposits. Gatti and Love (2008)
and Levine and Warusawitharana (2016) show that increased access to finance is associated
with total factor productivity (TFP) growth in a sample of Bulgarian and European firms,
respectively. A recent study by Cerqueiro et al. (2016) investigates the effects of a legal
reform in Sweden that reduces the collateral value. They show that the productive efficiency
of treated firms does not change. The closest study to my study is Krishnan et al. (2014).
By using Census data, they show that TFP increases following interstate banking deregula-
tions among the smallest firms in the economy. I complement their study in the following
four ways. First, the natural experiment I am using provides a different source of increased
access to finance for treated firms. Interstate banking deregulations used by Krishnan et al.
(2014) result in increased access to finance through increased bank competition, whereas
anti-recharacterization laws allow increased access to finance through shifting the balance
of power toward a broader set of creditors. Second, I exploit the granularity of the Census
data to compare two plants in the same state, industry, and year, but with different states of
incorporation, which provides a very clean identification. Third, I show that the move to a
newer and more capital-intensive production technology following a relaxation of borrowing
constraints is the channel behind the increase in productivity. Finally, I show that public
firms’ productivity also is affected increased access to finance.
2.2. Anti-Recharacterization Laws
I begin by describing anti-recharacterization laws that affect the securitization industry and
firms using a special-purpose vehicle (SPV) to conduct secured borrowing. Collateral is
transferred to an SPV, which is a financial intermediary designed to be bankruptcy-remote,
then sold to investors as securities. The main reason for transferring assets to a different
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entity is to characterize them as sales, thereby protecting them from automatic stay in
case of bankruptcy of the issuing firm. The bankruptcy-remoteness of an SPV is intended
to assure investors that obligations will be fulfilled even if the SPV originating firm goes
bankrupt. However, the bankruptcy-remoteness of an SPV should not be taken for granted.
Sometimes bankruptcy courts can recharacterize the asset transfer as a secured loan rather
than as a true sale, making the SPV assets subject to automatic stay. Such discretion of
bankruptcy courts is generally justified by stating that the SPV will play an important role
in the reorganization of the bankrupt firm. The enactment of anti-recharacterization laws
discards the possibility of recharacterization by bankruptcy courts.
These laws were enacted in seven states: Texas and Louisiana in 1997, Alabama in 2001,
Delaware in 2002, South Dakota in 2003, Virginia in 2004, and Nevada in 2005. Kettering
(2011) states that these seven states can be divided into two groups in terms of the coverage
of their anti-recharacterization laws. In Texas and Louisiana, Section 9.109 of the Uniform
Commercial Code (U.C.C.) discards the possibility of recharacterization for all sales of re-
ceivables, whereas in the other states, the possibility of recharacterization is prevented only
for sales under a securitization transaction.4
A deeper look at these anti-recharacterization laws shows that these laws affect a substan-
tial number of transactions. Section 9.109 of the Texas and Louisiana Uniform Commercial
Code (U.C.C.) explicitly discards the possibility of recharacterization of the sale of the fol-
lowing four items: accounts, chattel paper, payment intangibles, and promissory notes.5 The
most important item for the purposes of my study is accounts, defined in Section 9.102 of the
Uniform Commercial Code (U.C.C.). “Accounts” means a right to payment of a monetary
obligation, whether or not earned by performance, for a variety of items, including (i) prop-
erty that has been or is to be sold, leased, licensed, assigned, or otherwise disposed of; (ii)
services rendered or to be rendered; (iii) a policy of insurance; (iv) licensing of intellectual
property; and (v) credit cards. As can be seen, this definition of accounts goes beyond the
traditional definition of accounts consisting mainly of trade receivables.
In Alabama, which constitutes my third treatment state, and the remaining four states,
4Appendix B.2 gives the section of the state statutes that guarantees anti-recharacterization for Texas,
Louisiana, and Alabama, which constitute my treatment states.
5Part of Section 9.109 of the Texas and Louisiana Uniform Commercial Code (U.C.C.) that explicitly dis-
cards the recharacterization: “The application of this chapter to the sale of accounts, chattel paper, payment
intangibles, or promissory notes is not to recharacterize that sale as a transaction to secure indebtedness but
to protect purchasers of those assets by providing a notice filing system. For all purposes, in the absence of
fraud or intentional misrepresentation, the parties’ characterization of a transaction as a sale of such assets
shall be conclusive that the transaction is a sale and is not a secured transaction and that title, legal and
equitable, has passed to the party characterized as the purchaser of those assets regardless of whether the
secured party has any recourse against the debtor, whether the debtor is entitled to any surplus, or any
other term of the parties’ agreement.”
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anti-recharacterization is guaranteed by an act that precludes recharacterization of a sale of
property of any kind included in a securitization transaction. In Appendix B.2, as can be
seen in Section 35-10A-2 of the Code of Alabama, no property, assets, or rights transferred
to an SPV can be subject to recharacterization. Assets typically transferred to an SPV
include trade receivables, residential and commercial loans, equipment leases, licenses, and
management contracts.
Taken together, these laws increase the pledgeability of any rights to future payment,
receivables, by making them more accessible to creditors. Manufacturing firms, which con-
stitute my sample, in particular generate a large amount of receivables. Korgaonkar and Nini
(2010) state that firms involved in the manufacturing and production of consumer durables
are heavy users of SPVs. For this reason, I expect these anti-recharacterization laws to have
a significant effect on manufacturing firms.
The use of securitization is not confined to manufacturing firms. Feng et al. (2009) doc-
ument that the percentage of firms using at least one SPV increased from 23 percent in
1997 to 59 percent in 2004, which confirms how common they became in the time period my
sample covers. Finally, these laws are fairly exogenous to the firms included in my sample.
Kettering (2008) describes the enactment of anti-recharacterization laws as a great success
of the securitization industry. Janger (2003) constitutes another study arguing for the big
role played by the financial industry in the enactment of anti-recharacterization laws. I will
return to the endogeneity concern due to lobbying by industrial firms in Section 2.4.1.1.
2.3. Data and Empirical Methodology
I adapt the empirical methodology of Bertrand and Mullainathan (2003) in the sample
construction and the plant-level analysis. In this section, I describe each step in detail.
2.3.1. Data Sources
The main data I use in this study is a combination of two data sets from the Census.
Both data sets cover only U.S. manufacturing plants. The first manufacturing plant data
set is the Census of Manufacturers (CMF). The CMF is conducted every five years and
consists of all manufacturing plants in the United States with at least one paid employee.
The second manufacturing data set is the Annual Survey of Manufacturers (ASM). The
ASM is conducted in years when the CMF is not conducted and includes a subset of plants
surveyed in the CMF. Plants with 250 employees and above are always included in this
sample, whereas plants with a smaller number of employees are chosen randomly, with a
37
probability positively correlated with their number of employees. Both of these data sets
include detailed information on industry, corporate affiliation, total shipments, employment,
capital expenditures, and material inputs of each plant. Reporting for both of these surveys
is mandatory and misreporting is penalized, which alleviates misreporting and response rate
concerns. The level of granularity of these manufacturing data sets plays a critical role
in my analysis. First, it allows me to construct various measures of productivity for each
manufacturing plant, and thereby analyze how the productivity of a plant and the creditor
rights are related. Second, it helps me study how the vintage of productive assets as well as
the capital-labor ratio are affected by providing granular and reliable machinery, computer,
and employment numbers.
In addition to these two manufacturing data sets, I use another data set from the Census,
the Longitudinal Business Database (LBD). The LBD keeps yearly track of all business
establishments in the United States with at least one paid employee. It provides information
on the number of employees, payroll, geographical location, industry, and corporate affiliation
for each establishment. For the purpose of this study, I use the LBD to get information about
the age of the plant as well as the number of plants owned by the firm the plant belongs to.
Finally, I use firm-level data from Compustat. I confine my analysis to public firms because
I can observe the state of incorporation only for public firms. I use the Compustat bridge
maintained by the Census to match firms in Compustat to plants. However, this bridge
ends in 2005. I extend the bridge to 2009 by making use of various employer characteristics,
including name, address, and identification number (EIN). My sample covers the period from
1992 to 2009.
2.3.2. Variable Construction and Summary Statistics
I follow Li et al. (2016) in the construction of the anti-recharacterization treatment variable,
which constitutes the main independent variable in this study. The anti-recharacterization
laws were enacted in seven states: Texas and Louisiana in 1997, Alabama in 2001, Delaware
in 2002, South Dakota in 2003, Virginia in 2004, and Nevada in 2005. However, the 2003
federal court ruling on Reaves Brokerage Company, Inc. vs. Sunbelt Fruit & Vegetable
Company, Inc. significantly harmed the influence of these laws by creating a precedent that
anti-recharacterization laws could be overruled by federal courts. For this reason, I only
include Texas, Louisiana, and Alabama in the set of treated states.
Following Li et al. (2016), I consider firms incorporated in Texas, Louisiana, and Alabama
between 1997 and 2003 as treated firms. I also include firms whose headquarters are in those
states between 1997 and 2001 in the set of treated firms. The question of which state law
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will govern recharacterization is quite complicated.6 Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial
Code (U.C.C.) specifies the rules governing secured transactions, including securitization. A
revised version of Article 9, effective as of July 2001, states that the law governing a secured
party’s interest in receivables is the law of the location of the debtor, which is defined to
be the state in which the entity is registered. For corporations, this definition of location
of debtor means the state of incorporation. However, the old version of Article 9, effective
before June 2001, deemed the debtor’s location to be the location of its chief executive office,
which is the headquarters. The official comment to this older version of Article 9 explicitly
states that the chief executive office does not mean the place of incorporation but is the
place from which the debtor manages the main part of his business operations. Therefore,
before 2001, the state of headquarters needs to be taken into account.7
The main dependent variable I use in this study is the natural logarithm of total factor
productivity (TFP), which I am constructing at the plant level following the methodology
in Foster et al. (2014).
TFP it = ln Q it − αkt ln K it − αlt ln Lit − αmt ln M it, (2.1)
where i and t index plant and year, respectively. The variables TFP, Q, K, L, M, and α
represent total factor productivity, real output, capital stock, labor input, cost of materials
and parts, and factor elasticities, respectively.8 Output is constructed by summing the total
value of shipments and change in inventories for finished goods and work-in-process. Because
the Census does not collect establishment-level prices, I use an industry-level measure from
the NBER-CES Manufacturing Industry Database to deflate output.
A perpetual inventory method is used to construct capital stock that consists of structure
and equipment belonging to the plant. The first year a plant is seen in the CMF/ASM
is taken as a starting point to construct capital stock series. Capital expenditures using
investment price deflators from the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) at the two-digit SIC
or three-digit NAICS level are added to the capital stock each year. An industry-level
depreciation rate from the Bureau of Economic Analysis is used. Capital stock series are
constructed for structure and equipment separately. They are then added to represent the
total capital stock owned by the plant. Following Brav et al. (2015), I use “production-worker
equivalent hours” as my measure of labor input. This measure is constructed by multiplying
number of hours worked by production workers with the ratio of total wages and salaries
to total wages and salaries paid to production workers. Materials costs include both non-
6See Kettering (2011) for an extensive analysis of the choice of law governing recharacterization.
7See Appendix B.2 for the choice of law rules specified in both old and new versions of Article 9.
8See Foster et al. (2014) for a more detailed explanation of how each variable is constructed.
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energy and energy-related costs. Non-energy materials costs include costs of materials and
parts as well as cost of resales and contract work. Energy costs include electricity and fuel
costs. Both types of costs are deflated by their corresponding industry deflators. Finally,
following Syverson (2011) and Foster et al. (2014), I use industry-level factor cost shares
for factor elasticities. I get the industry-level cost shares for capital, labor, materials, and
energy expenditures from the NBER Productivity Database.
In addition to total factor productivity, I analyze the effects of stronger creditor rights on
factor productivities, including labor and capital productivities. I use the measure of labor
productivity used in Brav et al. (2015) and Silva (2013): the natural logarithm of value
added per labor hour, which is the total value of shipments minus material and energy costs
divided by total labor hours. As to capital productivity, I follow Giroud and Mueller (2015)-
and use return on capital (ROC), which is calculated as the total value of shipments minus
labor, material, and energy costs scaled by capital stock. All inputs are measured in 1997
dollars.
In the second part of the empirical analysis, where I try to uncover the determinants of
increased productivity, I use two variables: new machinery investment and computer invest-
ment. New machinery investment is constructed by scaling new machinery expenditures by
lagged capital stock. Following Brav et al. (2015), I use the capital expenditures for com-
puters variable from the CMF and ASM databases and scale it by lagged capital stock to
represent investment in information technology (IT). Specifically, capital expenditures for
computers includes computer hardware, software, and network expenditures. I have this
variable starting with 2000.
Futhermore, I examine how new machinery expenditures scaled by labor change following
the enactment of anti-recharacterization laws. To ensure the robustness of my findings, I use
four different variables to represent labor. First, I use total payroll to represent the aggregate
amount of wages and salaries. Second, I use production payroll to represent the amount of
wages and salaries paid to production workers. Third, I use employees to represent the
number of employees. Finally, I use total hours to represent the number of hours worked
at the plant. I winsorize all variables at 1 percent to ensure that the results are robust to
outliers.
Table 2.1 presents summary statistics for the aggregate sample as well as the subsample of
plant-year observations treated by anti-recharacterization laws.9 The final sample contains
220,000 plant-year observations covering the period between 1992 and 2009. As seen, the
subsample of treated plants accounts for a relatively small fraction of the total plant-year
9Following the disclosure requirements of the Census, quantile values are not reported; I round off number
of observations in each table.
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observations. However, the treated subsample nearing 10,000 plant-year observations is suffi-
cient, given that the treatment effect requires only that the treated subsample be sufficiently
large in absolute terms, as argued in Giroud (2013). Untreated plants are older and bigger,
which constitutes one of the main reasons why I include age of plants and their total value
of shipments to control for differences between treated and untreated plants.
2.3.3. Identification and Empirical Model
I closely follow Bertrand and Mullainathan (2003) in my empirical strategy. The only dif-
ference is that, in my setting, not only the state of incorporation but also the state of
headquarters plays a role. In the first part of my empirical analysis, I estimate the following
equation:
y ifhklst = αlst + αi + αh + αk + γ X ifhklst + δ ARLhkt + ifhklst, (2.2)
where i, f , h, k, l, s, and t index plant, firm, state of headquarters, state of incorporation,
state of location, industry, and year, respectively. The unit of observation is a plant-year.
The variable y stands for variables related to productivity and investment: total factor
productivity (TFP), labor productivity, return on capital, new machinery investment, and
computer investment. ARLhkt is an indicator variable that equals one if the plant belongs to
a firm whose state of headquarters or state of incorporation passed an anti-recharacterization
law (ARL) within the past three years (t, t-1, and t-2 ). Following Bai (2016), I take the
last three years into account given that the effect of these laws on productivity may take
longer to materialize. αlst, αi, αh, and αk are state of location-industry-year, plant, state of
headquarters, and state of incorporation fixed effects, respectively. X ifhklst stands for plant
and firm controls: total value of shipments, age of the plant, and number of plants owned
by the firm the plant belongs to. Age is defined based on the first year the plant is first
seen in LBD records. Industry is defined at the two-digit SIC level. Following Bertrand and
Mullainathan (2003), I cluster standard errors at the state of location level.10
Because of the 2003 federal court ruling, I adopt an “on-off” approach in my estimation
strategy, following Li et al. (2016) and Chu (2017). According to this approach, the “on”
period includes years after a state passes anti-recharacterization laws but before 2004. I do
not include 2004 and the following years because of the 2003 federal court ruling that created
substantial uncertainty around these laws. To be more specific about the treatment variable,
for a firm incorporated in Texas, the “on” period consists of 1997 to 2003, whereas the “off”
10In regressions not reported here, I cluster standard errors at the state of headquarters, state of incorpo-
ration, and firm level and find similar results.
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period consists of 1992 to 1996 and 2004 to 2009.
I control for time-invariant characteristics at the plant level through plant fixed effects.
Following Bertrand and Mullainathan (2003), I use state of incorporation fixed effects to
control for time-invariant differences between treated and untreated plants. In addition, I
use state of headquarters fixed effects, given that my definition of treatment includes both
state of incorporation and state of headquarters. The state of location dummies interacted
with industry and year dummies, αlst, allow me to fully control for contemporaneous shocks
at the state of location and industry levels. There are two main reasons why I use state and
industry dummies. First, as documented in Foster et al. (2014), total factor productivity
shows considerable variation across industries. For this reason, industry differences need
to be controlled. Second, the TFP measure I am using is essentially a revenue measure.
Demand shocks at different geographies may inflate or deflate my TFP measure in a way
totally unrelated to the productive efficiency, which constitutes the main reason why I control
for state of location. For these two main reasons, I use state-industry-year fixed effects to
fully control for contemporaneous shocks at the state of location. I use fixed effects instead
of demeaning the dependent variable at the state-industry-year level because demeaning can
lead to inconsistent estimates (Gormley and Matsa, 2013). The coefficient of interest is δ,
which measures the effect of anti-recharacterization laws on TFP.
One potential problem is related to the endogeneity of anti-recharacterization laws. If
firms in my sample lobbied for these laws, then enactment of these laws might be correlated
with unobserved factors affecting firms’ productivity. First, Kettering (2008) describes the
enactment of anti-recharacterization laws as a great success of the securitization industry.
Kettering (2008) argues that these statutes are the product of efforts by the financial industry
to totally abolish the possibility of recharacterization. Second, I address this concern with
a dynamic analysis explained in great detail in Section 3.2. If these laws are the result of
economic factors leading firms to lobby for them, then I should be able to detect their effect
before their enactment. My dynamic analysis shows no such effect.
2.4. Empirical Results
This section documents how anti-recharacterization laws affect firms’ productivity as well
as their investment decisions. In Section 4.1, I analyze how stronger creditor rights affect
total as well as factor productivities. In Section 4.2, I investigate the channel through which
stronger creditor rights translate into increasing productivity.
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2.4.1. Anti-Recharacterization Laws and Productivity
I first estimate equation (2) with the natural logarithm of total factor productivity as the
dependent variable. Table 2.2 presents the results.
Column [1] presents results from estimation of equation (2) with only plant and year fixed
effects. The estimated coefficient of interest, which is the one on ARL, is 0.032, and it is
significant at the 1 percent confidence level. The positive sign of this estimate is in line
with the prediction that stronger creditor rights will lead firms to operate more efficiently.
To put this estimate in economic terms, I follow Schoar (2002) and Krishnan et al. (2014).
Holding inputs constant, a 3.2 percent increase in total factor productivity corresponds to
a 3.2 percent increase in revenues. Since the elasticity of profits to total factor productivity
is greater than one, increase in revenues will result in a greater increase in profits, the
magnitude of which will depend on the profit margin. Assuming a profit margin of 20 or
40 percent, a 3.2 percent increase in total factor productivity will lead to a 16 or 8 percent
increase in profits, respectively, which is economically significant.
Column [2] adds state of incorporation and state of headquarters fixed effects to control for
time-invariant differences between treated and untreated firms. The inclusion of these fixed
effects decreases the estimated coefficient to 0.027. However, this coefficient is still significant
at the 1 percent confidence level, and translates into a 2.7 percentage-point increase in total
factor productivity.
Column [3] adds state of location-industry-year fixed effects to the estimation in column [2]
to further tighten the specification. As discussed in Section 3.1.3, these interacted dummies
allow me to control for contemporaneous shocks at the state of location level. The inclusion
of these controls makes a small change to the estimated coefficient of interest, which is 0.026
and significant at the 1 percent confidence level. The enactment of anti-recharacterization
laws is associated with an economically and statistically significant increase in total factor
productivity.
In Table 2.3, I look at the effects of anti-recharacterization laws on factor productivities.
Columns [1] to [3], and [4] to [6], report results for labor and capital productivity, respectively.
For labor productivity, estimated coefficients of interest range between 0.057 and 0.068 across
specifications. Estimates are both economically and statistically significant, which suggests
that increase in labor productivity is an important driver of an increase in total factor
productivity.
In columns [4] to [6], I follow Giroud and Mueller (2015), and use return on capital
(ROC), which is calculated as total value of shipments minus labor, material, and energy
costs scaled by capital stock to proxy for capital productivity. Estimated coefficients are
both economically and statistically significant.
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Taken together, these estimates indicate that the passage of anti-recharacterization laws
leads to an economically large and statistically robust effect on total factor productivity and
capital and labor productivities of treated plants. These estimates suggest a positive impact
of stronger creditor rights, leading firms to operate more efficiently.
2.4.1.1. Robustness Checks
I next conduct several tests to ensure the robustness of the results in Table 2.2. One po-
tential problem is that spurious correlation might be driving the results in Table 2.2. Some
unobserved covariates or changing economic conditions might be inducing firms to operate
more efficiently as well as lobby for the anti-recharacterization laws. While there seems to
be no perfect way to address this concern, I estimate a dynamic version of equation (2) to
investigate when the effects of these laws materialize. If there is a spurious correlation due to
changing economic conditions, it is reasonable to expect a significant effect on productivity
before the passage of these laws.
Table 2.4 investigates the dynamic effects of anti-recharacterization laws. In column [1],
the estimated coefficient on Before−1 is economically small and statistically insignificant.
The estimated coefficient on Before0, which represents the year anti-recharacterization laws
passed, is economically bigger. However, it lacks statistical significance. Finally, the coeffi-
cients on After1 and After2+ are both economically and statistically significant. In line with
my expectations, this shows that the effects of these laws on total factor productivity start
materializing one year after their passage.
Columns [2] and [3] conduct the same analysis in column [1] for labor productivity and
return on capital, respectively. In column [2], there is no significant effect on labor produc-
tivity before the passage of the laws: the estimated coefficient on Before−1 is economically
small and statistically insignificant. The coefficient on Before0 is 0.060 and significant at
the 1 percent confidence level. For the following years, the coefficients get bigger: 0.100 and
0.090 for After1 and After2+, respectively, and they are significant at the 1 percent confidence
level.
Column [3] further strengthens the causal interpretation of these laws: The coefficient on
Before−1 is statistically indistinguishable from zero. Taken together, none of the columns
in Table 2.4 show a significant effect of these laws before they are passed, which allays the
concerns that these laws were passed as a result of changing economic conditions.
In Table 2.5, I conduct another test to check the validity of the results in Table 2.2
and 2.3. One might worry that there are regional shocks affecting firms headquartered or
incorporated in treated and nearby states. Hence, my estimates might simply be picking up
these regional shocks rather than the effect of anti-recharacterization laws. I address this
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issue in the following way: following Campello and Larrain (2016), I falsely assume that
states bordering Texas, Louisiana, and Alabama passed the anti-recharacterization laws.
Columns [1] to [3] report results using total factor productivity, labor productivity, and
return on capital, respectively, as dependent variables using falsely assumed treated states.
None of the three estimations give a significant result, which shows that results in Table 2.2
and Table 2.3 are not artifacts of some regional or political shocks affecting states in the
near geography of Texas, Louisiana, and Alabama.
There are several concerns related to the productivity measure I am using in my baseline
estimations. One criticism of this measure is that it does not take into account selection and
simultaneity issues. The selection problem arises because of the exit of unproductive plants,
whereas the simultaneity problem arises when firms increase (decrease) output and input
at the same time in response to a positive (negative) productivity shock, which introduces
correlation between the error term and the inputs in the estimation of TFP. To address
selection and simultaneity issues, I employ the structural techniques of Olley and Pakes
(1996) and Levinsohn and Petrin (2003). Estimated coefficients of interest are very similar
to the ones in Table 2.2.
In ASM, plants with more than 250 employees are always included, whereas plants with a
smaller number of employees are chosen randomly, with a probability positively correlated
with their number of employees. This sampling policy creates bias toward larger plants. To
address this, I reestimate the baseline regression by weighting observations by their respective
ASM sample weight. Results are very similar to those in Table 2.2.
2.4.2. Channel behind Creditor Rights and Increasing Productivity
2.4.2.1. Debt
From this point on, I investigate the channel through which stronger creditor rights translate
into increasing productivity. In this section, I analyze whether stronger creditor rights as a
result of anti-recharacterization laws lead firms to increase their borrowing. On the theo-
retical front, the effect of stronger creditor rights on the borrowing behavior of firms is not
obvious. On the one hand, relaxation of collateral constraints would induce firms to borrow
more, as predicted in Hart and Moore (1994). On the other hand, as seen in Vig (2013),
increasing access to collateral by creditors might lead firms to decrease their use of secured
debt.
Table 2.6 shows that consistent with Hart and Moore (1994) and Li et al. (2016), treated
firms increase their borrowing. In columns [1] and [2], long-term debt scaled by total assets
increases significantly. The estimated coefficient of interest is statistically significant at the
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1 percent confidence level. In columns [3] and [4], leverage, defined as the sum of long-term
and short-term debt divided by total assets, increases significantly. Finally, in columns [5]
and [6], the dependent variable is defined to be the natural logarithm of the sum of long-term
and short-term debt to ensure that the results in columns [1] to [4] are not driven by the
asset values in the denominator. Estimated coefficients show that total debt increases by
approximately 14 percent, which is economically significant. These results confirm that anti-
recharacterization laws relax the borrowing constraints of treated firms by allowing creditors
more access to collateral.
2.4.2.2. Financial Constraints and Productivity
If firms can’t make productivity-enhancing investments because of financial constraints, then
a relaxation of borrowing constraints as a result of improved access to collateral by credi-
tors should have a stronger effect on the productive efficiency of constrained firms, which
constitutes the hypothesis I am testing in this section.
I focus on three different measures of financial constraints. Following Giroud and Mueller
(2015), for all three financing constraint measures I use, I take the median value one year
before the treatment across all companies to classify firms as financially constrained or fi-
nancially unconstrained. My first measure of financing constraints is firm size. I classify
firms as financially constrained (unconstrained) if their lagged asset value is below (above)
the median. Second, I use the size-age (SA) index first used in Hadlock and Pierce (2010).
I classify firms as financially constrained (unconstrained) if their SA value, which is a lin-
ear combination of their asset value and age, is above (below) the median. Finally, I use
the Whited-Wu index first used in Whited and Wu (2006). I classify firms as financially
constrained (unconstrained) if their Whited-Wu value is above (below) the median.
Table 2.7 presents the results. Columns [1], [3], and [5] show that plants belonging to
financially constrained firms experience a significant increase in total factor productivity
following the passage of anti-recharacterization laws. Estimated coefficients are statistically
significant at the 1 percent confidence level. Columns [2], [4], and [6] indicate that there
is no significant change in the total factor productivity of plants belonging to financially
unconstrained firms. All estimated coefficients are statistically indistinguishable from zero.11
Results in this table show that following a relaxation of borrowing constraints, financially
constrained firms use the extra financing to operate more efficiently.
If a firm is financially constrained, then optimality implies that increased access to finance
as a result of relaxation of borrowing constraints will be spread across other units to equate
11F-tests ensure that difference between estimated coefficients for constrained and unconstrained firms is
statistically significant at the 1 percent confidence level.
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the marginal revenue product across units. In Table 2.8, I test this implication by looking
at the productivity of plants differing in location with respect to the state of headquarters
and state of incorporation. I classify each plant as near or far depending on its state of
location. I classify a plant as near if it is located at either the state of headquarters or the
state of incorporation of the firm it belongs to, far otherwise. This test also allows me to see
whether baseline results in Table 2.2 are an artifact of some local economic shocks in Texas,
Louisiana, or Alabama.
Table 2.8 shows that plants both in and out of these treated states experience an increase
in productivity, which is in line with the implication that financially constrained firms spread
financing shocks to all of their units.
2.4.2.3. Investment Composition
Results so far show that firms borrow more and operate more efficiently following the enact-
ment of anti-recharacterization laws. In this section, I will try to establish the link between
increased borrowing and increased productively by looking at investments made at the plant
level.
There is an important literature arguing that relaxation of collateral-based lending con-
straints will result in higher investment by firms.12 However, not all investment is the same
in terms of productivity consequences. Firms might be investing in pet projects, or invest
in land or buildings that may have little effect on the efficiency of the production process.
Therefore, the composition of investment plays a critical role for productivity.
One aspect of investment composition relevant for productivity is vintage of capital. Eis-
feldt and Rampini (2007) show that investing in used capital rather than new capital is very
common among credit-constrained firms. They also show that the fraction of used capital
expenditures relative to total capital expenditures decreases significantly as one moves to-
ward relatively less constrained firms. If new capital is more productive due to technological
progress, then firms can become productive by investing in new capital rather than used cap-
ital. This line of reasoning is in line with Midrigan and Xu (2014), who argue that distortion
of technology adoption decisions is an important channel through which financial frictions
decrease productivity. According to this argument, following the relaxation in borrowing
constraints, firms become more productive by increasing their technology adoption.
A second aspect of investment composition relates to the capital-labor ratio. Garmaise
(2008) argues that constrained firms are much more labor-intensive in their production pro-
cess. He also predicts that productivity of constrained firms will decrease over time since
12Chaney et al. (2012), Gan (2007), and Peek and Rosengren (2000) are prominent examples of this
literature.
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they cannot shift to a more capital-intensive production process.
One of the main reasons why there is relatively limited research about the composition of
investment is data limitations. Aggregate items like capital investment expenditures or plant,
property, and equipment reported by standard corporate data sources cannot inform us about
the vintage of the productive assets or the number of machines per labor in a manufacturing
plant. Furthermore, the difficulty of finding reliable firm- or plant-level employment numbers
constitutes another obstacle against any attempt to analyze the capital intensity of a firm’s
production.
The Census provides two important variables for my vintage and technology adoption
analysis: new machinery expenditures and capital expenditures for computers. Columns [1]
to [3] of Table 2.9 document how the new machinery investments13 of treated firms change
following the adoption of anti-recharacterization laws. The dependent variable is new ma-
chinery investment, calculated by scaling new machinery expenditures by the lagged capital
stock. The CMF and ASM databases provide detailed description of machinery-related ex-
penditures by differentiating between new and old machinery expenditures. Results indicate
that treated plants increase their new machinery investments. The estimated coefficient of
interest in column [3] is 0.008, and it is significant at the 1 percent confidence level. In terms
of economic magnitudes, this estimate corresponds to a 7.5 percent increase relative to the
sample mean, which is significant.
Capital expenditures for computers constitute the second variable for the analysis in Table
2.9. There is an important literature on the relationship between information technology
(IT), computers, and output.14 Two recent studies in the finance literature examine the
impact of IT-related investments. First, Brav et al. (2015) show that IT-related invest-
ments by hedge funds contribute to the productivity of target firms. Second, Agrawal and
Tambe (2016) argue that many employees in target firms benefit from IT-related private
13Census defines machinery expenditures in the following way: “Machinery expenditures include outlays
for the following types of equipment: lathes, punch presses and similar machinery and equipment for use
in production, as well as office machines and fixtures, computers, furniture, cafeteria and dressing room
furnishings, automobiles and tracks, and other similar equipment. Capital expenditures also include the
value of major improvements and repairs to existing machinery and equipment, if the cost is capitalized,
whether repairs and improvements were purchased or made by employees of the reporting establishment.”
Census defines new machinery expenditures in the following way: “New Machinery Expenditures consist of
capital expenditures during the year for new production machinery and equipment and other new machinery
and equipment, including replacements as well as additions to capacity. New equipment manufactured by
the plant for use in its own production should be included in this category.”
14By using survey data from 584 establishments and 21 industries, Kelley (1994) shows that computer-
controlled machinery is key to efficiency in manufacturing process. Greenman and Mairesse (1996) examine
the French manufacturing and service industries and argue that use of computers impacts productivity
positively. Finally, Black and Lynch (2001), using a nationally representative sample of businesses, show
that plant productivity is positively correlated with greater computer usage by non-managerial employees.
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equity investments by acquiring new skills. They show that workers treated with a private
equity investment earn higher wages on average. Therefore, IT-related investment can be a
channel through which stronger creditor rights translate into increasing productive efficiency.
Columns [4] to [6] of Table 2.9 document how computer investment changes following the
passage of anti-recharacterization laws. The dependent variable is computer investment,
defined as capital expenditures for computers scaled by lagged capital stock. I observe that
treated plants increase their computer investment. The estimated coefficients are statistically
significant at the 1 percent or 5 percent confidence level.
A potential problem with the results in columns [1] to [6] is that the increase in new
machinery and computer investments does not necessarily mean that the average productive
capital is becoming newer. Used capital expenditures might be increasing as well. To check
this, in columns [7] to [9], in line with Eisfeldt and Rampini (2007), I analyze how the fraction
of new machinery expenditures relative to total capital expenditures changes. I find that
the fraction of new machinery expenditures relative to total capital expenditures increases
significantly at treated plants. Estimated coefficients of interest are statistically significant
at the 1 percent confidence level in all columns. The estimated coefficient in column [3]
is 0.027, and is economically significant given that it constitutes about 12.2 percent of its
standard deviation (0.221) among the full sample of plants. Therefore, I make sure that the
treated plants are moving toward a younger vintage and newer technology.
The second compositional aspect I analyze relates to the capital-intensity of the produc-
tion. The CMF and ASM data sets provide two advantages regarding the labor component
of my analysis. First, both data sets are of the highest quality and reliability given that
misreporting is penalized. Second, these two data sets provide a variety of labor-related
variables, including number of employees, total hours worked, total payroll, and production
payroll, which will allow me to make sure that any result I get about the capital-labor ratio
is not an artifact of the labor measure I am using.
The results in Table 2.9 do not necessarily indicate that production is becoming more
capital-intensive. In a plant where the number of employees grows faster than machinery,
we might wrongfully interpret increases in machinery investment as making the plant more
machinery-intensive. Therefore, in Table 2.10, I analyze new machinery investment in con-
junction with labor. The dependent variable is new machinery expenditures scaled by labor.
In each column, I use a different variable to represent labor: total payroll, production pay-
roll, employees, and total hours. In column [1], total payroll represents the total amount of
wages and salaries. In column [2], production payroll represents the total amount of wages
and salaries paid to production workers. In column [3], employees represents the number of
employees. Finally, in column [4], total hours represents the total number of hours worked.
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The results in all columns indicate that new machinery expenditures per labor increase
significantly at treated plants following the adoption of anti-recharacterization laws. There-
fore, in line with Garmaise (2008), I show that increasing capital intensity is associated with
relaxation of borrowing constraints and increasing productivity.
In Table 2.11, I investigate where the increase in productivity reported in Table 2.2 is com-
ing from. If financial constraints cause firms not to take up productive projects, relaxation
of these constraints should make the greatest impact on parts of the firm that remain unpro-
ductive because of these constraints. This makes more sense in an environment where firms
operate in multiple industries and have limited budgets, which makes them unable to make
productivity-enhancing investments in all segments in which they operate. Therefore, I ex-
pect that unproductive plants should experience the greatest change in productivity as well
as change in productivity-enhancing investments reported in Table 2.9 and 2.10. Table 2.11
uses total factor productivity one year before the treatment to rank plants. I adopt a within-
firm productivity ranking of plants. Columns [1] and [2] use the same dependent variable
I used in column [1] of Table 2.11, new machinery expenditures over total payroll, whereas
columns [3] and [4] use total factor productivity as the dependent variable. After ranking
the plants based on their productivity, I look at how their new machinery expenditures over
total payroll and TFP change during the following three years. First, I see that initially
unproductive plants experience both an economically and statistically significant increase
in productivity. In column [4], the estimated coefficient on ARL × Unproductive is 0.052,
which translates into a productivity increase of 5.2 percentage points, and is statistically
significant at the 1 percent confidence level. Productive plants before the treatment do not
appear to become more productive, given that the estimated coefficient on ARL×Productive
is statistically indistinguishable from zero. Second, columns [1] and [2] show that initially
unproductive plants that happen to experience a substantial increase in productivity are the
ones that happen to benefit from an increase in new machinery expenditures per unit of
labor. The estimated coefficient on ARL×Unproductive is statistically different from zero at
the 1 percent confidence level. Therefore, a within-firm productivity ranking of plants helps
me nail down the one-to-one relationship between the increasing productivity and capital
intensity reported in the first and second parts of my empirical analysis, respectively.
Taken together, the results in Table 2.6 to Table 2.11 show that following the enact-
ment anti-recharacterization laws, treated manufacturing firms borrow more and make two
compositional changes in their investments: first, they increase the share of total capital
expenditures on new capital by increasing new machinery and computer investments. Sec-
ond, they increase the capital- and machine-intensity of their plants. These changes happen
to primarily benefit the productivity of initially unproductive plants. This also suggests
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that the underlying reason why these plants were unproductive in the first place is that
productivity-enhancing investments were not being done because of financial constraints.
2.5. Conclusion
Using plant-level data from the Census, I first show that the total factor productivity of plants
belonging to treated firms increases significantly, by 2.6 percent, following the adoption of
anti-recharacterization laws in Texas, Louisiana, and Alabama. The granularity of my data
helps me compare two plants in the same state, industry, and year. My baseline results
survive various robustness checks, including a dynamic analysis of the effects of laws and a
placebo test where treated states are falsely assumed to be neighboring states.
As argued in Li et al. (2016), anti-recharacterization laws allow secured creditors to seize
collateral easily in case the debtor declares bankruptcy. I show that this improved ability
to access collateral mainly benefits the productive efficiency of financially constrained firms:
productivity of plants belonging to financially constrained firms increases, whereas there is
no significant change for plants belonging to financially unconstrained firms. This finding is
in line with previous research arguing that a relaxation of financial constraints induces firms
to increase their productivity by adopting productivity-enhancing projects (Midrigan and
Xu, 2014; Krishnan et al., 2014).
In the second part of my empirical analysis, I analyze two compositional aspects of in-
vestment argued to be related to financial constraints and having the potential to affect
productivity. First, I show that treated plants invest in capital of younger vintage and newer
technology by increasing their new machinery and computer investments. Second, I docu-
ment that new machinery expenditures per labor increase, which means that treated plants
move toward a more mechanized and capital-intensive production. Finally, I document that
these investments primarily benefit initially unproductive plants, which experience the high-
est increase in productivity following the enactment of laws. This finding suggests that firms
now can take up productive projects for their plants they could not previously invest in due
to borrowing constraints.
My results are consistent with the view that stronger creditor rights during bankruptcy can
help firms have more access to credit and to productivity-enhancing projects. My findings
have crucial policy implications, especially in a time period where advanced economies suffer


















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 2.2 Creditor Rights and Productivity: Baseline Estimates
This table presents estimates of the plant-level impact of anti-recharacterization laws on total
factor productivity (TFP). The main independent variable is ARL, which is an indicator variable
that equals one if a firm is headquartered in a treated state between 1997 and 2001 or incorporated
in a treated state between 1997 and 2003. The unit of observation in each regression is a plant-year
pair. Control variables include size and age of the plant as well as the number of plants owned by
the firm. All variables are defined in Appendix A. Standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered




ARL 0.032*** 0.027*** 0.026***
(0.008) (0.010) (0.010)
Control Variables Y Y Y
Plant Fixed Effects Y Y Y
Year Fixed Effects Y Y Y
State of Incorporation Fixed Effects N Y Y
State of Headquarters Fixed Effects N Y Y
State of Location-Industry-Year Fixed Effects N N Y
Rounded N 220,000 220,000 220,000
R2 0.77 0.77 0.74
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Table 2.3 Creditor Rights and Productivity: Labor and Capital Productivities
This table presents estimates of the plant-level impact of anti-recharacterization laws on labor and
capital productivities. The dependent variables in columns [1] to [3] and [4] to [6] are labor and
capital productivities, respectively. Labor productivity is defined as the natural logarithm of value
added per labor hour. Return on capital, calculated as sales minus material and energy costs and
payroll divided by plant-level capital stock, is used to measure capital productivity. The unit of
observation in each regression is a plant-year pair. The main independent variable is ARL, which
is an indicator variable that equals one if a firm is headquartered in a treated state between 1997
and 2001 or incorporated in a treated state between 1997 and 2003. Control variables include size
and age of the plant as well as the number of plants owned by the firm. All variables are defined
in Appendix A. Standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered at the state of location level. ***,
**, and * denote statistical significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent levels, respectively.
Dependent Variable: Labor Productivity Return on Capital
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6]
ARL 0.058*** 0.057** 0.068*** 0.090*** 0.082** 0.095***
(0.023) (0.026) (0.032) (0.037) (0.037) (0.036)
Control Variables Y Y Y Y Y Y
Plant Fixed Effects Y Y Y Y Y Y
Year Fixed Effects Y Y Y Y Y Y
State of Incorporation Fixed Effects N Y Y N Y Y
State of Headquarters Fixed Effects N Y Y N Y Y
State of Location-Industry-Year Fixed Effects N N Y N N Y
Rounded N 220,000 220,000 220,000 220,000 220,000 220,000
R2 0.77 0.77 0.77 0.74 0.74 0.74
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Table 2.4 Creditor Rights and Productivity: Dynamic Estimates
This table presents estimates of the plant-level impact of anti-recharacterization laws on total
factor, labor, and capital productivities. Columns [1] to [3] use total factor productivity (TFP)
and labor and capital productivities, respectively, as dependent variables. Labor productivity is
defined as the natural logarithm of value added per labor hour. Return on capital, calculated as
sales minus material and energy costs and payroll divided by plant-level capital stock, is used
to measure capital productivity. The unit of observation in each regression is a plant-year pair.
Before−1 is an indicator variable that equals one if the plant belongs to a firm headquartered
or incorporated in a state that will pass anti-recharacterization laws in one year. Before0 is an
indicator variable that equals one if the plant belongs to a firm headquartered or incorporated
in a state that passes anti-recharacterization laws that year. After1 is an indicator variable that
equals one if the plant belongs to a firm headquartered or incorporated in a state that passed
anti-recharacterization laws one year ago. After2+ is an indicator variable that equals one if the
plant belongs to a firm headquartered or incorporated in a state that passed anti-recharacterization
laws two years ago or more. Control variables include size and age of the plant as well as the
number of plants owned by the firm. All variables are defined in Appendix A. Standard errors
(in parentheses) are clustered at the state of location level. ***, **, and * denote statistical
significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent levels, respectively.
Dependent Variable: TFP Labor Productivity Return on Capital
[1] [2] [3]
Before−1 -0.009 0.017 0.036
(0.012) (0.025) (0.028)
Before0 0.014 0.060*** 0.160***
(0.012) (0.016) (0.043)
After1 0.039** 0.100*** 0.318**
(0.019) (0.020) (0.132)
After2+ 0.060*** 0.090*** 0.160**
(0.015) (0.018) (0.079)
Control Variables Y Y Y
Plant Fixed Effects Y Y Y
Year Fixed Effects Y Y Y
State of Incorporation Fixed Effects Y Y Y
State of Headquarters Fixed Effects Y Y Y
State of Location-Industry-Year Fixed Effects Y Y Y
Rounded N 220,000 220,000 220,000
R2 0.77 0.77 0.74
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Table 2.5 Creditor Rights and Productivity: Placebo Treatment
This table presents estimates of the plant-level impact of placebo anti-recharacterization laws on
total factor, labor, and capital productivities. In this robustness exercise, I falsely assume that
states bordering Texas, Louisiana, or Alabama are treated. Columns [1] to [3] use total factor
productivity (TFP) and labor and capital productivities, respectively, as dependent variables.
Labor productivity is defined as the natural logarithm of value added per labor hour. Return on
capital, calculated as sales minus material and energy costs and payroll divided by plant-level
capital stock, is used to measure capital productivity. The unit of observation in each regression
is a plant-year pair. The main independent variable is ARL, which is an indicator variable that
equals one if a firm is headquartered in a treated state between 1997 and 2001 or incorporated in
a treated state between 1997 and 2003. Control variables include size and age of the plant as well
as the number of plants owned by the firm. All variables are defined in Appendix A. Standard
errors (in parentheses) are clustered at the state of location level. ***, **, and * denote statistical
significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent levels, respectively.
Dependent Variable: TFP Labor Productivity Return on Capital
[1] [2] [3]
ARL 0.009 -0.004 -0.039
(0.013) (0.020) (0.051)
Control Variables Y Y Y
Plant Fixed Effects Y Y Y
Year Fixed Effects Y Y Y
State of Incorporation Fixed Effects Y Y Y
State of Headquarters Fixed Effects Y Y Y
State of Location-Industry-Year Fixed Effects Y Y Y
Rounded N 220,000 220,000 220,000
R2 0.77 0.77 0.74
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Table 2.6 Creditor Rights and Productivity: Debt
This table presents estimates of the firm-level impact of anti-recharacterization laws on long-term
debt, leverage, and total debt. I define the long-term debt, leverage, and total debt as long-term
debt scaled by total assets, sum of long-term and short-term debt scaled by total assets, and the
natural logarithm of sum of long-term and short-term debt, respectively. The main independent
variable is ARL, which is an indicator variable that equals one if a firm is headquartered in a
treated state between 1997 and 2001 or incorporated in a treated state between 1997 and 2003.
The unit of observation in each regression is a firm-year pair. Firm controls include the natural
logarithm of sales, profitability, Tobin’s Q, and tangibility. All variables are defined in Appendix
A. Standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered at the state of location level. ***, **, and *
denote statistical significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent levels, respectively.
Dependent Variable: Long-Term Debt Leverage Total Debt
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6]
ARL 0.019*** 0.018*** 0.017*** 0.013** 0.136** 0.137**
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.060) (0.058) (0.007)
Sales 0.024*** 0.024*** 0.024***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Profitability -0.127*** -0.127*** -0.127***
(0.017) (0.017) (0.017)
Tobin’s Q -0.009*** -0.009*** -0.009***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Tangibility 0.106*** 0.106*** 0.106***
(0.014) (0.014) (0.014)
Firm FE Y Y Y Y Y Y
Year FE Y Y Y Y Y Y
Rounded N 30,000 30,000 30,000 30,000 30,000 30,000























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 2.8 Creditor Rights and Productivity: Productivity Change Across Plants Differing
in Location
This table presents estimates of the plant-level impact of anti-recharacterization laws on produc-
tivity across plants differing in location with respect to the state of headquarters and state of
incorporation. Each plant is classified as near or far depending on its state of location. A plant is
classified as near if it is located at either the state of headquarters or the state of incorporation
of the firm it belongs to, far otherwise. ARL is an indicator variable that equals one if a firm is
headquartered in a treated state between 1997 and 2001 or incorporated in a treated state between
1997 and 2003. The unit of observation in each regression is a plant-year pair. Control variables
include size and age of the plant as well as the number of plants owned by the firm. All variables
are defined in Appendix A. Standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered at the state of location
level. ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent levels, respectively.
Dependent Variable: TFP
[1] [2] [3]
ARL×Near 0.036** 0.036** 0.039**
(0.015) (0.014) (0.016)
ARL× Far 0.029*** 0.023** 0.020**
(0.009) (0.011) (0.010)
Control Variables Y Y Y
Plant Fixed Effects Y Y Y
Year Fixed Effects Y Y Y
State of Incorporation Fixed Effects N Y Y
State of Headquarters Fixed Effects N Y Y
State of Location-Industry-Year Fixed Effects N N Y
Rounded N 220,000 220,000 220,000


































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 2.10 Creditor Rights and Productivity: New Machinery Expenditures Over Labor
This table presents estimates of the plant-level impact of anti-recharacterization laws on new
machinery expenditures over labor. Columns [1], [2], [3], and [4] use new machinery expenditures
over total payroll, production workers’ payroll, number of employees, and total hours worked,
respectively, as the dependent variable. The unit of observation in each regression is a plant-year
pair. The main independent variable is ARL, which is an indicator variable that equals one if
a firm is headquartered in a treated state between 1997 and 2001 or incorporated in a treated
state between 1997 and 2003. Control variables include size and age of the plant as well as the
number of plants owned by the firm. All variables are defined in Appendix A. Standard errors
(in parentheses) are clustered at the state of location level. ***, **, and * denote statistical
significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent levels, respectively.
Dependent Variable: New Machinery New Machinery New Machinery New Machinery
over over over over
Total Payroll Production Payroll Employees Total Hours
[1] [2] [3] [4]
ARL 0.024** 0.046*** 1.210*** 0.610***
(0.010) (0.017) (0.365) (0.167)
Control Variables Y Y Y Y
Plant FE Y Y Y Y
Year FE Y Y Y Y
State of Incorporation FE Y Y Y Y
State of Headquarters FE Y Y Y Y
State of Location-Industry-Year FE Y Y Y Y
Rounded N 140,000 140,000 140,000 140,000
R2 0.50 0.54 0.55 0.55
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Table 2.11 Creditor Rights and Productivity: Productivity Change Across Plants Differing
in Initial Productivity
This table presents estimates of the impact of anti-recharacterization laws on productivity across
plants differing in initial productivity one year before the treatment. Each plant is classified as
productive or unproductive depending on its within-firm ranking one year before the treatment.
Productive (unproductive) plants fall above (below) the median of the productivity measure of
the plants belonging to the same firm one year before the treatment. The unit of observation
in each regression is a plant-year pair. ARL is an indicator variable that equals one if a firm is
headquartered in a treated state between 1997 and 2001 or incorporated in a treated state between
1997 and 2003. The dependent variables in columns [1] to [2], and [3] to [4], are new machinery
expenditures over total payroll and total factor productivity, respectively. Control variables
include size and age of the plant as well as the number of plants owned by the firm. All variables
are defined in Appendix A. Standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered at the state of location
level. ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent levels, respectively.
Dependent Variable: New Machinery Over Total Payroll Total Factor Productivity
[1] [2] [3] [4]
ARL × Unproductive 0.031** 0.041** 0.061*** 0.052***
(0.015) (0.017) (0.016) (0.020)
ARL × Productive 0.017 0.016 0.004 0.003
(0.015) (0.015) (0.014) (0.013)
Control Variables Y Y Y Y
Plant Fixed Effects Y Y Y Y
Year Fixed Effects Y Y Y Y
State of Incorporation Fixed Effects Y Y Y Y
State of Headquarters Fixed Effects Y Y Y Y
State of Location-Industry-Year Fixed Effects N Y N Y
Rounded N 80,000 80,000 80,000 80,000
R2 0.51 0.54 0.85 0.86
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CHAPTER 3
CREDITOR CONTROL RIGHTS AND RESOURCE
ALLOCATION WITHIN FIRMS
A central topic in financial economics is how the allocation of cash flow and control rights
among the suppliers of corporate finance should evolve with firm performance. Theoret-
ically, allowing for a state-contingent transfer of control to creditors can alleviate agency
problems resulting from the separation of ownership and control, as well as conflicts of in-
terest between debt and equity holders (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). Empirical evidence
confirms that governance by creditors not only has profound effects among bankrupt firms
(Gilson, 1990), but it also extends to a broad spectrum of firms through technical default.
Debt covenant violations shift control rights to creditors, which, given their right to demand
immediate repayment, puts them in a strong position to influence corporate financing and
investment decisions (Chava and Roberts, 2008; Roberts and Sufi, 2009a).1 Strikingly, this
shift in control rights leads to improvements in operating performance that ultimately ben-
efit shareholders, consistent with a positive role for creditors in corporate governance when
firm performance deteriorates (Nini et al., 2009, 2012).
In this paper, we shed further light on the role of creditors in corporate governance among
firms outside of bankruptcy. In particular, we document the precise channels of resource al-
location driving the turnaround in operating performance among firms in technical default.2
Our empirical tests are based on comprehensive establishment-level data from the U.S. Cen-
sus Bureau (henceforth, Census). These data provide us with disaggregated information on
the internal organization of firms, permitting an analysis of the within-firm reallocation and
restructuring activities surrounding covenant violations. We focus on a sample of covenant
1Lenders may use the threat of calling the loan to indirectly influence firm decision-making through several
mechanisms: waivers contingent on borrower improvements in financial condition, constraints on credit
availability (Beneish and Press, 1993), additional contractual restrictions including hard limits on capital
expenditures (Nini et al., 2009), or enhanced monitoring of financial statements or collateral (Gustafson
et al., 2016). In addition, directors appointed after covenant violations often have connections to lenders,
and are subsequently more likely to implement creditor-friendly policies (Ferreira et al., Forthcoming).
2For example, in the 2016 10-K filing of Ignite Restaurant Group, “forebearing lenders” were acknowledged
as having discussions with management in their “pursuit of various strategic alternatives” to “enhance
and preserve liquidity” and “improve our capital structure.” These strategic alternatives included closing
underperforming restaurants, selling noncore assets, reducing labor, marketing, and operating expenses,
eliminating new restaurant development, and reducing capital expenditures to maintenance levels.
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violations disclosed to the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) covering all publicly
traded U.S. nonfinancial corporations. We link each of these firms to its constituent estab-
lishments over time and measure resource allocation using establishment-level employment,
investment, and closure rates. We estimate the dynamic impact of covenant violations at
both the firm and establishment levels by comparing changes in behavior before and after
violations between violators and nonviolators, while controlling flexibly for both levels and
trends in firm performance metrics (Roberts and Sufi, 2009a).
We initially document significant effects of covenant violations on firm-level outcomes, in-
cluding reductions in employment and labor costs, and a greater frequency of establishment
closures. The magnitude of these changes are large: for example, we find a typical firm re-
duces the number of employees by roughly five percentage points following a violation (about
12.5% of its unconditional standard deviation). We then turn to the establishment-level data
to investigate the within-firm effects of the shift in control rights and its potential connec-
tion with improvements in violating firms’ operating performance. Our analysis focuses on
important establishment attributes that are motivated by the literature on agency problems
and inefficient resource allocation within conglomerate firms: first, whether an establishment
operates in a core or peripheral industry of a firm, and, second, establishment productivity.3
Our key findings can be summarized as follows. First, we find resources are withdrawn to
a greater extent from establishments operating in peripheral industries. Violating firms lay
off more employees at continuing peripheral establishments and, along the extensive margin,
shutter them more often, relative to those within their core industry focus. This suggests that
refocusing operations is a channel through which stronger creditor rights induce performance
improvements.
Second, following covenant violations, firms’ operations retrench from relatively unpro-
ductive establishments. To establish this result, we focus on the set of manufacturing firms
for which the Census provides highly detailed information on factor inputs and output. This
richness enables us to construct an array of establishment-level productivity measures—
including total and individual labor and capital factor productivities—that we estimate
both parametrically and non-parametrically. We find that violating firms cut employment
and investment at, and close down more often, establishments classified as unproductive.
Thus, resource withdrawal from relatively unproductive units is a second contributing factor
to the improvement in firm performance.
3Shleifer and Vishny (1997) and Stein (2003) survey the literature on corporate governance and agency
problems within conglomerates. These surveys highlight the potential spillovers of entrenched managers’
preferences to firm performance. For example, “quiet life” managers might be slow to fire workers or shutter
underperforming plants (Bertrand and Mullainathan, 2003). Alternatively, “grandstanding” or “empire
building” managers might operate firms at a suboptimal scale or scope (Williamson, 1964; Gompers, 1996).
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Third, we investigate the role of establishment operating risk. Given that creditors are
exposed to losses on the downside, naturally we might expect them to push for risk reduc-
tion after the transfer of control rights. Measuring operating risk based on time-series and
cross-sectional variation in establishment outcomes (e.g., operating margins), we find robust
evidence that violating firms withdraw resources from riskier units. However, once we char-
acterize how establishment risk and productivity interact, we observe cuts occurring almost
exclusively among establishments classified as both risky and unproductive. Taken together,
our evidence indicates that the active role played by creditors after covenant violations can
benefit both the creditors and shareholders of violating firms by reducing default risk and
improving economic efficiency.
Finally, we explore how these internal reallocation effects vary in the cross-section of
lenders to provide evidence of an underlying mechanism. Creditors may contribute to op-
erational improvements among firms in technical default if lenders offer expertise and ex-
perience when monitoring and advising. We find evidence consistent with this mechanism.
Specifically, for each borrower, we measure lead lenders’ industry specialization according to
whether they have other loans outstanding or, alternatively, are a market leader in terms of
lending to its industry. We then document that, using either measure, only covenant viola-
tions in which the lead lender has prior industry experience exhibit the within-firm resource
reallocation effects described above. Thus, key lenders appear to bring industry-specific
turnaround skill to bear on violating firms’ operations.
Our findings contribute to empirical research on the importance of creditors in corporate
governance, which builds on theoretical work analyzing optimal debt contracting in the
presence of agency problems (e.g., Jensen and Meckling, 1976). Earlier work has argued
that regulatory and legal impediments—including prohibition of large equity investments
and the threat of having their claims equitably subordinated in bankruptcy or litigation
under lender liability laws—may limit the scope for creditor intervention outside of default
states (Gilson and Vetsuypens, 1994). Prior empirical research therefore emphasizes creditor
control through debt restructuring when borrowers are bankrupt (Gilson, 1990; Gilson et al.,
1990; Wruck, 1990; James, 1995, 1996), including modern evidence on the role of non-bank
lenders (Jiang et al., 2012; Ivashina et al., 2016). More recently, Nini et al. (2012) among
others, provide evidence suggesting a more active role for creditors in corporate governance
outside of contracting and bankruptcy states. They argue that, following covenant violations,
creditors are in a stronger position to influence firm decision-making and show that the
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transfer of control rights improves operating performance and firm value.4,5 Our micro-
evidence provides support by showing that these performance improvements are driven, at
least in part, by a redeployment of resources away from relatively unproductive and risky
establishments, as well as those operating outside of the firm’s core competency.
We identify sources of efficiency gains that are strikingly similar to those associated with
major equity-centered governance interventions, notably, mergers and acquisitions (Li, 2013;
Maksimovic et al., 2011), private equity (PE) transactions (Davis et al., 2014), and hedge
fund activism (Brav et al., 2015). However, while the operational adjustments surrounding
these interventions are similar, it is important to recognize that the types of firms violating
covenants look very different from those targeted by activist shareholders. For example,
hedge fund activist targets are mostly mature and generating free cash flow, whereas firms in
technical default tend to be cash-strapped and underperforming. Moreover, on the financial
side, hedge fund targets subsequently increase leverage and dividends, whereas firms in
technical default do the opposite (Nini et al., 2012). Our findings therefore suggest that
despite the fact that equity-centered and creditor-centered governance might be suitable
for different firm types or firms at different stages in their life-cycle, the effects of these
interventions for capital reallocation and restructuring are quite comparable.
More broadly, our paper relates to the literature on creditor rights and firm outcomes,
including risk-taking. In a cross-country analysis, Acharya et al. (2011) find that firms in
creditor-friendly bankruptcy regimes have lower leverage and cash-flow risk. In the U.S.
context, Eisdorfer (2008) finds evidence of risk-shifting among financially distressed firms,
whereas Gilje (2016), in the context of the oil and gas industry, finds that firms with bank
loans featuring stricter financial covenants reduce investment risk (i.e., exploratory drilling)
as they approach bankruptcy. Prior studies show that covenant violations are followed by
conservatism in capital structure (Roberts and Sufi, 2009a), investment (Chava and Roberts,
2008; Nini et al., 2009), employment (Falato and Liang, 2016), and R&D (Chava et al.,
2016). Our unique contribution to this literature is to provide granular evidence on the
within-firm effects of covenant violations for employment, investment, and asset disposals, as
well as how these reallocation decisions relate to several important establishment attributes.
Importantly, our results suggest that lenders offer advice and expertise, which enables firms
4They show a turnaround in the ratio of operating cash to assets of about 7% in the year following the
violation, an effect driven by a reduction in operating costs of between 5% and 10%. Violating firms’ stock
returns (risk-adjusted) rebound at a rate of 5% per year within three months of the violation.
5Theoretically, creditor control may be value-improving for underperforming firms, since creditors’ con-
cave payoff structure gives them sharper incentives to monitor and constrain inefficient managers or reduce
excessive risk-taking (Aghion and Bolton, 1992; Dewatripont and Tirole, 1994; Zender, 1991). In the presence
of agency conflicts between management and outside investors, creditor discipline may therefore increase the
value of both debt and equity.
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to turn performance around through improvements in resource allocation and productive
efficiency. These findings contrast with a narrow view of stronger lenders bargaining solely
for risk reduction to protect their short-term interests.6
3.1. Data and Empirical Methodology
3.1.1. Data sources
Our firm-level data comes from Compustat. This database contains balance sheet and income
statement data for publicly traded U.S. corporations, which are the focus of this study. We
gather a large number of standard accounting variables primarily to be used as control
variables in our analysis. Our sample covers the period from 1996 to 2009. Following Nini
et al. (2012), for a firm-year to be included in the sample, we require non-missing data on
total assets, total sales, common shares outstanding, and closing share price. We exclude
(financial) firms with Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) codes between 6000 and 6999,
as well as firms with book value of assets less than $10 million.
We use three establishment-level data sets provided by the Census. First, we use the
Longitudinal Business Database (LBD), which annually tracks all business establishments in
the United States with at least one paid employee. It provides longitudinal identifiers as well
as data on the number of employees, payroll, location, and industry for each establishment.
The LBD also records corporate affiliation, allowing us to identify establishment closures.
The Census of Manufactures (CMF) and Annual Survey of Manufactures (ASM) provide
greater detail on activities for the subset of manufacturing establishments (SIC codes between
3000 and 3999). The CMF is a survey conducted every five years (years ending 2 and 7)
and consists of all manufacturing establishments in the United States with at least one paid
employee. The ASM is another survey conducted in non-census years (i.e., when the CMF
is not conducted) for a subset of these manufacturing establishments. This includes all
establishments with greater than 250 employees and some with fewer employees, which are
selected with a probability positively correlated with size. Reporting for both of these surveys
is mandatory and misreporting is penalized, so the data is of the highest quality. Both the
CMF and ASM include information on industry, corporate affiliation, output (total value of
shipments), employment, capital expenditures, and on material inputs of each establishment.
The level of detail of these manufacturing data sets helps us construct various measures of
6Other research argues that maintaining a relationship with the borrower as a going concern may be
valuable to the bank due to reputation costs of default (Gopalan et al., 2011) or future lending and cross-
selling opportunities (Bharath et al., 2007).
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productivity for each manufacturing establishment.
We use the longitudinal identifiers in LBD to merge the CMF and ASM. We then use the
Compustat-SSEL bridge maintained by the Census to match each firm in Compustat to its
establishments. The Compustat-SSEL bridge ends in 2005, so we extend the match to 2009
using employer characteristics including name, address, and employer identification number.
Our primary data on financial covenant violations is kindly provided online by Nini et al.
(2012).7 This is a quarterly data set that contains an indicator variable defining whether each
firm-quarter in Compustat has violated a financial covenant. All companies with registered
securities are required to disclose covenant violations in quarterly filings with the SEC under
Regulation S-X (Roberts and Sufi, 2009a; Beneish and Press, 1993). The authors use a
combination of textual analysis and hand collection to carefully identify firms reporting
a covenant violation. Their approach captures about 90% of actual reported violations.
This data set begins in 1996—the first year in which electronic filing with the SEC became
mandatory—and ends in 2009, which explains our choice of sample window.
In robustness tests, we use alternative measures of covenant violations based on loan
contract terms at origination from Reuters’ Loan Pricing Corporation’s Dealscan database
(henceforth, Dealscan) following Chava and Roberts (2008). Dealscan provides a large sam-
ple of loan contracts, including detailed information on maintenance covenants based on
accounting ratios, that we match to Compustat.8 We assume firms are bound by a given
covenant threshold as stated at origination until the loan matures and take the tightest
covenant at a given point in time.9 In these tests, we restrict the sample merged to Compu-
stat to firms having either net worth or current ratio covenants during the time period from
1996 until 2009. We focus on these covenants for two main reasons. First, Roberts and Sufi
(2009a) show that more than 95% of loan contracts include at least one financial covenant,
with the net worth (leverage) and current ratio covenants being among the most common.
Second, determining whether a violation has occurred or not for these two covenants is
straightforward, since the corresponding accounting variables are standard.
7These authors provide an excellent description of covenants in corporate credit agreements, including
specific examples of violations from SEC filings. They argue that covenants, while common in most debt
contracts, are most prevalent and often binding in bank loans (see also Taylor and Sansone, 2007).
8Thanks to Sudheer Chava and Michael Roberts for providing the Dealscan-Compustat link.
9Two caveats apply. First, firms may have overlapping deals, i.e., the first deal matures after the start
of the second deal. Second, covenant thresholds can change over the tenure of the loan in a predetermined
manner or, say, due to a renegotiation or refinancing of the deal. We address these challenges following Chava
and Roberts (2008) (see their Appendix B). We assume firms are subject to a given covenant threshold for
the longest maturity of all loans in each package and take the most restrictive covenant across packages.
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3.1.2. Variable construction and summary statistics
Our main dependent variable is a measure of employment, which we use to capture how
firms allocate resources. We focus primarily on employment because of the completeness of
the data provided in the LBD. In most tests, employment is measured as the annual change
in the natural logarithm of the number of employees. At the establishment level, the number
of employees comes directly from the LBD. At the firm level, the number of employees is
summed across all of the firm’s establishments.
We consider additional employment measures for robustness and also to better understand
the channels through which firms adjust resource allocation and potentially achieve cost
improvements (i.e., reducing labor costs through the number of employees or wages per
employee). We use four such measures based on data from the LBD. First, the annual change
in the natural logarithm of payroll. Second, the symmetric growth rate of employment,
calculated by dividing the annual change in number of employees by the average of current
and lagged number of employees. This measure accommodates both entry and exit as well as
limiting the effects of extreme values (Davis et al., 1998). For the third and fourth measures,
we use the change in the number of employees and in payroll scaled by the average of current
and lagged book value of assets, respectively.
We also analyze establishment closure rates. Such closures represent an extreme form of
resource withdrawal that may be less likely to occur absent outside pressure (Bertrand and
Mullainathan, 2003). We use longitudinal identifiers from LBD to define for each establish-
ment in year t, a closure indicator variable that is set equal to one if the establishment is
closed down in year t + 1. This is a dependent variable in the establishment-level analysis.
For the firm-level analysis, we use indicator variable set equal to one if the firm closes any
of its establishments in a given year.
In some tests we analyze the investment decisions of manufacturing firms based on data
from the CMF and ASM. We calculate investment as the annual change in establishment-
level capital expenditures scaled by the establishment-level capital stock. Establishment-level
capital stock is estimated using the perpetual inventory method following Brav et al. (2015).
Our main independent variable is an indicator set equal to one if a firm violates a covenant
in the current year. These violations are considered material information and must be
disclosed in SEC filings. We aggregate the quarterly violation data to the annual frequency
of the Census data. In light of this data constraint, we take a conservative approach when
we measure the occurrence of a violation. To code a firm-year as a violation, we require a
violation in at least one quarter of the current year and non-missing covenant information
without any violation in all four quarters of the previous year. Effectively, we focus on new
covenant violations—those occurring in the current but not the previous year—which is a
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cleaner setting to observe the effects of creditor influence (e.g., Nini et al., 2012).
To complement our main approach, we also measure covenant violations based on at-
origination loan contract terms (i.e., maintenance covenant thresholds) from the Dealscan
data set. We focus on current ratio and net worth covenants due to their ubiquity and
standardization. A covenant violation occurs in a given firm-year when the realized current
or net worth ratio falls below the threshold specified by either covenant. As an additional
robustness test, we restrict the sample to firm-year observations close to the threshold and
conduct a regression discontinuity design (RDD) in the spirit of Chava and Roberts (2008).
We discuss the identification assumptions underlying this test in the next section.
We include in our regressions firm-level accounting ratios on which covenants are written,
as well as variables to account for systematic differences between violator and nonviolator
firms that could affect decision-making. We control for operating cash flow, leverage ratio,
interest expense scaled by average assets, net worth over total assets, current ratio, and
market-to-book ratio. These variables are winsorized at the 1% and 99% levels to limit the
effects of outliers. In the establishment-level analysis, we further control for establishment
age, the number of establishments per firm, and the number of establishments per three-digit
industry segment of the parent firm. Appendix A.2 defines all variables precisely.
With our data restrictions in place, particularly the Compustat-SSEL link, we construct
a final sample containing 21,000 firm-year observations covering approximately 2,000,000
establishment-years for the period from 1996 until 2009. Table 3.1 presents summary statis-
tics for the full sample, as well as the subsamples of covenant violators and nonviolators.10
The firm-level summary statistics are similar to Nini et al. (2012), reassuring us that sample
selection resulting from the Compustat-Census match is not a problem. This is not surpris-
ing given the administrative nature of the Census data—that is, it should cover the universe
of Compustat firms. New covenant violations occur in 6.3% of firm-year observations.
Comparing violators with nonviolators motivates our main results and empirical approach.
Notably, both at the firm and establishment levels, the change in employment is larger for
violators than for the rest of the sample. In addition, establishments belonging to violating
firms experience closures with greater frequency. However, there appear to be significant
performance differences between violators and nonviolators: violators have lower net worth,
current ratio, and market-to-book ratio; hold less cash; and are more levered. To ensure that
our results do not simply reflect differences in these characteristics, it is crucial that we con-
trol flexibly for them in our regression framework. We also conduct several falsification and
sensitivity tests to ensure that our results do not reflect systematic differences or differences
10As per Census disclosure requirements, we round off the number of observations in each table and
quantile values are not reported in any summary statistics table.
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in trends among violators and nonviolators.
Finally, it is worthwhile noting the differences between the LBD establishments (Panel
B) and the subsample of manufacturing establishments from the CMF and ASM (Panel
C). The rate of covenant violations is about the same for manufacturing (0.040) compared
with all other establishments (0.041). Where manufacturing firms differ is that they tend
to own fewer and older establishments. We control for these differences throughout our
establishment-level analysis, including tests that focus specifically on manufacturing firms.
3.1.3. Identification and empirical model
We adapt the empirical methodology of Roberts and Sufi (2009a) and Nini et al. (2012) to
our setting. To examine the firm-level implications of covenant violations, we estimate the
following equation for the annual change in (log) employment:
∆yi,t+1 = αt + αk + β Covenant V iolationit
+ γ1 Covenant Controlsit + γ2 Covenant Controlsi,t−1
+ γ3 Higher-Order Covenant Controlsit + it, (3.1)
where i indexes firms, t indexes years, and k indexes industries. The unit of observation is a
firm-year. The dependent variable, ∆yi,t+1, is primarily the within-firm annual change in the
natural logarithm of the number of employees.11 The main independent variable, Covenant
Violation it, is an indicator variable equal to one for a new covenant violation. The αt and
αk denote year and industry (based on three-digit SIC codes) fixed effects, respectively. The
industry fixed effects control for time-invariant differences between industries and the year
fixed effects control for aggregate economic shocks. The error term, it, is assumed to be
correlated within-firm and potentially heteroskedastic (Petersen, 2009).
The set of variables labeled Covenant Controls it are included to account for variables on
which covenants are written as well as those that may have an independent effect on employ-
ment and, more broadly, resource allocation decisions. These include operating cash flow,
leverage ratio, interest expense scaled by average assets, net worth over total assets, cur-
rent ratio, and market-to-book ratio. These variables are the most common ratios included
in financial covenants (Roberts and Sufi, 2009a), as well as predictors of firm employment
outcomes (Nickell and Wadhwani, 1991). These variables are included linearly, squared, and
cubed, as indicated by the higher-order covenant controls term, as well as their one-year lag.
11Census employment variables are measured as of March 12 each year. For this reason, if a violation occurs
in the first or second (third or fourth) quarters of year t, we measure the annual change in employment from
year t to t+ 1 (t+ 1 to t+ 2).
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The coefficient of interest, β, measures how a firm’s employment responds in percentage
point terms to a new covenant violation. If firms reduce employment to improve net cash
flows and satisfy creditors worried about the value of their claims, the coefficient β will be
strictly negative. The null hypothesis that covenant violations are irrelevant for employ-
ment (because firms can find substitute financing or creditors cannot influence operations)
corresponds to expecting that β will be zero.
The main identification challenge in the estimation of β is to separate out the effect of vio-
lations from expected changes in resource allocation based on differences in financial perfor-
mance and other fundamentals between violators and nonviolators. Our approach addresses
this challenge through a comparison of firms close to the covenant threshold by controlling
flexibly for continuous functions of the underlying variables—on which covenants thresholds
are contracted upon—and utilizing the discontinuous change in firm behavior occurring at
the time of a violation (Roberts and Sufi, 2009a; Nini et al., 2012). In effect, the outcomes
of violations are measured by comparing firms with similar pre-violation performance and
thus a similar expected time-series path of outcomes. Specifically, we take the within-firm
annual difference in dependent variables, which sweeps out fixed differences in outcomes be-
tween violators and nonviolators. We also flexibly control for contemporaneous and lagged
firm-level covenant control variables known to affect outcomes, as described above, and thus
control for pre-violation trend differences between violators and nonviolators.
We complement our baseline approach with a standard RDD that incorporates the actual
contractual level of covenants (Chava and Roberts, 2008). The RDD essentially compares
firms that just violate covenants to those that closely avoid doing so. We focus on the net
worth and current ratio thresholds and define a firm-year to be in violation if the observed
accounting ratio falls below the threshold specified by the contract. Thus, the covenant
violation is a discontinuous function of the distance between the accounting ratio and the
threshold, which constitutes the basis of the RDD approach.12 We use this alternative defi-
nition of a violation in two sets of robustness tests. The first simply uses it as a substitute
independent variable in equation (3.1). The second restricts the sample to firm-year obser-
vations within a reasonably tight window, say, ±10%, around the covenant threshold. In
this case, a violation can plausibly be considered as good as random. The RDD approach
offers two key advantages. First, it allows us to tackle borrower selection into loan contracts
12The RDD uses “locally” exogenous variation in violations arising from the distance to the threshold.
The main identification assumption is local continuity, which amounts to continuity of all factors besides
the violation through the covenant threshold. This requires that firms cannot perfectly sort themselves on
one side of the threshold (Lee and Lemieux, 2010). In our context, this would require that firms manipulate
accounting ratios to avoid violations, an outcome mitigated by the institutional features of the U.S. loan
market (Chava and Roberts, 2008).
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and covenant thresholds at origination. In particular, the analysis is conditional on firms
receiving similar covenants in their contracts. We can also control for the the distance to
covenant thresholds at origination (e.g., covenant strictness, see Murfin, 2012) and at the
time of technical default. Doing so mitigates the concern that covenant strictness conveys
information about investment opportunities. Second, using a narrow bandwidth around the
threshold ensures the covenant violation is close to a random event and thus unlikely to
correlate with firm characteristics (Bakke and Whited, 2012).13
Analyzing the firm-level response to covenant violations can mask important operational
changes within the firm. To better understand the channels through which the transfer
of control rights might affect operating performance, we examine establishment-level data.
While firms’ establishments differ across several important dimensions, we focus on two
characteristics that have been emphasized by the literature on resource allocation within
conglomerates (e.g., Stein, 2003; Maksimovic and Phillips, 2008): establishment productivity
and whether it operates in a core or peripheral industry of a firm. We also examine the role
of establishment-level operating risk in determining the resource allocation decision. This
analysis is based on the full sample of establishments covering all industries based on the
LBD and the subsample of manufacturers based on the CMF and ASM. In the latter sample,
we have detailed establishment data on investment, performance, and operating risk.
To examine the effect of violations on resource allocation across establishments within the
same firm, we estimate a modified version of (3.1) following Giroud and Mueller (2015):
∆yij,t+1 = αi + αk(j) × αs(j) × αt + β1 Covenant Violation it × Yesjt
+ β2 Covenant Violation it × Nojt + γ1 Establishment Controlsjt
+ γ2 Covenant Controls it + γ3 Covenant Controls i,t−1
+ γ4 Higher-Order Covenant Controls it + ijt, (3.2)
where i, j, k(j), s(j), and t index for firms, establishments, industries, and states of the re-
spective establishments, and years, respectively. The unit of observation is an establishment-
year. The dependent variable, ∆yij,t+1, is the within-establishment annual change in resource
allocation. Depending on the data source, this could be employment, investment, or estab-
lishment closures. The main independent variable, Covenant Violation it, is an indicator
variable equal to one if an establishment’s owner firm violates a covenant. The indicator
13The disadvantage of this approach is that the restricted RDD sample size renders much of our analysis
infeasible, and we therefore choose specification (3.1) as our baseline model. While our baseline approach does
not incorporate explicit covenant thresholds, we can proxy for the unobserved thresholds by including lags
of the covenant controls. In support of this approximation, Chava and Roberts (2008) show that covenant
violations tend to occur two years after origination, on average.
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variable Yesjt (Nojt) is set equal to one (zero) if the attribute under consideration is satis-
fied (not satisfied) by a given establishment at the beginning of year t. The set of variables
labeled Establishment Controlsjt include establishment age, the number of establishments
per firm, and the number of establishments per segment. We continue to cluster standard
errors at the firm level to account for dependence across establishments of the same firm.
The coefficients of interest are β1, which captures the effect on the establishments with the
attribute of interest, and β2, which captures the effect on other establishments within the
same firm. If firms reduce employment uniformly across establishments, then the coefficients
β1 and β2 will both be negative and statistically indistinguishable. On the other hand, if
β2 is smaller than β1, then the firm cuts employment more at establishments not satisfying
the criterion (e.g., outside of the core industry focus of the firm). The null hypothesis is
that covenant violations are irrelevant for establishment-level employment decisions, which
corresponds to β1 and β2 both equal to zero.
3.2. Empirical Results
3.2.1. Covenant violations and firm-level outcomes
Table 3.2 shows the firm-level effect of new covenant violations on the employment outcomes
of violators and other firms. Column [1] presents results from estimating equation (3.1)
with only industry and year fixed effects. We see that the coefficient of interest on Covenant
Violation it, β, is -0.063, and it is statistically significant at 1% confidence level. The direction
of this estimate is consistent with our expectation that following covenant violations firms
lay off employees to improve net cash flows and satisfy creditors’ concerns. In terms of
economic magnitudes, the estimate implies that a typical covenant violation is associated
with a 6.3-percentage-point decrease in the number of employees, which constitutes about
15.7% of its standard deviation (0.401) among the full sample of firms.
Column [2] adds covenant control variables, namely, operating cash flow, leverage, interest
expense, net worth, current ratio, and market-to-book ratio. As expected, their inclusion
lowers the estimated coefficient of interest as the comparison group has similar (weak) perfor-
mance to violating firms. The estimate drops to -0.042, remains significant at the 1% level,
and continues to be large in economic terms. Column [3] further includes lagged covenant
controls to account for pre-violation trend differences between violators and nonviolators.
The coefficient of interest remains essentially the same in terms of size and significance.
Column [4] shows that when we add covenant controls both squared and raised to the third
power—which allows us to control more flexibly for the firm fundamentals—the result re-
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mains unchanged.
We next examine whether covenant violations lead firms to withdraw resources on a larger
scale through establishment closures. We identify closures through establishment longitudi-
nal identifiers in LBD. We define a firm-level variable, Any Establishment Closure i,t+1, equal
to one if a firm closes any establishment from year t to t+1 (and zero otherwise) and estimate
(3.1) as a linear probability model. Column [5] shows a point estimate is 0.024, significant
at the 5% level, which indicates a violating firm is 2.4 percentage points more likely to close
an establishment than a nonviolator. This estimated effect is moderate given the coarse
measurement of closures at the firm level: about 50% of all firms close an establishment in a
given year.14 We shall see our estimates become sharper and more economically meaningful
in our establishment-level analysis.
Overall, these estimates indicate that loan covenant violations have an economically large
and statistically robust impact on firm-level labor outcomes. Our baseline estimates indicate
a cut in the number of employees among violating firms on the order of four to six percentage
points relative to nonviolators. Given the frequent occurrence of covenant violations and
contract renegotiations (Roberts and Sufi, 2009b), these estimates suggest that creditor
influence might be an important determinant of employment outcomes.
Our findings line up quite well with existing estimates from the literature relying on other
data sources. Falato and Liang (2016) use data on the number of employees from Compustat
and hand-collected layoff announcements to estimate a 10% reduction in the workforce among
firms in technical default. Moreover, our estimates are quite reasonable in magnitude when
compared with less frequent, more severe financial distress events such as bond defaults and
bankruptcy filings, which exhibit layoffs of 27% and 50%, respectively (Agrawal and Matsa,
2013; Hotchkiss, 1995).
3.2.2. Internal resource allocation: Establishment-level analysis
3.2.2.1. Establishments operating in core and peripheral business lines
From this point on, we analyze the effects of creditor control on resource allocation among
establishments belonging to the same firm. We first test for a heterogeneous response among
establishments operating in core and peripheral business lines. Since peripheral business lines
are outside the main scope of the firm, these activities may be less developed, could arise from
managers’ private incentives, or management may lack experience relative to core business
lines (e.g., Gompers, 1996; Scharfstein and Stein, 2000). Thus, withdrawing resources from
14In unreported results, we find a positive and statistically significant relation between covenant violations
and the percentage of establishments closed in the subsequent year.
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these establishments and refocusing may improve operating efficiency and decrease the risk
of failure, thus improving firm performance and value (e.g., Lang and Stulz, 1994; Schoar,
2002). On the other hand, diversification from an operational standpoint could increase the
value of debt—provided cash flows are not perfectly correlated (i.e., a “coinsurance” effect,
as in Lewellen, 1971)—in which case we might see no change in focus.
To test for the importance of industry focus in resource allocation, we turn to the establishment-
level data from LBD. We follow Maksimovic and Phillips (2002) and, for each firm, classify
a three-digit SIC industry as core (peripheral) if its payroll summed across establishments
is more (less) than 25% of the firm’s total payroll. Each establishment within the firm
is characterized as core or peripheral based on its industry classification. We then es-
timate our establishment-level regression model (3.2) allowing for differential sensitivities
among establishments operating in the firm’s core or peripheral business lines following
a new covenant violation. The estimated coefficients on Covenant Violation it × Corejt and
Covenant Violation it×Peripheral jt measure these heterogeneous responses. Table 3.3 shows
the results.
In columns [1] to [4] the dependent variable is the establishment-level change in the natural
logarithm of the number of employees. In column [1], we perform the estimation without any
covenant controls and find that covenant violations result in a decrease in employment of 2.7
percentage points in core establishments and 8.4% in peripheral establishments. Both point
estimates are significant at conventional levels. In column [2], we add covenant controls and
the coefficients of interest are estimated to be -0.026 and -0.090, still statistically significant
at conventional levels. Columns [3] and [4] include further controls but the finding does not
change: firms decrease employment significantly at both core and peripheral establishments,
but the effect is about twice as large at peripheral establishments.15
Column [5] reports results from regressions where the dependent variable is an indicator
variable for establishment closure. In this case, the dependent variable is equal to one if the
establishment is closed in the subsequent year and zero otherwise. Here, a similar pattern
emerges: the coefficients of interest are significantly positive for both types of establishment,
but the coefficient for peripheral establishments is much larger (0.013 versus 0.039). Once
again, this difference is statistically significant at the 1% level based on an F -test.
Table 3.4 further examines the robustness of these results to our classifications of core
and peripheral industries. We conduct two tests. First, in columns [1] and [2], we use finer
information on establishment industry codes to classify industries. In particular, we focus
on four-digit SIC codes and maintain the 25% threshold (e.g., Giroud and Mueller, 2015).
15We test whether these coefficients are statistically distinct using F -tests. In each case, we find the
difference between coefficients is significantly different from zero at 1% confidence level.
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In columns [3] to [4], we maintain the use of three-digit SIC codes but now adopt a 50%
payroll threshold to classify industries within a firm as core or peripheral. For both sets of
tests, we find very similar results relative to Table 3.3, indicating that this finding is not an
artifact of our industry classification scheme.
Overall, these establishment-level results indicate a large withdrawal of resources from
violating firms’ operations, particularly, establishments operating in peripheral industries.
Specifically, following covenant violations, firms decrease employment more at their continu-
ing peripheral establishments and, along the extensive margin, close them significantly more
often. Thus, our findings suggest that increasing the focus of firms’ operations following
covenant violations is an important channel through which creditor control may improve
firm operating performance and market valuations.
3.2.2.2. Establishment productivity
We next analyze the effects of covenant violations on within-firm reallocation across produc-
tive and unproductive establishments. If operating performance improves, then, naturally,
we expect managers to withdraw resources from less productive establishments.
We focus primarily on the sample of manufacturers using the CMF and ASM. These data
provide detailed information on manufacturing establishments, including output and factor
inputs, allowing us to construct an array of productivity measures. We can measure total,
labor, and capital productivity several ways both parametrically and nonparametrically,
which gives us confidence that measurement error is not driving our results. We first use total
factor productivity (TFP) to estimate establishment productivity. We follow the literature
to compute TFP using Census data (e.g., Foster et al., 2008). TFP is estimated as the
difference between actual and predicted output, where the latter is estimated using a log-
linear Cobb-Douglas production function with capital, labor, and materials as inputs.
We rank establishments on the basis of their within-firm productivity ranking—productive
(unproductive) establishments fall above (below) the median of TFP of the establishments
belonging to the same firm in a given year—and consider the within-industry ranking later
in a robustness test.16 Given the richness of the manufacturing data, we examine effects
of covenant violations on establishment-level investment, in addition to employment and
closures. To implement our tests, we estimate (3.2) allowing high and low productivity
establishments to display different sensitivities of establishment outcomes to violations.
Table 3.5 shows the within-firm effects of productivity on employment and closures. In
columns [1] to [8], the dependent variable is the annual change in the natural logarithm of
16If industry production is heterogeneous in terms of capital, labor, and total factor productivity, then
within-firm productivity rankings might be misleading, especially for firms spread across several industries.
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the number of employees. Column [1] indicates that firms cut employment at both produc-
tive and unproductive establishments, although layoffs are considerably larger at unproduc-
tive establishments. The coefficients show a decrease in number of employees of 5.7 and
19.0 percentage points for productive and unproductive establishments, respectively. As we
introduce covenant controls, the estimated effect on productive establishments diminishes
in size and statistical significance. In column [4], with the full set of controls, layoffs at
productive establishments are indistinguishable from zero. In contrast, unproductive estab-
lishments experience employment cuts that are large and statistically significant at the 1%
level. Furthermore, F -tests confirm that the difference in the estimates between productive
and unproductive establishments is always statistically significant at conventional levels.
We next examine the robustness of employment outcomes to alternative measures of pro-
ductive efficiency. In column [5], we consider a within-industry (three-digit SIC code) TFP
ranking of establishments and find a similar result as compared to using the within-firm
productivity ranking. The estimates indicate that following a violation firms decrease the
number of employees at unproductive establishments by 14.3 percentage points, whereas the
change in employment at productive establishments is statistically insignificant.
We consider three more refined measures of labor productivity commonly used in the liter-
ature (e.g., Brav et al., 2015). First, in column [6], we use value-added per labor hour, which
is total value of shipments minus material and energy costs divided by total labor hours.
Second, in column [7], we use output divided by total labor hours. Finally, in column [8], we
use wage per hour. Each time, we use a within-industry productivity ranking to determine
which establishments are relatively productive. It can be seen that following covenant vio-
lations, the withdrawal of labor resources occurs most strongly at establishments with low
labor productivity. In contrast to the productive establishment interaction, the unproductive
establishment interaction is always negative, larger in magnitude, and statistically significant
at the 1% confidence level. Finally, in column [9] we examine establishment closures and
find that, along the extensive margin, firms only close unproductive establishments. Here,
we revert to the within-firm TFP ranking, as in column [1].
In Table 3.6 we uncover similar patterns for investment. We consider the investment
rate as a dependent variable, which we measure as the annual change in establishment-level
capital expenditures scaled by the establishment-level capital stock. Following covenant
violations, violating firms cut the investment rate by between 2.0 and 2.7 percentage points
at unproductive establishments, relative to the establishments of nonviolators. There is
virtually zero effect on productive establishments. This pattern holds either for the within-
firm TFP ranking (columns [1] to [4]) and the within-industry TFP ranking (column [5]).
In column [6] we proxy for capital productivity based on return on capital (ROC) (e.g.,
78
Giroud and Mueller, 2015), which has the advantage of being a simple and nonparametric
measure. ROC is calculated as total value of shipments minus labor, material, and energy
costs scaled by capital stock. Very similar results emerge: compared with the investment
rate of nonviolator establishments, the investment rate decreases by 0.015 among violating
firms’ establishments with below-median within-firm ROC (significant at the 5% level) and
indistinguishable from zero in the case of productive establishments.
We next analyze how establishment productivity and industry focus interact in the re-
sponse of firms to covenant violations. Table 3.7 presents the results of estimating (3.2),
further interacting these two establishment characteristics. Two key results obtain. First,
we observe that the cuts occurring at manufacturing establishments outside of the core focus
of violating firms are in line with the estimates for all industries (see Table 3.3). Second, on
the interaction between focus and productivity, we see that the cuts occur among unproduc-
tive plants in both core and peripheral industries; however, they are far larger in magnitude
at the peripheral establishments. For example, column [2] shows a 10.8 percentage point
reduction in employment at Core × Unproductive establishments (significant at the 5%
level), about half the size of the 22.5 percentage point cut at Peripheral × Unproductive
establishments (significant at the 1% level). This finding is consistent with managers with-
drawing resources primarily from less productive establishments, although the peripheral
characteristic appears to play an important amplification role.
In summary, this evidence highlights the importance of establishment productivity in firm
decision-making following covenant violations. We find strong evidence that violating firms
cut employment and investment at unproductive establishments and close them down more
frequently. Overall, the taking away of resources from and disposal of relatively unproduc-
tive establishments appears to be a second channel through which creditors facilitate the
turnaround of violating firms and enhance their valuation.
3.2.2.3. Establishment operating risk
Next, we examine the importance of establishment operating risk for resource allocation
decisions after the transfer of control rights to creditors. Risk-taking on the operational side
might expose the firm to large potential losses. Management might undertake excessively
risky investments due to a lack of information or skill. Alternatively, these operating decisions
might be optimal from the perspective of shareholders who reap the gains on the upside, but
at the expense of creditors who are exposed to the losses on the downside. Consequently,
in the presence of shareholder-creditor conflicts of interest, creditors may prefer to shift
resources away from projects that have high operating risk.
We construct industry-level measures of operating risk based on the variance of estab-
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lishment outcomes. Following Maksimovic et al. (2011), our main measure of risk is the
cross-sectional standard deviation of operating margins across manufacturing establishments
in the same three-digit SIC code, where operating margins are calculated as the total value
of shipments minus all input costs divided by the value of shipments. Operating margins
can only be calculated using the CMF/ASM data, so we continue to focus on manufacturing
establishments. We also wish to examine the interactions between operating risk and produc-
tivity, further necessitating the focus on manufacturers. For each three-digit SIC code-year,
we calculate operating risk and classify an establishment as Risky if it belongs to an industry
with above-median standard deviation of operating margins and Safe otherwise.
Table 3.8 presents the results of estimating equation (3.2) using a risk-based classification
of establishments. In panel A, the dependent variable is the annual change in the natural
logarithm of the number of employees. Columns [1] to [4] use our main measure of operat-
ing risk and indicate that layoffs are present only at risky establishments. The estimated
coefficients show a decrease in number of employees of between 11.3 and 15.4 percentage
points for risky establishments (always significant at the 1% level), whereas layoffs at safe
establishments are indistinguishable from zero.17
The remaining columns of panel A use alternative measures of establishment operating
risk for robustness. In column [5], we classify establishments as safe or risky instead based
on the cross-sectional standard deviation of operating margins across Compustat firms at
the three-digit SIC code level. Columns [6] and [7] uses the time-series standard deviation
of the average industry operating margin at the three-digit SIC level based on Compustat
firms using 5 and 10 years of data, respectively. Finally, in column [8] we use the time-series
standard deviation of the average industry ratio of operating cash flows to assets. While
using the establishment-level data allows for a cleaner measurement of which industries
an establishment operates in and therefore its operating risk, we nevertheless find similar
patterns in layoffs emerge based on firm-level measures. Finally, we find similar results when
we instead examine establishment closure as a dependent variable in panel B. These findings
collectively support the idea that creditor influence brings about a decline in operational
risk-taking through a reallocation of resources following covenant violations and the transfer
of control rights.
In Table 3.9, we characterize how establishment productivity and operating risk interact.
We see very clearly that layoffs are concentrated among the establishments that are consid-
ered to be both unproductive and risky. For example, column [1] of panel A shows a 16.2
percentage point reduction in employment at Unproductive × Risky establishments (signif-
17F -tests indicate that the difference between risky and safe establishments point estimates is statistically
significant at at least the 5% confidence level.
80
icant at the 1% level) and nowhere else. In this column we use our preferred measures of
productivity and risk; however, this finding persists across the various alternative measures
defined above. This large and statistically robust effect holds for establishment closures in
panel B and is particularly stark for investment. Thus, while riskier operations experience
cuts, resources are withdrawn from unproductive units and therefore are likely to benefit
both creditors and shareholders by both reducing default risk and improving productive
efficiency.
3.2.2.4. Cross-sectional heterogeneity in resource allocation effects
To strengthen the causal interpretation of our results, in this section we analyze how the
resource allocation effects of covenant violations vary with in the cross-section of borrow-
ers and lenders. We first consider borrowers characteristics, in particular, agency frictions
and financial strength. Given the role of covenants in mitigating agency problems between
management and outside investors (Tirole, 2010), we expect creditor influence to be more
pronounced among firms with greater opportunity for managerial slack. In addition, the
shift in control should matter more when creditors are in a stronger bargaining position with
respect to management. For example, firms lacking outside financing options might be more
likely to make operational changes to satisfy creditors.
To explore the importance of agency frictions, we employ industry-level measures of prod-
uct market competition, based on the idea that managerial slack is more severe in industries
that feature less discipline from competitors (e.g., Giroud and Mueller, 2010). We calculate
product market competition using the Herfindahl Hirschman Index (HHI) at the four-digit
SIC industry level, split industries at the median to classify establishments into competi-
tive and noncompetitive groups, and repeat our establishment-level regressions. Consistent
with covenant violations alleviating agency problems, in Panel A of Table 3.10 we observe a
shift in resources away from peripheral, unproductive, and risky establishments only where
competition is weakest.
In Panel B, we proxy for the strength of borrower bargaining position using financial slack,
as measured by the presence of a credit rating. We use long-term credit ratings issued by
S&P and recorded in Compustat and sort firms each year according to whether they have a
rating or not. The point estimates show our benchmark establishment-level results are only
present among firms without a credit rating.
We next identify heterogeneity among lenders. Lenders with experience may use their
knowledge and turnaround expertise to offer advice and monitor operational improvements.
Consistent with this idea, prior research has shown that some lenders specialize in extending
credit to certain firms or markets (Boot, 2000; Paravisini et al., 2017), and this information
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advantage may confer benefits to borrowers.18 Moreover, specialized lenders—particularly
those with a significant market share—may value successful turnarounds due to reputa-
tion costs of default or future lending and cross-selling opportunities (Gopalan et al., 2011;
Bharath et al., 2007). We therefore test whether past lender industry experience and mar-
ket share are associated with pronounced resource reallocation outcomes around covenant
violations.
For each firm-year in our sample, we identify the names of lead lenders on active loans from
Dealscan.19 If a firm-year has more than one lead arranger—due to multiple lead arrangers
per loan or multiple loans with unique lead arrangers—then we assign the lead lender that
arranges the most credit across all deals.20 For each lender-year pair, we characterize lending
behavior across industries and construct two lender experience measures. First, we assign the
variable Industry Experience a value of one if the lead arranger has active credit extended
to at least one other firm in the same industry in the current year. Second, we consider
the industry market share of the lead lender by cumulating active credit extended by each
lead as a fraction of total credit outstanding to the industry over the previous year. We set
the variable High Share equal to one if a given lead arranger has an above-median industry
market share.21
In Table 3.11 we repeat our establishment-level analysis but now interacting establishment
characteristics with the lender experience variables. The coefficients on the peripheral, un-
productive, and risky establishment interactions have the expected sign and are statistically
significant at conventional levels. This holds for changes in employment and establishment
closures, as well as for both lender experience measures. Thus, only those firms in technical
default whose main lender has industry experience exhibit reallocation effects that are con-
sistent with operational improvements. These results suggest advice or enhanced monitoring
by lenders with industry expertise is a channel for operational improvements among firms in
technical default.
3.3. Conclusion
Using establishment-level data from the U.S. Census Bureau, we provide detailed evidence on
how U.S. publicly traded corporations adjust their operations in response to debt covenant
18Acharya et al. (2012) and Bernstein and Sheen (2016) find that PE partners’ past industry experience
improves the performance of the portfolio company and the operating performance of PE-backed firms,
respectively.
19Thanks to Michael Schwert for providing the Dealscan-Compustat link for lenders.
20Similar results obtain if we use the maximum experience in the case of multiple lead arrangers.
21Similar results obtain if we split lead lenders at the 75th percentile of market share.
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violations. We first show that covenant violations are followed by significant employment
cutbacks. A typical violating firm lays off between 4% and 6% of its labor force, as compared
with similar nonviolating firms. Using the Census micro-data, we look inside the black box
of the firm and document two patterns of within-firm resource allocation following covenant
violations. First, we show that firms refocus the scope of their operations by withdrawing
resources significantly more from peripheral establishments outside of the firm’s core business
lines. Second, total and individual factor productivities drive resource allocation, whereby
violating firms pull resources entirely at unproductive establishments. These previously
unexplored channels may explain, as least in part, the gains in violating firms’ operating
performance and valuations following violations (Nini et al., 2009, 2012). Finally, we show
these changes are prominent when key lenders specialize in a borrower’s industry, which is
consistent with them offering expertise and knowledge when advising management.
Our results are consistent with a valuable role of creditors in corporate governance. Reg-
ulatory changes in the wake of the Great Recession and recent financial innovations may
impede the ability of lenders to perform this role. Notably, stricter capital regulation and
new liquidity requirements levied on banks increase the cost of originating and holding cor-
porate loans, particularly long-term loans to risky borrowers that may benefit most from
monitoring. In addition, the introduction of “covenant-light” loan contracts with weaker
lender protection—namely, loans excluding maintenance covenants (Ivashina and Becker,
2016; Berlin et al., 2017)—may reduce the occurrence of covenant violations and potential
creditor influence. Finally, relatively new credit risk transfer tools such as credit default
swaps separate control rights from potential losses (Parlour and Winton, 2013), which may
weaken incentives to intervene when borrowers violate covenants (Bolton and Oehmke, 2011;
Chakraborty et al., 2015). Investigating the role of banks and other creditors in corporate




Table 3.1 Summary statistics
This table provides sample summary statistics. Panel A provides firm-level statistics. Panels B
and C provide establishment-level statistics. The unit of observation in Panel A and Panels B
and C, respectively, is a firm-year and establishment-year. All variables are defined in Appendix A.2
Full sample Nonviolators Violators
N Mean Std. N Mean Std. N Mean Std.
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] [9]
Panel A: Firm-level
∆Log(Employment) 21,000 -0.061 0.401 19,000 -0.002 0.399 2,000 -0.062 0.424
∆Log(Payroll) 21,000 0.000 0.410 19,000 0.004 0.408 2,000 -0.047 0.431
Symmetric Employment 21,000 0.018 0.308 19,000 0.018 0.306 2,000 0.029 0.334
∆Employees/ Assets 21,000 9.453 47.376 19,000 9.322 48.448 2,000 11.392 26.895
∆Payroll/ Assets 21,000 0.349 2.697 19,000 0.347 2.776 2,000 0.388 0.966
Establishment Closure 21,000 0.472 0.499 19,000 0.471 0.499 2,000 0.486 0.500
Covenant Violation 21,000 0.063 0.244 19,000 0 0 2,000 1 0
Operating Cash Flow 21,000 0.075 0.246 19,000 0.077 0.250 2,000 0.050 0.174
Leverage 21,000 0.256 0.456 19,000 0.252 0.466 2,000 0.315 0.280
Interest Expense 21,000 0.023 0.074 19,000 0.023 0.076 2,000 0.028 0.035
Net Worth 21,000 0.432 0.967 19,000 0.435 0.995 2,000 0.393 0.371
Current Ratio 21,000 2.772 4.615 19,000 2.821 4.744 2,000 2.048 1.724
Market-to-Book 21,000 2.029 3.170 19,000 2.063 3.255 2,000 1.533 1.305
Panel B: Establishment-level (LBD)
∆Log(Employment) 2,000,000 -0.138 0.664 1,900,000 -0.133 0.655 100,000 -0.251 0.832
Establishment Closure 2,000,000 0.054 0.227 1,900,000 0.053 0.224 100,000 0.087 0.282
Covenant Violation 2,000,000 0.041 0.197 1,900,000 0 0 100,000 1 0
Age 2,000,000 13.021 8.811 1,900,000 13.065 8.819 100,000 11.973 8.552
Est. per Firm 21,000 93.710 356.328 20,000 93.872 357 1,000 90 347
Est. per Segment 93,000 22.003 154.284 90,000 21.913 154 3,000 24.377 162
Core 2,000,000 0.764 0.424 1,900,000 0.761 0.427 100,000 0.841 0.365
Labor Productivity 2,000,000 0.051 6.968 1,900,000 0.052 7.114 100,000 0.029 0.050
Panel C: Establishment-level (CMF/ASM)
∆Log(Employment) 50,000 -0.193 0.814 48,000 -0.186 0.795 2,000 -0.378 1.158
∆Investment Rate 50,000 -0.008 0.158 48,000 -0.007 0.157 2,000 -0.025 0.161
Establishment Closure 50,000 0.035 0.185 48,000 0.034 0.18 2,000 0.077 0.267
Covenant Violation 50,000 0.040 0.197 48,000 0 0 2,000 1 0
Age 50,000 20.973 9.127 48,000 21.034 9.122 2,000 19.527 9.116
Est. per Firm 8,000 7.427 14.091 7,000 7.654 14.412 1,000 4.337 8
Est. per Segment 21,000 2.959 4.675 20,000 2.985 4.700 1,000 2.436 4.105
Core 50,000 0.653 0.476 48,000 0.647 0.478 2,000 0.808 0.411
Total Factor Productivity 50,000 1.823 0.658 48,000 1.826 0.66 2,000 1.765 0.609
Labor Prod(Alt. 1) 50,000 114.415 288.128 48,000 116.309 293.188 2,000 69.333 104.312
Labor Prod(Alt. 2) 50,000 233.327 919.057 48,000 235.547 924.285 2,000 180.473 782.704
Labor Prod(Alt. 3) 50,000 0.019 0.031 48,000 0.020 0.032 2,000 0.018 0.016
Return on Capital 50,000 5.920 604.419 48,000 6.110 617.968 2,000 1.714 4.135
Operating Risk 50,000 2.428 15.417 48,000 2.422 15.612 2,000 2.569 9.349
Operating Risk(Alt. 1) 50,000 15.161 67.914 48,000 15.372 68.896 2,000 10.141 40.702
Operating Risk(Alt. 2) 50,000 0.014 0.012 48,000 0.014 0.012 2,000 0.016 0.013
Operating Risk(Alt. 3) 50,000 0.017 0.011 48,000 0.017 0.011 2,000 0.018 0.012
Operating Risk(Alt. 4) 50,000 0.016 0.011 48,000 0.016 0.011 2,000 0.017 0.014
Operating Risk(Alt. 5) 50,000 25.904 169.89 48,000 26.180 171.685 2,000 19.801 134.152
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Table 3.2 Covenant violations and resource allocation: Firm-level analysis
This table shows estimates of the firm-level impact of debt covenant violations on asset allocation.
The unit of observation in each regression is a firm-year pair. The dependent variable is the annual
change in the natural logarithm of the number of employees aggregated across establishments
(columns [1] to [4]) and an indicator for whether the firm closed any establishment in a year
(column [5]). A covenant violation occurs when a firm reports a covenant violation in a SEC 10-K
or 10-Q filing in the current but not previous year. Covenant controls include operating cash flow
scaled by average assets, leverage, interest expense, net worth, current ratio, and market-to-book
ratio. Higher-order and lagged covenant controls refer to the second and third power and one-year
lag of the covenant controls, respectively. All variables are defined in Appendix A. Industry fixed
effects are based on three-digit SIC codes. Standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered at the
firm level. ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
Dependent variable: ∆Log(Employment) Est. Closure
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5]
Covenant Violation -0.063*** -0.042*** -0.042*** -0.040*** 0.024**
(0.007) (0.008) (0.009) (0.009) (0.012)
Operating Cash Flow 0.013*** 0.061** 0.119*** 0.143***
(0.013) (0.028) (0.036) (0.036)
Leverage 0.048** -0.063* -0.095 -0.157
(0.020) (0.032) (0.078) (0.126)
Interest Expense -0.085 -0.372 0.332 4.033***
(0.182) (0.257) (0.848) (1.268)
Net Worth 0.073*** 0.032 0.050 0.007
(0.014) (0.026) (0.032) (0.043)
Current Ratio 0.001 -0.007*** 0.000 -0.016
(0.001) (0.002) (0.006) (0.011)
Market-to-Book 0.019*** 0.022*** 0.061*** -0.038**
(0.001) (0.002) (0.010) (0.016)
Lagged covenant controls N N Y Y Y
Higher-order covenant controls N N N Y Y
Industry fixed effects Y Y Y Y Y
Year fixed effects Y Y Y Y Y
Rounded N 30,000 26,000 21,000 21,000 21,000
R2 0.02 0.12 0.11 0.11 0.32
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Table 3.3 Resource allocation and establishment industry focus
This table presents estimates of the within-firm impact of debt covenant violations on resource
allocation among establishments within the core and peripheral industry focus of the firm.
The unit of observation in each regression is an establishment-year pair. Core (peripheral)
establishments are establishments operating in three-digit SIC industries that account for more
than (less than) 25% of the firm’s total employment expenditures. The dependent variables in
columns [1] to [4] and [5] are the annual change in the (log) number of employees and a dummy
variable indicating whether an establishment is closed or not, respectively. A covenant violation
occurs when a firms reports a covenant violation in a SEC 10-K or 10-Q filing in the current
but not previous year. Establishment controls include age, the number of establishments, and
the number of establishments per segment. Industry fixed effects are based on establishments’
three-digit SIC codes. All variables are defined in Appendix A. Standard errors (in parentheses)
are clustered at the firm level. ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and
10% levels, respectively.
Dependent variable: ∆Log(Employment) Est. Closure
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5]
Covenant Violation × Core -0.027* -0.026* -0.048*** -0.049*** 0.013***
(0.015) (0.016) (0.018) (0.019) (0.001)
Covenant Violation × Peripheral -0.084*** -0.090*** -0.103*** -0.097*** 0.039***
(0.036) (0.035) (0.040) (0.038) (0.002)
Establishment controls Y Y Y Y Y
Covenant controls N Y Y Y Y
Lagged covenant controls N N Y Y Y
Higher-order covenant controls N N N Y Y
Firm fixed effects Y Y Y Y Y
Industry × state × year fixed effects Y Y Y Y Y
Rounded N 3,000,000 2,500,000 2,000,000 2,000,000 2,000,000
R2 0.13 0.14 0.15 0.15 0.14
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Table 3.4 Robustness checks for the analysis of establishment industry focus
This table presents robustness checks for the estimates of the within-firm impact of debt covenant
violations on resource allocation among establishments based on alternative classifications of
establishments’ industry focus. The unit of observation in each regression is an establishment-year
pair. Columns [1] and [2] define peripheral establishments as establishments operating in four-digit
SIC industries accounting for less than 25% of the firm’s total employment expenditures. In
columns [3] and [4], they are establishments operating in three-digit SIC industries that account for
less than 50% of these expenditures. The dependent variables in columns [1] and [3], and [2] and [4]
are annual change in the (log) number of employees, and a dummy variable indicating whether the
establishment is closed, respectively. A covenant violation occurs when a firm reports a covenant
violation in a SEC 10-K or 10-Q filing in the current but not previous year. Establishment
controls include age, the number of establishments, and the number of establishments per segment.
Industry fixed effects are based on establishments’ three-digit SIC codes. All variables are defined
in Appendix A. Standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered at the firm level. ***, **, and *
denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
Alternative measurement: Four-digit SIC 50% cutoff
Dependent variable: ∆Log(Emp.) Est. Closure ∆Log(Emp.) Est. Closure
[1] [2] [3] [4]
Covenant Violation × Core -0.048*** 0.013*** -0.050*** 0.012***
(0.018) (0.001) (0.019) (0.001)
Covenant Violation × Peripheral -0.094*** 0.036*** -0.085*** 0.031***
(0.034) (0.002) (0.033) (0.001)
Establishment controls Y Y Y Y
Covenant controls Y Y Y Y
Lagged covenant controls Y Y Y Y
Higher-order covenant controls Y Y Y Y
Firm fixed effects Y Y Y Y
Industry × state × year fixed effects Y Y Y Y
Rounded N 2,000,000 2,000,000 2,000,000 2,000,000





















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 3.6 Establishment productivity and investment
This table presents estimates of the within-firm impact of debt covenant violations on resource
allocation among productive and unproductive manufacturing establishments. The unit of observa-
tion in each regression is an establishment-year pair. The dependent variable the annual change in
investment given by establishment-level capital expenditures over capital stock. In columns [1] to
[4] each establishment is classified as productive or unproductive depending on its within-firm total
factor productivity (TFP) ranking. An establishment is considered productive (unproductive) if
its corresponding TFP rank is above (below) the median TFP of the establishments belonging to
the firm in a given year. Column [5] uses the within-industry total factor productivity to rank
establishments. Column [6] uses return on capital to measure capital productivity. A covenant
violation occurs when a firm reports a covenant violation in a SEC 10-K or 10-Q filing in the
current but not previous year. Establishment controls include age, the number of establishments,
and the number of establishments per segment. Industry fixed effects are based on establishments’
three-digit SIC codes. All variables are defined in Appendix A. Standard errors (in parentheses)
are clustered at the firm level. ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and
10% levels, respectively.
Dependent variable: ∆Investment Rate
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6]
Covenant Violation × Productive -0.004 0.006 0.006 0.004 0.007 -0.002
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007)
Covenant Violation × Unproductive -0.027*** -0.020*** -0.022*** -0.024*** -0.022*** -0.015**
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.008) (0.007)
Establishment controls Y Y Y Y Y Y
Covenant controls N Y Y Y Y Y
Lagged covenant controls N N Y Y Y Y
Higher-order covenant controls N N N Y Y Y
Firm fixed effects Y Y Y Y Y Y
Industry × state × year fixed effects Y Y Y Y Y Y
Rounded N 70,000 60,000 50,000 50,000 50,000 50,000
R2 0.25 0.26 0.26 0.26 0.26 0.26
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Table 3.7 Interaction between establishment industry focus and productivity
This table presents estimates of how the within-firm impact of debt covenant violations on
resource allocation among establishments within the core and peripheral industry focus of the
firm interacts with establishment productivity. The sample is restricted to manufacturing firms.
The unit of observation in each regression is an establishment-year pair. Core (peripheral)
establishments are establishments operating in three-digit SIC industries that account for more
than (less than) 25% of the firm’s total employment expenditures. The dependent variables in
columns [1] to [3] and [4] to [6] are the annual change in the (log) number of employees and a
dummy variable indicating whether an establishment is closed or not, respectively. In columns
[2] and [5] ([3] and [6]) each establishment is classified as productive or unproductive depending
on its within-firm (within-three-digit SIC industry) total factor productivity (TFP) ranking. An
establishment is considered productive if its corresponding TFP rank is above the median TFP of
the establishments belonging to the firm (industry) in a given year, and unproductive otherwise.
A covenant violation occurs when a firms reports a covenant violation in a SEC 10-K or 10-Q
filing in the current but not previous year. Establishment controls include age, the number of
establishments, and the number of establishments per segment. Industry fixed effects are based on
establishments’ three-digit SIC codes. All variables are defined in Appendix A. Standard errors
(in parentheses) are clustered at the firm level. ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the
1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
Dependent variable: ∆Log(Employment) Establishment Closure
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6]
Covenant Violation × Core -0.065** 0.015***
(0.031) (0.006)
Covenant Violation × Peripheral -0.136*** 0.027**
(0.040) (0.011)
Covenant Violation × Core × Productive -0.028 -0.003 0.010 0.006
(0.033) (0.031) (0.007) (0.009)
Covenant Violation × Core × Unproductive -0.108** -0.119** 0.022** 0.022***
(0.044) (0.053) (0.009) (0.008)
Covenant Violation × Peripheral × Productive -0.069 -0.045 0.023 0.014
(0.066) (0.054) (0.018) (0.018)
Covenant Violation × Peripheral × Unproductive -0.225*** -0.215** 0.035** 0.038**
(0.077) (0.097) (0.018) (0.018)
Establishment controls Y Y Y Y Y Y
Covenant controls Y Y Y Y Y Y
Lagged covenant controls Y Y Y Y Y Y
Higher-order covenant controls Y Y Y Y Y Y
Firm fixed effects Y Y Y Y Y Y
Industry × state × year fixed effects Y Y Y Y Y Y
Rounded N 50,000 50,000 50,000 60,000 60,000 60,000






































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Panel B: Establisment closure
Dependent variable: Establishment Closure
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8]
Covenant Violation × Safe 0.006 0.003 0.003 0.002 0.006 0.014* 0.013* 0.015**
(0.008) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.007) (0.007) (0.006)
Covenant Violation × Risky 0.031*** 0.028*** 0.025*** 0.024*** 0.026*** 0.024*** 0.026*** 0.025***
(0.006) (0.006) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.008) (0.008) (0.009)
Establishment controls Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Covenant controls N Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Lagged covenant controls N N Y Y Y Y Y Y
Higher-order covenant controls N N N Y Y Y Y Y
Firm fixed effects Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Industry × state × year fixed effects Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Rounded N 100,000 80,000 60,000 60,000 60,000 60,000 60,000 60,000
R2 0.27 0.29 0.32 0.32 0.32 0.32 0.32 0.32
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Table 3.9 Interaction between establishment productivity and operating risk
This table presents estimates of how the within-firm impact of debt covenant violations on resource
allocation among establishments with varying productivity interacts with operating risk. The
sample is restricted to manufacturing firms. The unit of observation in each regression is an
establishment-year pair. In panel A the dependent variable is the annual change in the (log)
number of employees and in panel B it is a dummy variable indicating whether the establishment
is closed. In columns [1] to [5] ([6]) each establishment is classified as productive or unproductive
depending on its within-firm (within-three-digit SIC industry) total factor productivity (TFP)
ranking. An establishment is considered productive if its corresponding TFP rank is above
the median TFP of the establishments belonging to the firm (industry) in a given year, and
unproductive otherwise. In column [1] each establishment is classified as safe or risky depending
on the cross-sectional standard deviation of operating margins across Census establishments in the
same three-digit SIC code. Operating margins are calculated as the total value of shipments minus
all input costs divided by the value of shipments made by the establishment. An establishment
is considered safe (risky) if its corresponding industry standard deviation of operating margins is
below (above) the median of all industries in a given year. Column [2] classifies establishments as
safe or risky instead based on the cross-sectional standard deviation of operating margins across
Compustat firms at the three-digit SIC code level. Column [3] ([4]) uses the time-series standard
deviation of the average industry operating margin at the three-digit SIC level based on Compustat
firms using 5 (10) years of data. Column [5] uses the time-series standard deviation of the average
industry ratio of operating cash flows to assets at the three-digit SIC level based on Compustat
firms using 5 years of data. A covenant violation occurs when a firm reports a covenant violation
in a SEC 10-K or 10-Q filing in the current but not previous year. Establishment controls include
age, the number of establishments, and the number of establishments per segment. Industry fixed
effects are based on establishments’ three-digit SIC codes. All variables are defined in Appendix
A. Standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered at the firm level. ***, **, and * denote statistical
significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
Panel A: Employment
Dependent variable: ∆Log(Employment)
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6]
Covenant Violation × Productive × Safe 0.071 0.011 -0.002 -0.008 -0.016 0.019
(0.068) (0.052) (0.048) (0.044) (0.045) (0.076)
Covenant Violation × Productive × Risky -0.080 -0.067 -0.095 -0.082 -0.099 -0.025
(0.051) (0.054) (0.061) (0.056) (0.063) (0.049)
Covenant Violation × Unproductive × Safe -0.086 -0.105 -0.065 -0.061 -0.099* -0.027
(0.086) (0.071) (0.055) (0.055) (0.055) (0.096)
Covenant Violation × Unproductive × Risky -0.162*** -0.166*** -0.234*** -0.237*** -0.220*** -0.185***
(0.063) (0.059) (0.077) (0.070) (0.083) (0.055)
Establishment controls Y Y Y Y Y Y
Covenant controls Y Y Y Y Y Y
Lagged covenant controls Y Y Y Y Y Y
Higher-order covenant controls Y Y Y Y Y Y
Firm fixed effects Y Y Y Y Y Y
Industry × state × year fixed effects Y Y Y Y Y Y
Rounded N 50,000 50,000 50,000 50,000 50,000 50,000
R2 0.34 0.34 0.34 0.34 0.34 0.34
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Table 3.9 (con’t.)
Panel B: Establishment closure
Dependent variable: Establishment Closure
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6]
Covenant Violation × Productive × Safe -0.012 -0.002 0.010 0.010 0.009 -0.003
(0.013) (0.011) (0.009) (0.009) (0.008) (0.015)
Covenant Violation × Productive × Risky 0.022** 0.021** 0.017 0.016 0.020* 0.013
(0.009) (0.009) (0.011) (0.011) (0.012) (0.010)
Covenant Violation × Unproductive × Safe 0.018 0.014 0.020* 0.015 0.022** 0.007
(0.017) (0.012) (0.011) (0.010) (0.010) (0.016)
Covenant Violation × Unproductive × Risky 0.026*** 0.031*** 0.030** 0.037*** 0.030** 0.033***
(0.010) (0.011) (0.013) (0.012) (0.015) (0.010)
Establishment controls Y Y Y Y Y Y
Covenant controls Y Y Y Y Y Y
Lagged covenant controls Y Y Y Y Y Y
Higher-order covenant controls Y Y Y Y Y Y
Firm fixed effects Y Y Y Y Y Y
Industry × state × year fixed effects Y Y Y Y Y Y
Rounded N 60,000 60,000 60,000 60,000 60,000 60,000
R2 0.32 0.32 0.32 0.32 0.32 0.32
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Table 3.10 Cross-sectional heterogeneity: Borrower characteristics
This table presents estimates of how the within-firm impact of debt covenant violations on resource
allocation among establishments with varying borrower and industry characteristics. The sample
is restricted to manufacturing firms. The unit of observation in each regression is an establishment-
year pair. Panel A and B examine borrowers’ industry competition and credit rating status, re-
spectively. In columns [1] to [3] and [4] to [6] the dependent variables are the annual change in the
(log) number of employees and a dummy variable indicating whether the establishment is closed,
respectively. Core (peripheral) establishments are establishments operating in three-digit SIC in-
dustries that account for more than (less than) 25% of the firm’s total employment expenditures.
An establishment is considered productive if its within-firm total factor productivity (TFP) rank
is above the median TFP of the establishments belonging to the firm in a given year, and unpro-
ductive otherwise. An establishment is considered safe (risky) if its industry standard deviation of
operating margins is below (above) the median of all industries in a given year. An establishment
operates in an uncompetitive industry if its industry Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) is above-
median. A borrower is unrated if it does not have an S&P Long-Term Domestic Issuer Credit
Rating. A covenant violation occurs when a firm reports a covenant violation in a SEC 10-K or
10-Q filing in the current but not previous year. Establishment controls include age, the number
of establishments, and the number of establishments per segment. Industry fixed effects are based
on establishments’ three-digit SIC codes. All variables are defined in Appendix A. Standard errors
(in parentheses) are clustered at the firm level. ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the
1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
Panel A: Borrower industry competition
Dependent variable: ∆Log(Employment) Establishment Closure
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6]
Covenant Violation × Core -0.048 0.012
(0.040) (0.008)
Covenant Violation × Core × Uncompetitive -0.109* 0.011
(0.060) (0.013)
Covenant Violation × Peripheral -0.022 0.023
(0.075) (0.016)
Covenant Violation × Peripheral × Uncompetitive -0.310*** 0.059**
(0.131) (0.024)
Covenant Violation × Productive 0.005 0.012
(0.051) (0.010)
Covenant Violation × Productive × Uncompetitive -0.055 0.001
(0.076) (0.016)
Covenant Violation × Unproductive -0.085* 0.017*
(0.050) (0.009)
Covenant Violation × Unproductive × Uncompetitive -0.263*** 0.042***
(0.077) (0.014)
Covenant Violation × Safe -0.038 0.015
(0.050) (0.011)
Covenant Violation × Safe × Uncompetitive -0.057 -0.013
(0.078) (0.014)
Covenant Violation × Risky -0.046 0.015*
(0.050) (0.008)
Covenant Violation × Risky × Uncompetitive -0.247*** 0.050***
(0.087) (0.016)
Establishment controls Y Y Y Y Y Y
Covenant controls Y Y Y Y Y Y
Lagged covenant controls Y Y Y Y Y Y
Higher-order covenant controls Y Y Y Y Y Y
Firm fixed effects Y Y Y Y Y Y
Industry × state × year fixed effects Y Y Y Y Y Y
Rounded N 50,000 50,000 50,000 60,000 60,000 60,000
R2 0.34 0.34 0.34 0.29 0.32 0.32
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Table 3.10 (con’t.)
Panel B: Borrower credit rating status
Dependent variable: ∆Log(Employment) Establishment Closure
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6]
Covenant Violation × Core -0.052 0.011
(0.049) (0.009)
Covenant Violation × Core × Unrated -0.051 0.010
(0.039) (0.008)
Covenant Violation × Peripheral -0.074 0.024
(0.119) (0.026)
Covenant Violation × Peripheral × Unrated -0.217** 0.048***
(0.091) (0.016)
Covenant Violation × Productive -0.047 0.004
(0.072) (0.015)
Covenant Violation × Productive × Unrated -0.005 0.005
(0.062) (0.010)
Covenant Violation × Unproductive -0.062 0.018
(0.097) (0.012)
Covenant Violation × Unproductive × Unrated -0.199*** 0.033***
(0.071) (0.011)
Covenant Violation × Safe -0.029 0.011
(0.067) (0.026)
Covenant Violation × Safe × Unrated 0.002 0.000
(0.037) (0.011)
Covenant Violation × Risky -0.064 0.014
(0.046) (0.009)
Covenant Violation × Risky × Unrated -0.156*** 0.032***
(0.050) (0.012)
Establishment controls Y Y Y Y Y Y
Covenant controls Y Y Y Y Y Y
Lagged covenant controls Y Y Y Y Y Y
Higher-order covenant controls Y Y Y Y Y Y
Firm fixed effects Y Y Y Y Y Y
Industry × state × year fixed effects Y Y Y Y Y Y
Rounded N 50,000 50,000 50,000 60,000 60,000 60,000
R2 0.32 0.33 0.32 0.29 0.29 0.29
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Table 3.11 Cross-sectional heterogeneity: Role of lender industry experience
This table presents estimates of how the within-firm impact of debt covenant violations on resource
allocation among establishments with varying lead lender experience. The sample is restricted
to manufacturing firms. The unit of observation in each regression is an establishment-year pair.
Panel A and B examine lenders’ industry experience defined according to whether the borrower’s
lead lender lends to other firms in the same industry or if they have a significant (above-median)
market share of lending to the borrower’s industry or not, respectively. If a borrower has multiple
lead lenders then the lead bank arranging the most amount of credit in dollar terms is selected. In
columns [1] to [3] and [4] to [6] the dependent variables are the annual change in the (log) number of
employees and a dummy variable indicating whether the establishment is closed, respectively. Core
(peripheral) establishments are establishments operating in three-digit SIC industries that account
for more than (less than) 25% of the firm’s total employment expenditures. An establishment is
considered productive if its within-firm total factor productivity (TFP) rank is above the median
TFP of the establishments belonging to the firm in a given year, and unproductive otherwise. An
establishment is considered safe (risky) if its industry standard deviation of operating margins is
below (above) the median of all industries in a given year. A covenant violation occurs when a
firm reports a covenant violation in a SEC 10-K or 10-Q filing in the current but not previous year.
Establishment controls include age, the number of establishments, and the number of establishments
per segment. Industry fixed effects are based on establishments’ three-digit SIC codes. All variables
are defined in Appendix A. Standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered at the firm level. ***,
**, and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
Panel A: Lead arranger industry experience
Dependent variable: ∆Log(Employment) Establishment Closure
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6]
Covenant Violation × Core -0.010 -0.009
(0.076) (0.020)
Covenant Violation × Core × Industry Experience -0.073* 0.009
(0.044) (0.010)
Covenant Violation × Peripheral 0.016 -0.005
(0.083) (0.028)
Covenant Violation × Peripheral × Industry Experience -0.157*** 0.038***
(0.037) (0.012)
Covenant Violation × Productive 0.059 -0.024
(0.118) (0.027)
Covenant Violation × Productive × Industry Experience -0.066 0.009
(0.048) (0.011)
Covenant Violation × Unproductive -0.054 0.003
(0.059) (0.016)
Covenant Violation × Unproductive × Industry Experience -0.158** 0.030***
(0.045) (0.011)
Covenant Violation × Safe -0.017 -0.014
(0.077) (0.015)
Covenant Violation × Safe × Industry Experience -0.035 0.004
(0.049) (0.011)
Covenant Violation × Risky 0.019 -0.004
(0.096) (0.025)
Covenant Violation × Risky × Industry Experience -0.152*** 0.032***
(0.050) (0.011)
Establishment controls Y Y Y Y Y Y
Covenant controls Y Y Y Y Y Y
Lagged covenant controls Y Y Y Y Y Y
Higher-order covenant controls Y Y Y Y Y Y
Firm fixed effects Y Y Y Y Y Y
Industry × state × year fixed effects Y Y Y Y Y Y
Rounded N 40,000 40,000 40,000 40,000 40,000 40,000
R2 0.33 0.35 0.35 0.31 0.31 0.34
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Table 3.11 (con’t.)
Panel B: Lead arranger market share
Dependent variable: ∆Log(Employment) Establishment Closure
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6]
Covenant Violation × Core 0.021 -0.006
(0.114) (0.023)
Covenant Violation × Core × High Share -0.069 0.011
(0.043) (0.009)
Covenant Violation × Peripheral -0.009 -0.017
(0.137) (0.028)
Covenant Violation × Peripheral × High Share -0.140*** 0.031***
(0.049) (0.009)
Covenant Violation × Productive -0.000 0.002
(0.118) (0.032)
Covenant Violation × Productive × High Share -0.057 0.013
(0.042) (0.009)
Covenant Violation × Unproductive 0.043 -0.022
(0.100) (0.026)
Covenant Violation × Unproductive × High Share -0.157*** 0.026***
(0.042) (0.009)
Covenant Violation × Safe 0.026 0.041
(0.125) (0.032)
Covenant Violation × Safe × High Share -0.038 0.004
(0.043) (0.010)
Covenant Violation × Risky 0.012 0.005
(0.110) (0.029)
Covenant Violation × Risky × High Share -0.141*** 0.028***
(0.047) (0.010)
Establishment controls Y Y Y Y Y Y
Covenant controls Y Y Y Y Y Y
Lagged covenant controls Y Y Y Y Y Y
Higher-order covenant controls Y Y Y Y Y Y
Firm fixed effects Y Y Y Y Y Y
Industry × state × year fixed effects Y Y Y Y Y Y
Rounded N 40,000 40,000 40,000 40,000 40,000 40,000




A.1. Variable Definitions for Chapter 2
ARL: Indicator variable if firm is headquartered in a treated state between 1997 and 2001
or incorporated in a treated state between 1997 and 2003
Total Factor Productivity : Establishment-level log total factor productivity computed fol-
lowing Foster et al. (2014)
Labor Productivity : Sales minus material and energy costs divided by plant-level total hours
Return on Capital : Sales minus material and energy costs and payroll divided by plant-level
capital stock
Capital Stock : Sum of structures and equipment calculated using perpetual inventory method
Size: Natural logarithm of the plant’s value of shipments
Age: Number of years since the first year the plant first appears in the LBD
Number of Plants : The total number of plants of the parent firm
New Machinery Investment : New machinery expenditures divided by plant-level capital
stock
Computer Investment : Capital expenditures for computers divided by plant-level capital
stock
Total Payroll : Total amount of wages and salaries paid
Production Workers’ Payroll : Total amount of wages and salaries paid to production work-
ers
Employees : Number of employees working in the plant
Total Hours : Total production worker hours times total wage bills divided by wage bills for
production workers
Sales : Natural logarithm of sales (sale)
Profitability : Operating income before depreciation (oibdp) minus depreciation and amorti-
zation (dp) divided by total assets (at)
Tobin’s Q : Number of common stocks (csho) times end of year closing price (prcc) plus total
assets (at) minus common equity (ceq) minus deferred taxes (txdb) divided by total assets
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(at)
Tangibility : Property, plant, and equipment (ppent) divided by total assets (at) t
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A.2. Variable Definitions for Chapter 3
∆Log(Employment): Annual change in the natural logarithm of number of employees summed
across establishments
∆Log(Payroll): Annual change in the natural logarithm of payroll summed across establish-
ments
Symmetric Employment Growth: Twice the annual change in total employees over the sum
of current and lagged employment
∆Employees/Average Assets : Annual change in the number of employees divided by the
average of current and lagged book assets
∆Payroll/Average Assets : Annual change in payroll divided by the average of current and
lagged book assets
Establishment Closure: Indicator variable equal to one if the firm closes any establishment
in the current year
Covenant Violation: Indicator variable equal to one if the firm violates a covenant in the
current but not previous year
New Capital Expenditure Restriction: Indicator variable equal to one if the new contract
contains a capital expenditure restriction and the previous contract for the same borrower
does not
Old Capital Expenditure Restriction: Indicator variable equal to one if the new contract
contains a capital expenditure restriction
Operating Cash Flow : Operating income before depreciation divided by average assets
Leverage: Sum of debt in current liabilities and long-term debt divided by total assets
Interest Expense: Interest expense divided by average assets
Net Worth: Stockholders equity divided by total assets
Current Ratio: Current assets divided by current liabilities
Market-to-Book : Market value of equity minus book equity (adjusted for deferred taxes)
divided by total asets
∆Log(Employment): Annual change in the establishment-level natural logarithm of number
of employees
∆Investment Rate: Annual change in establishment-level capital expenditures divided by
capital stock
Establishment Closure: Indicator variable equal to one if the establishment is closed
Covenant Violation: Indicator variable equal to one if the parent firm had a covenant viola-
tion in the current but not previous year
Age: Number of years since the first year the establishment first appears in the LBD
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Establishments per Firm: The total number of establishments of the parent firm
Establishments per Segment : The average number of establishments per three-digit industry
segment of the parent firm
Core: Establishment operates in three-digit SIC industry containing at least 25% of firm
employment
Total Factor Productivity : Establishment-level log total factor productivity computed fol-
lowing Foster et al. (2013)
Labor Productivity : Average wage defined as payroll divided by number of employees
Labor Productivity (Alt. 1): Value-added per labor hour defined as sales minus materials
and energy costs divided labor hours
Labor Productivity (Alt. 2): Output divided by total labor hours
Labor Productivity (Alt. 3): Wage per hour defined as payroll divided by total labor hours
Return on Capital : Sales minus material and energy costs and payroll divided by establishment-
level capital stock
Operating Risk : Cross-sectional volatility of establishment operating margins at three-digit
SIC code level
Operating Risk (Alt. 1): Cross-sectional volatility of firm operating margins at the three-
digit SIC code level
Operating Risk (Alt. 2): 5-year time-series volatility of average industry operating margin
at the three-digit SIC level
Operating Risk (Alt. 3): 10-year time-series volatility of average industry operating margin
at the three-digit SIC level
Operating Risk (Alt. 4): 5-year time-series volatility of average industry ratio of operating
cash flows to assets at the three-digit SIC level
Operating Risk (Alt. 5): Cross-sectional volatility of establishment return on capital at




B.1. Fraudulent Transfer Law
B.1.1. Small Business Failure
Although business failure is often synonymous with bankruptcy, bankruptcy is a distinct
legal process that is governed in the United States by federal code. This code is divided into
several chapters that relate to different types of bankrupt entities.1 While Chapter 7 relates
to both small businesses as well as individuals wishing to liquidate substantially all of their
assets, sole proprietors are often given the option to undergo either Chapter 11 or Chapter 13
proceedings if they hope to reorganize. Partnerships, LLCs, and corporations are not given
the option of filing for Chapter 13. Because Chapter 11 is costlier, most sole proprietors
that file for bankruptcy choose to file for Chapter 13, although eligibility is dictated by size
restrictions on debt.2
Bankruptcy is not the only option for entrepreneurs, however. Because of filing fees, legal
fees, long bankruptcy durations, loss of control over business operations, the automatic stay,
and other indirect costs associated with bankruptcy, both debtors and creditors of small
businesses often prefer to avoid bankruptcy if possible.3 Morrison (2008, 2009) provides
a comprehensive overview of the small business decision whether to file for bankruptcy or
cease operations based on other means when faced with insolvency. Using data from 2004
until 2006, these studies show that federal bankruptcy filings were only between 3 and 4
percent of business closures that took place among indebted businesses. When limited to
businesses that closed while financially distressed based on the Dun & Bradstreet financial
1Chapter 7 concerns asset liquidation, Chapter 9 the reorganization of municipalities, Chapter 11 complex
reorganizations (generally of businesses), Chapter 12 reorganizations of family farms or fishermen, Chapter
13 reorganization for individuals, and Chapter 15 cross-border insolvency.
2Currently, individuals with more than $383,175 in unsecured claims and $1,149,525 in se-
cured claims may not file for Chapter 13 bankruptcy; see www.nolo.com/legal-encyclopedia/
chapter-13-chapter-11-bankruptcy-small-business-owners.html.
3Creditors may force debtors into involuntary bankruptcy, but this is not common in practice. Rather,
it can be used as a bargaining chip for debtors in a private workout.
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distress score, the ratio of failing firms filing for bankruptcy jumps to between 10 and 13
percent for non-corporations and between 21 and 22 percent for corporations. Even based
on stringent definitions, though, the majority of insolvent businesses liquidate or reorganize
without filing for federal bankruptcy.
What are the alternatives to bankruptcy? The procedures in place typically derive from
the laws of contracts, trusts, and secured lending, which are enforced in state courts based
on each state’s judicial organizational structure. The friendliest option is a private workout
that avoids courts altogether. These agreements rely on the debtor’s ability to arrange for a
plan of asset distribution in a way that satisfies all parties involved. Another option, at least
for secured creditors, is to step in and foreclose on any assets in which they have a security
interest. They may do so based on state laws set forth in the Uniform Commercial Code. If
these actions are taken by secured creditors without impediments by debtors or unsecured
creditors, then the process is known as a friendly foreclosure. Alternatively, if a business
owner wishes to continue operations, similar to a restructuring under Chapter 11 of the
Bankruptcy Code, then he has the option of undergoing a procedure called an “assignment
for benefit of creditors” or ABC. In this case, a trustee receives the assets of the business
and holds an auction.4 Proceeds go toward the secured debt holders, unsecured debt holders
receive nothing if the secured claimants are not made whole, and the old business ceases to
exist as a legal entity. Often, though, the former business owner is able to repurchase most
of the assets of the business and establish a new entity.
In any of these situations, aggrieved parties may attempt to delay proceedings or receive
higher distributions by bringing suit against another party in state court. One course of
action, also used frequently in bankruptcy proceedings, is referred to as an avoidance, and
takes place when a previous transaction carried out by the business is undone. Transactions
found to be fraudulent—the subject of this paper—are one example of commonly sought
avoidances. Preferential transfers, or transfers to a junior class of claim holders or to an
equivalent class of claim holders in a way that is not pro rata, are also an important feature
of fraudulent transfer law.
B.1.2. Organizational Structure and Personal Wealth Protection
There are two important features that govern the interactions between a business owner
and outside agents: the establishment of the business as a separate legal entity and the
4The details of these auctions vary by state. Trustees are not often required to go to great lengths to
publicize these auctions, and the business owner may be able to reclaim the business physical assets as the
sole bidder in the auction.
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protection of the owner from unlimited liability. The line is generally drawn between sole
proprietorships, which are not separate legal entities from the individual owner and do
not protect the owner from unlimited liability, and limited liability companies (LLCs) or
corporations, which stand on their own as legal entities and offer the owner limited liability
protection.5 The liability status of partnerships depends on whether the partnership is a
limited liability partnership (LLP) or a limited partnership (LP), the latter of which may
involve general partners who are not protected by limited liability. According to the U.S.
Small Business Administration, 72.1 percent of businesses are sole proprietorships, while
18.5 percent are corporations (including S types). Furthermore, 79.9 percent of businesses
do not officially retain any employees other than the owner-manager, and 52 percent are
home-based.
In addition to separate legal status and limited liability protection, simplicity is a key
factor in corporate organization. In order to technically register as a sole proprietorship,
owners in most states only need to obtain local licenses at the time of business formation.6
These licenses are usually easy to obtain, inexpensive, and do not require annual updates. In
addition, assets of the business owner are commingled with personal assets, and so it is not
necessary to keep separate records. Conversely, LLCs and corporations are more costly and
complicated to establish and keep track of. Business owners must pay not only organizational
formation fees, but also filing fees and annual state fees. Even though income from LLCs
and S corporations may pass through to the business owners for taxation purposes, record-
keeping is more complicated because these business forms have their own legal identities.
Regardless of organizational structure, there is only a fine line for most small businesses
between personal assets and business assets. Even for businesses with limited liability pro-
tection, owners often utilize their own wealth as startup capital by transferring titles of assets
to the business. They also facilitate external borrowing by providing personal guarantees.
Owners continually have to decide whether to reinvest profits into the business or withdraw
cash in the form of salary or dividend payments. Because of this, asset protection has become
a key component of small business planning.
Exemption planning and strategic transfers are the two main tenets of asset protection
planning. The relative importance of these strategies depends on the business’s organi-
zational form. For proprietorships, the first line of defense is to make full use of state
5LLCs may have an unlimited number of shareholders and can make disproportionate distributions to
these investors, while S corporations are limited to 100 shareholders and distributions must be pro rata.
Otherwise, these two structures are very similar.
6Technically, any freelance income qualifies the earner as a sole proprietor. In general, it is not necessary
to take any formal action to register as a sole proprietorship. Various types of business, however, require
licenses and permits.
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asset exemption laws. For businesses in states with paltry exemptions, or medium-sized
businesses that involve assets that are significantly greater than the exemption threshold,
strategic transfers play a more important role. Personal assets that have been transferred to
a limited liability structure very rarely qualify for exemptions, and so transfers play a more
important role in protecting the assets of LLC or corporation owners.
Each state has its own set of rules governing exemptions that protect certain core per-
sonal assets from seizure by creditors. The homestead exemption is the most well known of
these, followed by personal property exemptions.7,8 Other exemptions include pension and
retirement benefits, insurance, tools of trade, earned but unpaid wages, and public compen-
sation benefits such as Social Security. Some states even offer wildcards for any other type
of personal property not covered, usually up to a small amount.
Other than direct exemptions, the primary tool that small business owners may use to
protect personal property from creditors is through strategic funding, or transfers of assets
into and out of the business. For businesses that are not protected by limited liability, this
may involve the transfer of assets into trusts or to other individuals. Domestic asset protec-
tion trusts (DAPTs) are a form of wealth protection that shield assets from creditors but
also allow the transferor to be the beneficiary of the trust. They are legal in fourteen juris-
dictions, but transfers of business assets into DAPTs have not received favorable treatment
in insolvency proceedings. Offshore trusts used to be a popular form of asset protection,
but have fallen out of favor more recently following several notorious cases.9 Alternatively,
an individual providing a personal guarantee for a business debt may still legally transfer
his home to his spouse and shield it from creditors provided that the spouse is not liable
to those creditors and the transfer does not qualify as fraudulent, as discussed in the Legal
Appendix.
For LLC or corporation owners, protecting assets involves legally transferring them from
the business to the individual. Cash may be withdrawn in the form of salary, dividend,
and personal loan payments. Owner-managers are given the flexibility to determine their
salaries, although how much they are able to pay is often governed by external factors.10 The
7Personal property exemptions are often further itemized, and limits are applied to each category, ranging
from motor vehicles to burial plots.
8Agarwal et al. (2005) finds that states with higher homestead exemptions are associated with higher
bankruptcy rates, while Fan and White (2003) identify a positive but insignificant relationship between high
exemption states and the likelihood that financially troubled businesses are shut down.
9After filing for bankruptcy in 1997, Stephen J. Lawrence, founder of a derivatives trading firm, was found
in contempt of court for establishing offshore asset protection trusts and served several years in jail. In 1999,
Michael and Denyse Anderson were also found in contempt of court after refusing to repatriate funds kept
in an offshore trust, and each spent six months in jail.
10Corporations, for example, must pay an additional employment tax on salaries distributed to owners,
therefore incentivizing distribution through dividends. This tax is levied on earnings of an LLC regardless
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IRS limits distributions in the form of salary, however, and usually bases its assessment of
reasonable compensation to owner-managers on gross receipts, comparable businesses, and
payments to non-shareholder employees. Salary payments in excess of the acceptable limit
are treated as dividends. Real property may also be transferred from a business entity to an
individual through a quitclaim deed. Finally, owners may strategically withdraw cash from
LLCs or corporations by giving preference to personal loans made to the business or external




The section below is from Texas and Louisiana Uniform Commercial Code (U.C.C.).
Section 9-109. Scope
(e) The application of this chapter to the sale of accounts, chattel paper, payment intan-
gibles, or promissory notes is not to recharacterize that sale as a transaction to secure
indebtedness but to protect purchasers of those assets by providing a notice filing sys-
tem. For all purposes, in the absence of fraud or intentional misrepresentation, the
parties’ characterization of a transaction as a sale of such assets shall be conclusive
that the transaction is a sale and is not a secured transaction and that title, legal
and equitable, has passed to the party characterized as the purchaser of those assets
regardless of whether the secured party has any recourse against the debtor, whether
the debtor is entitled to any surplus, or any other term of the parties’ agreement.
Alabama
The section below are from the 2013 Code of Alabama.
Section 35-10A-1
This chapter may be referred to as the “Asset-Backed Securities Facilitation Act.” It is
intended by the Legislature that the term securitization transaction be construed broadly.




(a) Notwithstanding any other provision of law including, but not limited to, Section 7-9-
506 and Section 7-9A-623, to the extent set forth in the transaction documents relating
to a securitization transaction:
(1) Any property, assets, or rights purported to be transferred, in whole or in part, in
the securitization transaction shall be deemed to no longer be the property, assets, or
rights of the transferor;
(2) A transferor in the securitization transaction, its creditors or, in any insolvency pro-
ceeding with respect to the transferor or the transferor’s property, a bankruptcy trustee,
receiver, debtor, debtor in possession, or similar person, to the extent the issue is gov-
erned by Alabama law, shall have no rights, legal or equitable, whatsoever to reac-
quire, reclaim, recover, repudiate, disaffirm, redeem, or recharacterize as property of
the transferor any property, assets, or rights purported to be transferred, in whole or
in part, by the transferor; and
(3) In the event of a bankruptcy, receivership, or other insolvency proceeding with respect
to the transferor or the transferor’s property, to the extent the issue is governed by
Alabama law, such property, assets, and rights shall not be deemed to be part of the
transferor’s property, assets, rights, or estate.
(b) Nothing contained in this chapter shall be deemed to require any securitization trans-
action to be treated as a sale for federal or state tax purposes or to preclude the
treatment of any securitization transaction as debt for federal or state tax purposes
or to change any applicable laws relating to the perfection and priority of security
or ownership interests of persons other than the transferor, hypothetical lien creditor
or, in the event of a bankruptcy, receivership, or other insolvency proceeding with re-
spect to the transferor or its property, a bankruptcy trustee, receiver, debtor, debtor
in possession, or similar person
Section 35-10A-3
Any act which becomes effective after September 12, 2001, shall not be construed to amend
or repeal any provision of this chapter unless the subsequent act specifically references this
chapter and states that this chapter is repealed or states the manner in which this chapter
is to be amended. Without limiting the foregoing, Act 2001-481, 2001 Regular Session, does
not amend or repeal any provision of this chapter.
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B.2.2. Choice of Law Rules of Article 9 Uniform Commercial Code (U.C.C.)
1972 and 2002 versions of Uniform Commercial Codes (U.C.C.) are the relevant codes for
treatment states. Below is Chapter 3 of Section 9-103 of 1972 Official Text and Comments
of Article 9 Secured Transactions.
Section 9-103. Perfection of Security Interests in Multiple State Transactions
(3) Accounts, general intangibles and mobile goods.
(a) This subsection applies to accounts (other than an account described in subsec-
tion (5) on minerals) and general intangibles and to goods which are mobile and
which are of a type normally used in more than one jurisdiction, such as motor
vehicles, trailers, rolling stock, airplanes, shipping containers, road building and
construction machinery and commercial harvesting machinery and the like, if the
goods are equipment or are inventory leased or held for lease by the debtor to
others, and are not covered by a certificate of title described in subsection (2).
(b) The law (including the conflict of laws rules) of the jurisdiction in which the debtor
is located governs the perfection and the effect of perfection or non-perfection of
the security interest.
(c) If, however, the debtor is located in a jurisdiction which is not a part of the United
States, and which does not provide for perfection of the security interest by filing
or recording in that jurisdiction, the law of the jurisdiction in the United States
in which the debtor has its major executive office in the United States governs the
perfection and the effect of perfection or non-perfection of the security interest
through filing. In the alternative, if the debtor is located in a jurisdiction which
is not a part of the United States or Canada and the collateral is accounts or
general intangibles for money due or to become due, the security interest may
be perfected by notification to the account debtor. As used in the paragraph,
“United States” includes its territories and possessions and the Commonwealth
of Puerto Rico.
(d) A debtor shall be deemed located at this place of business if he has one,
at his chief executive office if he has more than ones place of business,
otherwise at this residence. If, however, the debtor is a foreign air carrier
under the Federal Aviation Act of 1958, as amended, it shall be deemed located
at the designated office of the agent upon whom service of process may be made
on behalf of the foreign air carrier.
Below is the official comment (e) for the section above.
(e) “Chief executive office” does not the mean the place of incorporation; it means the
place from which in fact the debtor manages the main part of his business operations.
This is the place where persons dealing with the debtor would normally look for credit
information, and is the appropriate place for filing.
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As seen above, the 1972 version of U.C.C. defines the debtor location to be the location
of the Chief Executive Office, which makes the the treatment state to be the state where
the headquarters is located. The official comment explicitly states that the Chief Executive
Office does not mean the place of incorporation. The 2002 version of U.C.C. changes the
location of debtor to be the state of incorporation for registered organizations, as stated
below.
Section 9-307. Location of Debtor
(a) “Place of business.”
In this section, “place of business” means a place where a debtor conducts its affairs.
(b) Debtor’s location: general rules.
Except as otherwise provided in this section, the following rules determine a debtor’s
location:
(1) A debtor who is an individual is located at the individual’s principal residence.
(2) A debtor that is an organization and has only one place of business is located at
its place of business.
(3) A debtor that is an organization and has more than one place of business is located
at its chief executive office.
(c) Limitation of applicability of subsection (b).
Subsection (b) applies only if a debtor’s residence, place of business, or chief executive
office, as applicable, is located in a jurisdiction whose law generally requires information
concerning the existence of a nonpossessory security interest to be made generally
available in a filing, recording, or registration system as a condition or result of the
security interest’s obtaining priority over the rights of a lien creditor with respect to
the collateral. If subsection (b) does not apply, the debtor is located in the District of
Columbia.
(d) Continuation of location: cessation of existence, etc.
A person that ceases to exist, have a residence, or have a place of business continues
to be located in the jurisdiction specified by subsections (b) and (c).
(e) Location of registered organization organized under State law.
A registered organization that is organized under the law of a State is located in that
State.
Section 9-102. Definitions and Index of Definitions
(70) “Registered organization” means an organization organized solely under the law of a
single State or the United States and as to which the State or the United States must
maintain a public record showing the organization to have been organized.
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